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“True happiness is to enjoy the present, without anxious dependence upon the future, not 
to amuse ourselves with either hopes or fears but to rest satisfied with what we have, which 
is sufficient, for he that is so wants nothing. The greatest blessings of mankind are within 
us and within our reach. A wise man is content with his lot, whatever it may be, without 
wishing for what he has not.” 
~Seneca 
 
 Pursuing a doctoral degree is an extraordinarily selfish exercise. You spend a great 
deal of time burning through the assistance and goodwill of your peers and colleagues as 
you stumble, oftentimes blindly, toward an end shrouded in uncertainty. It is difficult to 
complete this work without kind, though honest, professional mentors, much less the 
support of your friends and family. The modal experience of an academic is rejection, and, 
without the right support system, this endeavor is difficult and lonely. I was blessed, 
however, with a network of people who made this possible.  
 Jim Garand is an excellent tutor. Ever (sometimes frustratingly) optimistic, Jim’s 
training and friendship set the foundation for this achievement. He let me swim upriver on 
my own, yet was always willing to pull me out of unhappy waters when I floundered. 
Martin Johnson provided a serious and thoughtful voice to my training. This dissertation 
and my approach to research would poorer if not for his input. Matt Hitt has been like a 
brother to me. Although his stay was short in Baton Rouge, his friendship endures, as do 
his pleas for greater economy in my writing (he will, of course, not begrudge me in this 
instance). Bill Clark is the consummate bureaucrat (and friend). Bill encouraged me to 
submit the manuscript that would eventually turn into my first publication, and he was 
always willing to plug me into teaching when my requests to do so turned up tragically 
late. Mike Henderson, though a late addition to this group, is an excellent scholar and 
encouragement. Mike read through numerous drafts of my market materials (a laborious 
and boring task), and they were much better for it.  
Outside of these committee members, I am grateful for a close-knit group of 
colleagues and friends. Johanna Dunaway allowed me to partner with her very early on and 
taught me how to be a good coauthor. I often chafed at her preparedness and meticulous 




lesson. Chris Weber taught a seminar on political psychology that set the foundation for 
this dissertation. He is a master number cruncher and a better friend. He also introduced 
me to Lily Mason who, in turn, shared her love of sorting with me. Lily’s humor is wicked 
and her insights keen. I am thankful for her friendship—without it, this dissertation would 
likely be much different. Kirby Goidel and Brian Smentkowski are gentlemen and scholars. 
Without their humor and good cheer, I feel that I likely would have wound up in a 
sanatorium. Finally, Wayne Parent’s friendship has been dear to me. Wayne is an evergreen 
cheerleader who is always willing to grab a cup of coffee or lunch to listen to me bemoan 
the market wasteland. His generosity is matched only by his quick wit.  
 I am grateful to a number of non-academic co-laborers in this effort. My mother 
and father supported me (and us) through every step of the way. They knew when I was 
bored in elementary school and found a capable mentor in Dr. Parish, who took me under 
her tutelage. That kindness probably changed the trajectory of where a foolish boy with a 
short attention span would wind up. My mother and father-in-law kindly didn’t reject my 
(our) plan(s) to move from the beautiful, serine lakes of Minnesota to swampy Baton 
Rouge. Their willingness to travel to see us made the distance bearable, and John’s Monday 
morning phone calls kept me sane. Within this familial ecosystem, the love and support 
from my brothers and sisters has always been constant. Thank you Annie, Mark, Michael, 
Whitney, and Audra.  
Finally, there would be no dissertation without the love and support of my partner, 
Marybeth. Mare, you were way more adventurous than I could have imagined, and, in 
many respects, you made this dream possible. Thank you for enduring these six years. You 
put up with an embarrassing amount of bemoaning about how much I hated Reviewer 2, 
kept us financially sound working jobs you didn’t love while I spent my time reading and 
writing, and birthed and cared for Theodore with aplomb. Theo is our best work. 
The epigraph that anchors these acknowledgements is well-suited to describe my 
thoughts as I conclude this final stage. The future I envisioned at the outset of this process 
has yet to manifest. However, among the lessons learned these last six years, the sun will 
rise tomorrow in spite of disappointment (also, reviewer 2 is still a jerk). Life’s richness 






This dissertation is a story about the divisions that characterize the mass public. 
Specifically, it explores how Americans think about politics, and, in particular, how 
citizens connect their attitudes, beliefs, and, vitally, ideological identity to their partisan 
affiliation—a phenomenon known as sorting. Practically, this project proceeds in two parts. 
In Part 1, I investigate the nature of partisan sorting in the mass public. Chapter 2 reviews 
the extant scholarly literature regarding partisanship and ideology, or the raw materials of 
sorting. Drawing on this research, I operationalize two types of sorting in Chapter 3 and 
compare how different measurement protocols affect the characterization of public 
opinion. This distinction culminates in Chapter 4, which provides a series of empirical tests 
that justify partitioning sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs. 
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to the study of identity-based 
sorting. Chapter 5 takes up the question of why individuals’ identities converge and 
conveys that sorting is related to asymmetric perceptions of out-group dissimilarity rather 
than relative perceptions of between-group differences. Chapter 6 explores how this sorting 
affects compromise. I discover that, even in the absence of consistent policy preferences, 
identity sorting is sufficient to decrease an individual’s willingness to accept 
bipartisanship. Finally, Chapter 7 examines how identity sorting alters the decisional 
criteria that voters utilize to select political candidates. Here, I show that sorting produces 
a disconnect between the perceived and objective ideological congruence between voters 
and their preferred candidate. Sorting, then, is a sufficient condition for pushing citizens 
toward more extreme candidates—even when individuals’ issue preferences suggest that 
their “best” candidate is considerably more moderate.  
Taken as a whole, this dissertation both refines the extant logic of sorting and 
pushes this research into new territory. In demonstrating that identity-based sorting 
constitutes a unique and particularly powerful political phenomenon, I reveal why concern 
over the systematic coherency of mass opinion is, perhaps, misplaced. Instead, it is this 
identity sorting that contributes to the intemperate and polarized atmosphere that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Sort (sôrt) v. 1. To arrange systematically in groups; separate according to type, 
class, etc.  
-Oxford Dictionary 
 
“We are increasingly moving toward two entirely separate Americas, a liberal 





Americans are divided. Among the indicators that bear witness to the extent of their 
disunity, a sampling of recent headlines is particularly striking. The New York Times argues 
that “Polarization is dividing American society, not just politics.”2 The Washington Post 
writes that “Urban and rural America are becoming increasingly polarized.”3 Apparently, 
neither gastronomical fare, “Americans just as polarized on food as they are on politics,”4 
nor sports “Our polarized nation interprets one 84 Lumber Super Bowl ad two completely 
different ways,”5 have remained unsullied. Taking these divisions into account, the 
Scientific American aptly titles this state of affairs, “The hyper-polarization of America.”6  
 The election of Donald J. Trump to the United States Presidency has amplified 
these divisions—indeed, for only the fourth time in the country’s history, the results of the 
popular vote didn’t match the Electoral College one. Yet, while Time Magazine’s byline 
for their annual “Person of the Year” story captures this milieu, describing Donald Trump 
as “President-elect of the divided States of America,” what do these divisions really 
portend?7 Is the mass public deeply and intractably divided on the major issues of the day? 
















Or, could it be, according to yet another headline, that “Americans aren’t polarized, just 
better sorted?”8 
 This dissertation is a story about the divisions that characterize the mass public’s 
political preferences. Specifically, it explores how Americans think about politics, and, in 
particular, how citizens connect their attitudes, beliefs, and, vitally, group memberships to 
their partisan affiliation—a phenomenon known as sorting. Much has been written recently 
about sorting and, by extension, polarization, and, yet, the two concepts are frequently 
misunderstood and, worse, thoroughly muddled in their application. Breaking from the 
work of Levendusky (2009) in The Partisan Sort, this project provides a new investigation 
into the nature of sorting within the mass public. Over the coming chapters, I outline the 
first cohesive theoretical and empirical justification for disaggregating the sorting of the 
mass public into separate issue- and identity-based domains. While the relationship 
between attitudes and partisan memberships is modest, it is the sorting of political identities 
that has had profound effects on the transformation of American politics. Building on this 
distinction, I present a new account of when and under what circumstances sorting occurs 
and why identity sorting, in particular, has serious ramifications for American politics.  
 
1.2 Sorting and the coherency of public opinion 
For a vast majority of the 20th Century, the mass public was not particularly adept, much 
less principled, at enunciating its political preferences (Achen and Bartels, 2004; Cohen, 
Noel and Zaller, 2004; Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). During the era of the first systematic 
studies of public opinion, scholars observed that politics was not only a remote concept for 
much of the electorate, but that individuals’ political preferences were often shallow, 
vague, and inconsistent. Although the average person could generally identify and 
differentiate between the parties, individuals struggled to convey particular or unique 
features about them. In fact, in perhaps the most important work from this period, The 
American Voter, Campbell and his colleagues (1960) found evidence that less than six 
percent of their interviewees used ideological labels “liberal” or “conservative” to describe 
the American political parties.  






Converse’s (1964) subsequent inquiry into the mind of the American citizen 
buttressed these findings. He estimated that less than 10 percent of individuals grounded 
their political decisions in any sort of substantive ideological preferences, while a paltry 
two percent of people utilized he described as “constrained” thinking, or the ability to 
logically connect and extrapolate attitudes across separate issue areas. Although it was true 
that particular events occasionally captured individuals’ attention to the extent that they 
developed meaningful opinions, their political attitudes, when subjected to further 
empirical scrutiny, were largely idiosyncratic and only weakly related to those of political 
elites. In other words, it was impossible to claim “that the mass public shares ideological 
patterns of belief with relevant elites at a specific level any more than it shares the abstract 
conceptual frames of reference” (Converse 2000, pg. 34). 
 This lack of coherent ideological thinking within the electorate dovetailed with a 
meaningful decline in differences between party elites during the 1960s and 1970s, a period 
noted for its unique legislative bipartisanship. As both the Republican and Democrat 
Parties embraced postwar liberalism, the share of liberal Republicans and conservative 
Democratic legislators reached historic levels (Brady, Han, and Pope, 2007).9 While 
perhaps advantageous for the production of policy in that gridlock, which stymies 
legislation, was comparatively low, both scholars and political observers lamented that this 
ideological convergence by elites had severe, negative implications for the wider party 
system itself (Broder, 1972; APSA Task Force, 1950). According to Nie, Verba, and 
Petrocik (1976) in The Changing America Voter, the issues of the day had ceased to 
correspond with party positions. In the absence of perceived distinctions between the 
parties, citizens began to disengage and dealign from them (Clarke and Suzuki, 1994). 
Such ideological naiveté and partisan disinterest, however, were relatively short-
lived (Wattenberg, 1981; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). By the late 1990s, a new partisan voter 
had manifested (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009)—one that was not 
only more ideological than its forebears, but whose issue preferences were more strongly 
rooted within a liberal-conservative framework (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). By taking 
                                                          
9 Theriault (2008) reports on the breadth of this overlap in the 93rd Congress: better than 
90 percent of Republicans were more liberal than the most conservative Democrat, while 





positions on matters of public policy that corresponded to those preferred by their party, 
partisans had sorted (Levendusky, 2009).  
At its core, the concept of sorting reflects the ordering or coherency of individuals’ 
preferences—long a central interest in studies of public opinion. In fact, while scholars 
have puzzled over the stability (Feldman, 1988; Lenz, 2012) and consistency of 
individuals’ political attitudes (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004; Achen, 1975; Zaller and 
Feldman, 1992), the ordering of preferences within belief systems has received special 
consideration (Converse, 1964, 2000; Zaller, 1992; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017). Why this 
interest? Aside from academic curiosity in the nature of mass opinion, there are serious 
implications regarding whether or not a mass public’s preferences adhere to some sort of 
overarching framework. As Feldman (2003, pg. 478) ominously warns, “Politics doesn’t 
seem to “work” without some structure that allows broad sets of policies to somehow go 
together. And democratic representation may depend on people having some 
understanding of that structure.” Indeed, a lack of such coherence is troubling for well-
established theories of political representation and electoral choice, which demand that 
citizens’ ideal preferences can be arrayed within a common dimensional space (Gerber and 
Lewis, 2004). If citizens’ preferences are effectively nonideological or only weakly tied to 
a particular party, then the representational fit between citizens and legislators is likely to 
be poor and voting a quasi-random exercise (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984). 
 Yet while Americans’ political preferences are not known for the quality of their 
structure (e.g. Myers, Lupton, and Thornton, 2015; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), the fault 
lines that demarcate Republicans and Democrats have crystallized over the previous two 
decades (Pew, 2014). Recent polling, for example, indicates that the political values that 
separate Democrats from Republicans segregate them into historically-divided “liberal” 
and “conservative” groups—by 2014 the share of persons who expressed ideologically-
consistent opinions across a range of issues including the environment, foreign, and the 
scope of government had doubled from only 10 years previous (Pew Research Center, 
2014). In turn, the scholarly attention to the coherence of public opinion has shifted from 
the interdependence of political beliefs—which has, perhaps, always been difficult to 
expect from the average, politically-disinterested citizen—to the extent to which 




In part, the scholarly interest in sorting has grown because this concept represents 
something of a common middle ground between warring interpretations of mass opinion 
that simultaneously present the public as both principled and intractably divided 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008) and strikingly moderate (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 
2006).10 On the one hand, scholars find that Americans respond differently toward scandal 
(Blais et al., 2010), economic events (Bartels, 2009; Popescu, 2013), and disregard factual 
information based on partisan affiliation (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010)—even preferring their 
family members not intermarry with individuals belonging to opposing political groups 
(Kandler, Bleidron, and Riemann, 2012). On the other hand, the distribution of aggregate 
ideological identification and policy attitudes within the mass public has remained 
relatively consistent, stable, and moderate over time (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Kinder 
and Kalmoe, 2017). In the words of a recent Pew Research Center report, “The way that 
the public thinks about poverty, opportunity, business, unions, religion, civic duty, foreign 
affairs, and many other subjects is, to a large extent, the same today as in 1987” (2012, 17). 
Remaining agnostic about the extremity of citizens’ attitudes, the conventional 
conceptualization of sorting simply implies that there is greater matching between ideology 
and partisanship. On this point, there is broad agreement. Yet, this consensus masks two 
acute problems. First, extant research confuses consistency among political attitudes and 
identities (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). Why is this distinction important? Identities are critical 
to how an individual thinks and evaluates, providing the “perceptual screen” through which 
the larger socio-political environment is filtered (Campbell et al., 1960). These group 
memberships are fundamentally different from the particularistic views, attitudes, or values 
that individuals possess, which are often diverse and uncorrelated to the symbolic 
ideological self-concept (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Malka and Llekes, 2010, pg. 180). 
Conceptualizing sorting as some sort of omnibus concept that simultaneously accounts for 
both of these facets—as prior research does—is similarly problematic.   
Second, the interpretation of what sorting conveys remains a significant point of 
conflict. For some, sorting is a fundamental component of the narrative that the mass public 
                                                          
10 One point of agreement, however, is that “social” polarization, or the degree to which 
individuals negatively rate their political opponents relative their own party, not only exists 
but has meaningfully increased (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012; Mason, 2015; 




has become more polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). For others, it stands as the 
primary evidence that polarization has not occurred (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2010). 
Still others have taken a more nuanced view that sorting represents a facet of mass 
polarization, but that sorting might occur without a concomitant increase in the extremity 
of mass attitudes (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Garner and Palmer, 2011).   
 
1.2.1 Defining sorting 
In order to qualify these claims, let us begin with a fresh depiction of sorting. Conceptually, 
sorting reflects the systematized arrangement of things by some predetermined criterion. 
Partisans might sort by geographical location (Bishop, 2008; Mummolo and Nall, 2016), 
for example, or within their social relationships (Huber and Malhotra, 2017). Here, 
however, I am primarily concerned with sorting as a behavioral phenomenon in which 
attitudes, values, beliefs, and identities can be categorized according to the criterion of the 
ubiquitous left-right ideo-political framework. Within the two-party political landscape of 
American politics, this organizational scheme of “left” and “right” conveniently 
demarcates liberals from conservatives and Democrats from Republicans, respectively, 
such that sorting occurs when one’s liberal-conservative preferences converge with 
partisanship (Levendusky, 2009). 
Although I will discuss the elements that comprise this sorting in greater detail in 
Chapters 1 and 2, it is appropriate for now to quickly establish working definitions of these 
terms for clarity’s sake. Beginning first with partisanship, it is well-established that partisan 
identification encompasses an individual’s political self-concept (Green and Schickler, 
1993; Green 1999; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Drawing on decades of social-
psychological research dating back to the early Michigan studies (Campbell et al., 1960), 
this perspective conveys that a partisan identity not only reflects profound psychological 
attachments to a particular party, but “helps the citizen locate him/herself and others on the 
political landscape” (Campbell et al., 1986, pg. 100). In other words, partisanship provides 
the formal organizational moorings that spatially orient individuals within the political 
landscape.  
Attempting to define the corresponding, though more nebulous concept of 
“ideological preferences,” however, is more complicated. There is nothing particularly 




colloquial use by elites (Ellis and Stimson, 2012). Leaving aside for a moment the older 
literature’s treatment of “ideology” as a systematized belief system (i.e. Converse, 1964), 
I am interested in both ideological identity—psychological attachment to ideological 
groups—and the particular attitudes and beliefs that otherwise comprise this system—what 
are commonly referred to as policy preferences. While the former explicitly adopt the 
labels liberal and conservative, the latter are “ideological” in the sense that they can be 
characterized according to a liberal-conservative scheme that characterizes their realistic 
use by political commentators, elites, and even citizens themselves.11   
For our purposes, individuals are sorted when their policy preferences fall to the 
“right” (“left”) of moderate and they profess to be a Republican (Democrat).12 Conversely, 
if an individual’s partisanship is incongruent to these attitudes, say, a Democrat who is pro-
life or prefers limiting government spending, then this person is “unsorted” on these 
particular partisanship-policy pairings. By aggregating together the many possible 
partisanship-policy dyads that an individual might possess, we can envision a continuum 
that ranges from completely unsorted on one end, where partisanship bears an inverse 
relationship to the ideological character of an individual’s preferences, to fully-sorted on 
the other end, where there is full congruence between partisanship and these sentiments.13  
But how does this sorting differ from polarization? To better illustrate the potential 
differences between these concepts, Figure 1.1 provides a series of helpful diagrams. Panel 
A portrays a hypothetical, heterogeneous distribution of an electorate, wherein individuals 
are split into different partisan groups (vertical bars) across ideological categories (arrayed 
along the x-axis).  
                                                          
11 Put another way, these “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that 
groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a 
prescription as to how that environment should be structured” (Parsons, 1951, pg. 24). 
12 Presumably, it is also possible for Independents / moderates to be “sorted,” insofar as 
these neutral categories match, although this is a much less consequential form of 
matching. 
13 But what about persons who identify as “Independent” and “moderate” in their partisan 
and ideological affiliation? By the definitional criteria employed here, such individuals 
would be as “sorted” as partisans with matching and strong ideological preferences (perfect 
overlap). By ignoring gradations in the strength of these constructs, past research 
effectively treat respondents with weak (if not “neutral”) orientations the same as those 
with “strong ones.” This problematic aspect is a further justification for moving beyond 






Notes: Each panel represents hypothetical electorate, where the sum of all 
respective bars in a panel total 100 percent of persons in population. 
 
Figure 1.1. Hypothetical Distribution of Ideology by Partisanship 
 
This population is neither particularly sorted nor polarized; individuals are more 
or less evenly split among the three categories of political affiliation and are evenly 
distributed across the various ideological categories. Panel B illustrates how this population 
changes if it becomes sorted, but not polarized. Here, the distinguishing feature of a sorted 
but not polarized population is that the population of independents remains, even as the 
categorization of partisans into the correct ideological groups increases markedly. In other 
words, the overall population of partisans does not change; instead the distribution of 
partisans in the “correct” ideological category changes. Whereas polarization implies that 







A: Hypothetical population; 

































preferences, sorting merely implies that the composition of individuals’ preferences is, in 
the parlance of an older literature, “constrained” (Converse, 1964).  However, while sorting 
can occur without individuals becoming tangibly more extreme in their partisan 
orientations, what happens if the proportion of party identifiers remains constant, yet the 
strength of those attachments increase? This question highlights the difficulty and, indeed, 
the confusion generated by artificially prying such matching (sorting) apart from the 
distribution (extremity, polarization) of the survey response. 
Unlike Panel B, Panel C portrays an electorate that is starkly polarized but not 
well-sorted. This is polarization without any attendant matching between partisanship and 
ideology. Here, the lack of Independent identifiers conveys that individuals have fled the 
neutral core of political affiliation such that the population has polarized into two distinct 
and separate groups, yet these partisan groups are not marked by matching ideological 
preferences. In other words, there is little sorting. This type of scenario is probably unlikely 
for obvious reasons: what generates deeply-divided partisans if not ideology? Thus, Panel 
D illustrates both a sorted and polarized population, wherein the population of individuals 
are completely split between the Democratic and Republican parties who are, 
consequently, correctly divvied up between the correct, corresponding ideological groups. 
This is the scenario in which the starkest political divisions are observed, where individuals 
not only flock toward the parties but become “correctly” ideological in the process.  
Which of these portrayals faithfully depicts the shape of mass public opinion in 
America? In a vacuum, such as this, it is perhaps easier to differentiate between contrived 
examples of sorting and polarization than in practice. It is clear that, on some level, these 
two phenomena are inherently, if not intimately, related—it would be a very odd population 
indeed that was polarized but not sorted. This is perhaps why Fiorina (2012, 2) notes that 
“Of all the misconceptions associated with discussions of political polarization, none is 
more common than the confusion between party sorting and polarization.” In part, this 
confusion is the probably the result of a lack of terminological precision—Levendusky 
(2009) notes that “party polarization” is sometimes used interchangeably with “sorting,” 
even though “polarization” implies a change in the extremity of an individual’s views while 
sorting does not. To recover some sensibility in this debate, and to decipher the shape of 





1.2.2 What is the extent and nature of sorting? 
While Fiorina (2012) notes that the two processes of sorting and polarization are not 
mutually-exclusive, the existing literature struggles to fully explicate the relationship 
between these concepts. Hazarding the risk of pedantry, a major problem with a firm 
distinction between sorting and polarization rests on the fact that the extant literature 
essentially dichotomizes individuals’ partisan and ideological preferences to identify 
whether an individual is sorted. As Levendusky (2009, pg. 44-45) writes, a citizen is sorted 
“when his position is on the same side of moderate as that of his national party elites—a 
sorted Democrat takes a liberal position; a sorted Republican takes a conservative one.” 
Yet this seems to be a gross simplification regarding the true nature of one’s preferences. 
In fact, individuals identify as “strong” or “weak” ideologues and hold opinions that 
similarly range in strength—in other words, they vary in the degree to which they identify 
as a liberal or a conservative and the degree to which they support, for example, expanding 
government spending or supporting access to abortion.  
This is not a purely semantic distinction. We could sort attitudes like laundry, 
differentiating between liberal and conservative responses as if we were parceling lights 
from darks, but this inevitably loses a great deal of interesting variation within these 
responses. For instance, this scheme cannot differentiate between the matching of “weak” 
and “strong” ideological preferences to an individual’s partisanship. Instead a Republican 
who possesses weak conservative preferences across, say, the extent of government 
spending and the provision of public healthcare, is considered as “sorted” as a Republican 
who espouses extremely conservative opinions across those items, respectively. Yet if 
variation within these preferences exists, then an appropriate conceptualization of sorting 
should not only capture simple categorization but also the strength of those attendant 
relationships, more faithfully capturing the extent to which a person is sorted.  
Ironically, when scholars have traditionally spoken of political sorting as a 
phenomenon in which partisanship and ideological preferences converge, they are 
speaking about the extent to which these concepts are correlated—implying as much a 
difference of degree as kind—even though the prevailing specification of sorting does not 
account for such variation.14 Indeed, as Levendusky (2009, pg. 4-5) writes, “sorting is a 
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changing correlation between partisanship and ideology, so that in a sorted electorate party 
and ideology are more closely related (more correlated) than in an unsorted electorate.” 
Yet this is a fundamentally different type of sorting than the definition of sorting found in 
The Partisan Sort, which treats sorting as simply correctly-matched political preferences 
without a compensatory notion of how well-matched those concepts actually are.  
A second example illustrates this shortcoming, and, in the process, reveals another. 
Recalling from Figure 1.1 that a sorted population needn’t be a “polarized” one, we would 
expect a well-sorted population of partisans to resemble a horseshoe in the distribution of 
their attitudes. Figure 1.2 introduces two items from the American National Election 
Studies 2012 Time-Series survey, defense spending preferences and ideological self-
identification, to help illustrate how very different conclusions can be drawn about the 
extent of sorting based on this measurement distinction. As Panels A and B indicate, there 
is a noticeable “V” shape to the distribution of these responses. Republicans generally favor 
increasing defense spending (conservative response), while Democrats prefer decreasing 
such spending (liberal response); similarly, Republicans overwhelmingly identify as 
conservatives and Democrats as liberals. In other words, it appears that citizens are 
reasonably, if not similarly, sorted on these items.  
Yet the discretization of responses to these “ideology” items hemorrhages 
substantive information about their true relationship to partisanship. As Panel C illustrates, 
the modal category of partisans’ defense spending preferences is actually the neutral, 
midpoint response “keep spending the same.” Further, the vast majority of correctly-sorted 
preferences cluster around this midpoint of the scale—partisans may manage to espouse 
the correct response, but this relationship is weak (fewer than 10 percent of Republicans 
and Democrats comprise the strongest category of “correct” preferences).  
Panel D, like Panel C, illustrates that the simple expression of sorting-as-matching 
obscures meaningful variation in how partisans are distributed across liberal-conservative 
identity. However, a different portrait of sorting emerges here in that the distribution of 
partisans across liberal-conservative identification is essentially bimodal, where responses 
are skewed more toward the extremes than middle. Further, relative defense spending 
attitudes, higher rates of sorting on ideological identity exist. Although there is not a perfect 
                                                          





“V” shape to the distribution of responses—the existence of which would be indicative of 
sorting and polarization—both the fit between partisanship and ideological identity is 
stronger than defense spending preferences.  
 
Source: 2012 ANES Time-Series survey  
Notes: Partisan groups aggregate “strong,” “weak,” and “leaner” categories of identification. 
 
Figure 1.2. “Ideology” by Partisanship, 2012 ANES Time-Series 
 
The benefit of conceptualizing sorting in the terms of Panels C and D is twofold. 
First, these illustrations convey that Americans are not particularly “polarized” in their 
responses to survey items tend to only modestly skew toward the distributional extremes. 
Second, by extension, they indicate that individuals are not uniformly sorted on different 
types of ideological preferences. If Fiorina (2012, pg. 3) is correct in asserting that “sorting 
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to which people belong change,” then the relationship between liberal-conservative and 
partisan identification may be qualitatively different than the connection between policy 
attitudes and partisanship.  
Why is it problematic that the prevailing theoretical and empirical 
operationalization of sorting has traditionally weighted ideological self-identification 
equivalent to attitudinal ideological preferences? Because it conflates, in the parlance of 
Ellis and Stimson (2012), a symbolic, or identity-based, form of ideology with an 
operational, or attitudinal-based, one. This is a vital distinction. They write that  
 
symbolic ideology is a representation of how citizens 
think about themselves: whether they consider their views 
to be liberal, conservative, moderate, or something else. 
Operational ideology is grounded more explicitly in 
concrete decisions, what citizens think the government 
should or should not be doing with respect to important 
matters of public policy (2012, pg. 11). 
 
Although these concepts are closely intertwined at the elite level—conservative elites 
support conservative policies, and liberal elites, liberal ones (McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal, 2006; Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015)—at the individual level, “it is 
another matter entirely” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11; see also: Kinder and Kalmoe, 
2017; Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015). If individuals’ attitudes do not conform to a 
unidimensional framework (e.g. Feldman and Johnston, 2014), then this absence of 
systematic ordering has implications for the relationship between ideology and partisan 
identity. In particular, sorting on ideological attitudes (i.e. policy preferences) ought to be 
distinct from sorting on ideological identity (i.e. the categories to which people belong). 
 
1.3 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation proceeds in two parts. In Part 1, I build on the foregoing discussion of 
problems with the prevailing understanding of partisan sorting. In doing so, I show that 
identity- and issue-sorting constitute two unique facets of the socio-political features that 
divide Americans. Chapter 1 reviews the extant scholarly literature regarding partisanship 
and ideology, or the raw materials of sorting. Drawing on this research, I operationalize 
two types of sorting in Chapter 2 and compare how different measurement protocols affect 




is much more modest than the proportion of individuals who merely match ideology to 
partisanship. Although the popular description of sorting is that “Americans are 
increasingly sorted into think-alike communities that reflect not only their politics but their 
demographics” (Pew, 2016), this sorting is—in many ways—more superficial than many 
realize. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a series of empirical tests that justify partitioning 
sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs. 
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to the study of identity-based 
sorting, with a particular focus on the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon. 
Given that political identities are the fundamental constructs from which Americans reason 
and navigate the political environment, understanding the nature of sorted identities is a 
pressing concern for both theoretical and practical reasons.  Chapter 4 takes up the question 
of why individuals’ identities converge. Prior research posits that elite cues generate greater 
matching between partisan and ideological preferences—that is, elite polarization causes 
mass sorting. However, while the underlying spatial model of politics employed in this 
logic is intuitive, two problems plague this account. First, different cues shape different 
forms of sorting. Second, group memberships bias individuals’ understanding of where 
parties and their policy approaches fit within ideological space. These biases figure 
prominently into the calculus of sorting: I find that sorting is related to asymmetric 
perceptions of out-group dissimilarity rather than relative perceptions of between-group 
differences.  
Chapter 5 explores how this sorting affects compromise. While amicable 
intergroup communication is vital to both civil political discourse and to political 
compromise, identity sorting creates demands on the extent to which individuals are 
willingness to compromise. These findings, however, come with a caveat: well-sorted 
Republicans are much less likely than well-sorted Democrats to believe that compromise 
is an important and desire quality in principle. Fascinatingly, however, when compromise 
is operationalized as the extent to which individuals are willing to concede concessions to 
the “other side,” these differences between citizens with left- and right-leaning identities 
disappear. Further, and perhaps alarmingly, I discover that, even in the absence of 
consistent policy preferences, identity-sorting is sufficient to decrease an individual’s 




consequences of tribal political identities and why sorting poses a particularly acute 
problem for democratic exchange. 
Finally, Chapter 6 examines how identity sorting alters the decisional criteria that 
voters utilize to select political candidates. Presenting survey-takers with different 
depictions of candidates in policy space, I show that sorted individuals eschew proximately 
“optimal” candidates in favor of more extreme ones. In effect, while persons who exhibit 
high levels of sorting perceive that they are choosing ideologically-proximate candidates, 
there is a significant disconnect between perceived and objective ideological congruence. 
Sorting, then, is a sufficient condition for pushing citizens toward more extreme 
candidates—even when individuals’ issue preferences suggest that their “best” candidate 
is considerably more moderate. These findings help explain how sorting, in turn, 
exacerbates elite polarization. The well-sorted citizen behaves in ways that generate 
representational extremity, even as he or she possesses a mixed of inconsistent preferences.  
Taken as a whole, this dissertation both refines the extant logic of sorting and 
pushes this research into new territory. In demonstrating that identity-based sorting 
constitutes a unique and particularly powerful political phenomenon, I reveal why concern 
over the systematic coherency of mass opinion is, perhaps, misplaced. Politics largely 
trades on the power of symbolic information (Achen and Bartels, 2016), which often 
obscures the type of nuance needed to fully comprehend and solve complex socio-political 
problems. If symbolic cues generate identity sorting, and identity sorting, in turns, 
endangers commitment to deliberative democratic exchange and increases the 
attractiveness of extremist representation, then scholars might consider shifting a focus on 
the (lack of) systematic constraint that constitutes the average citizen’s belief system and 
instead scrutinize the tribal, group-based divisions that reduce compromise and amplify 






Chapter 2: The Raw Materials of Sorting 
 
“Politics doesn’t seem to “work” without some structure that allows 
broad sets of policies to somehow go together.” 
- Feldman (2003, pg. 478) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The study of sorting has been described as “an investigation of how voters align their party 
identification and ideological beliefs over time” (Levendusky, 2009, pg. 7). This is 
unquestionably true. However, the study of sorting also involves the study of both 
partisanship and ideology—separately and jointly. In other words, to understand the 
contours of the mass public’s sorting, it is necessary to understand the complexity of these 
constructs.   
In fact, while the scholarly interpretation of partisanship as a durable set of 
emotional attachments has withstood almost sixty years of inquiry, the study of ideology 
has puzzled and frustrated scholars. In particular, the exact relationship between 
individuals’ various policy attitudes and identification as a liberal or conservative is murky. 
Attitudes and identities are interlinked, yet they reflect different aspects of the cognitive 
and psychological processes that underscore an individual’s political preferences.  
Problematically, the prevailing sorting literature has ignored warnings that these 
forms of ideology are not interchangeable (e.g. Conover and Feldman, 1981; Malka and 
Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015). Levendusky’s (2009, pg. 4) work represents the single 
comprehensive text on partisan sorting in American politics, and his treatment of ideology 
is emblematic of this point. He writes that  
 
 
I focus here on indicators of ideology—respondents’ 
liberal-conservative self-identification and their issue 
positions on a variety of different policies. While there is 
some controversy about the self-identification measure in 
the literature (Conover and Feldman, 1981), I use it here 
as a summary indicator of the respondent’s outlook on 
politics (for similar uses, see Zaller, 1992; Hetherington, 




measures together will allow me to demonstrate that 
sorting is not simply an artifact of a particular measure. 
 
Yet, the conceptual, much less empirical, expression of sorting is very much the product 
of these underlying indicators. While there is some overlap between ideological self-
identification and issue-based ideology, a growing body of work conveys that these are 
distinct facets of ideology (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015)—that these facets of 
ideology are not so similar that they can be exchanged as substitutes or even treated as 
direct analogs. This disconnect is consequential for understanding the shape and scope of 
sorting in that the relationship of partisanship to these various “ideological” elements may 
not be uniform. Taking these differences seriously, this chapter provides the theoretical 
framework that justifies splitting sorting into identity- and issue-based constructs.  
 
2.2 What is partisanship? 
The canonical view of partisanship as a social-psychological construct is rooted in the early 
work of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ (1960, pg. 143) work in The American 
Voter, which conceptualized partisan identification as “an affective attachment to an 
important group object in the environment.” This emotional affinity for a party was 
described as both durable and encompassing, and, to the extent that these preferences were 
socialized in the home, partisan identification was presumably stable over the course of an 
individual’s lifetime.15 Only a serious event of extraordinary intensity might shake the 
fixity of this support.  
This interpretation, which stylizes partisan affiliation as exogenous to policy 
preferences, has occasionally been challenged on the grounds that partisanship ought to be 
construed as a summary set of (cognitive) evaluations of the parties (Fiorina, 1981). In this 
case, citizens function as good Bayesians who update their partisanship according to 
experiential evidence (Achen, 1989; Gerber and Green, 1998). Thus, partisanship is not so 
                                                          
15 Lost in the ensuing years, however, Campbell and colleagues (1960) did warn against 
caricaturizing partisanship as exclusively emotional ties. They noted that while 
partisanship appeared to influence attitudes more than attitudes influenced partisanship, 
this finding was conceivably restricted to the time-period of inquiry and not necessarily 




much an “unmoved mover” or “perceptual screen” that filters information, but a running 
tally of judgments without independent causal significance.16   
Be that as it may, the generally accepted, if not hegemonic, interpretation of 
partisan identification is deferential to the Michigan school’s original formulation of this 
concept as a vested, emotional attachment (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Bartels, 2002; Huddy, 
Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). In particular, recent scholarly work has returned to the group-
based qualities of partisanship, arguing that these psychological affinities for parties can 
be interpreted through the lens of social identity theory (Greene, 1999; Huddy, Mason, and 
Aaroe, 2015).17 Social identities involve the incorporation of a particular group 
membership into an individual’s self-concept, what Tajfel (1981, pg. 255) describes as the 
combination of group membership “together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to membership.” The foundations of social identities are prominently driven by a 
need for positive distinctiveness where one’s own group is favorably prioritized relative an 
out-group in such a way that members are motivated to protect or advance their own party’s 
status.18 Unlike  belonging to a club to which an individual might pay yearly membership 
dues and little else, this membership includes “an awareness of similarity, in-group 
identity, and shared fate with others who belong to the same category,” which has 
“pervasive effects on what people think and do” (Klandermans, 2014, pg. 5). In other 
words, a social identity is a highly valued group membership that structures how people 
think about and behave within their immediate environment (Huddy, 2013). 
                                                          
16 Yet even this approach has received its share of criticism for expecting too much out of 
a single, uni-dimensional measure. “45 years ago a single indicator called party 
identification was commissioned to perform too many tasks,” writes Johnston (2006, pgs. 
339-340), and “…it does seem clear that real heterogeneity—beyond that of direction and 
intensity—is being shoehorned into a single procrustean indicator.” Weisberg’s (1981) 
work was an attempt to reconcile some of these issues, but has mostly lost in the scrum 
over whether issues or group attachments underscore partisanship.  
17 In fact, Campbell and colleagues understood partisanship as a form of group attachment 
not unlike various racial or religious groups, a depiction that Greene (1999) notes was years 
ahead of its time. 
18 These motivations may have some evolutionary basis. Evolutionary psychologists stress 
the necessity of group coordination for basic activities like child-rearing, group defense, 
and even the production of basic goods (Sidanius and Kurzban, 2013). Within this 
perspective, the internalized attachment to a particular group evolved as a functional 
necessity for survival. In a post-material context, where safety and the availability of goods 
are no longer concerns, however, the psychological benefits of belonging to a group are 




For many citizens, partisanship fits this description. Not only do partisans intensely 
favor group members over non-group members (Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012; Mason, 
2015), but partisan identification strongly biases how individuals interpret information 
(e.g. Bartels, 2002; Leeper, 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Iyengar and 
Westwood, 2014). Further, because elections are competitions that produce significant 
material and psychological benefits to participants, individuals engage in behaviors 
consistent with and on behalf of their group—behavior consistent with the expectations of 
social identity theory. Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015), for example, provide 
experimental evidence that this sociological interpretation of partisanship explains such 
behaviors better than a purely psychological model. Much like the passionate fan who 
cheers their favorite team in the heat of a competition, partisans’ internalized sense of 
partisan identity is intimately related to their group’s victories and defeats; it is personal, 
rooted deeply within an individual’s subconscious (Theodoridis, 2013).  
This understanding of partisanship as a social identity complements the 
conceptualization of parties as groups whose central or primary motivation is the 
accumulation of power. Schumpeter (1942) argues that the classic (Burkean) stylization of 
parties as groups of individuals bound together by common principles is naïve. 
Acknowledging that parties will, of course, espouse certain principles that will be vital to 
their success in much the same way a department store’s success is related to certain brands, 
he argues that the department store can no more be defined in terms of its individual brands 
than a party might be defined in light of its particular principles. Instead, a “party is a group 
whose members who propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political 
power” (1942, pg. 238). This dissertation proceeds on the assumption that this competitive 
struggle for power feeds into the group-based nature of partisanship; that what it means to 
be a Republican and Democrat is not so much contingent upon what the parties stand for, 
but that these orientations ultimately comprise more primal attachments.19 Thus, 
partisanship reflects how individuals think of themselves as a “Democrat,” “Republican,’ 
or “Independent” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002, pg. 137).20  
                                                          
19 Still, this is not to say that partisanship contains no basis in issue preferences. Rather, 
this interpretation merely suggests that the average citizen conceptualizes partisanship in 
terms of group affiliation rather than issue-based preferences.  
20 There is some question of whether or not unaffiliated partisans—“independents” and, to 




Still, if this form of group identity provides locational information that helps 
citizens place themselves and other actors within the political landscape (Campbell et al., 
1986, pg. 100), then the positions that distinguish parties from each other should not be 
entirely irrelevant to understanding why individuals choose to affiliate with a given party. 
Thus, while “it would be naïve to suggest that either at the time of its inception or at the 
time of election, the members of a party are bound together solely by the force and 
rationality of an ideological stance,” it is also the case that “political parties tend to 
rationalize the existing interests of groups or classes supporting them and articulate issues 
in ideological terms…they play the game of power in the name of an ideology” (Ashraf 
and Sharma, 1983, pg. 89). Understanding how individuals think about and conceive of 
these stances and, ultimately, connect them back to their partisan identity, lies at the heart 
of understanding sorting and is the task to which we now turn.  
 
2.3 What is ideology?  
Classic democratic theory is demanding of citizens. It requires them to pay close attention 
to current events, to engage in political discussion and debate with their peers, and, 
ultimately, to participate in electoral processes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). 
These requirements impose a substantial informational burden on the average person. 
Rationally choosing a candidate or party to support not only demands that citizens possess 
some basic knowledge about political processes, figures, and policy of the day (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter, 1996), but that individuals possess sincere or orderable preferences 
(Downs, 1957). Accompanying the latter requirement is the implication that the relation of 
an individual’s preferences to each other is bound or organized by some unifying principle 
or paradigmatic criterion (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Converse, 1964).21 
Ideology is the embodiment of those preferences.  
Yet this idealized notion that individuals’ preferences are meaningfully structured 
has been the subject of serious debate. Sociological approaches to the study of ideology 
                                                          
their independence from the Republican and Democratic Parties as its own from of identity. 
But without clearly delineated group boundaries, much less group goals, it is difficult to 
see how relevant independent identity might be for politics.  
21 These demands are perhaps too great for the average citizen, however, whose return on 
this investment is low. Schattschneider (1960) argues that this “problem” lies more with 




allege, for example, that there is little organizational structure among specific beliefs (e.g. 
Converse, 1964, 2000), while psychological perspectives tend to stress that the origins of 
these preferences are often self-generated and only tenuously related to abstract political 
ideas (e.g. Lane, 1973; Jackson and Marcus, 1975). Yet despite their differences, “these 
two perspectives share a common concern with the question of whether people think 
ideologically” (Conover and Feldman, 1984, pg. 95). 
Ideology has been, and probably remains, one of the most ubiquitous—though 
elusive—concepts in modern political discourse. Sartori (1969, pg. 398) describes the 
frustrating opaqueness of ideology, writing that “the growing popularity of the term has 
been matched, if anything, by its growing obscurity,” eventually concluding that “the word 
ideology points to a black box.” Elsewhere, Mullins (1972) reflects on the ambiguous usage 
of ideology and a seeming lack of an agreed-upon definition of its basic properties by 
theorists and scientists alike. Converse’s lament that “a term like ‘ideology’ has been 
thoroughly muddled by diverse uses” (1964, pg. 3) was perhaps more prescient than he 
realized.22  
Nevertheless, these definitional difficulties have not prevented the concept of 
ideology from becoming a central component in the study of public opinion and political 
behavior (Lee, 2009). How, then, should we understand this concept? Let us begin with a 
simple definition of ideology as a benign organizing device that reflects the systematic 
composition of interconnected values and beliefs (Knight, 2006; Gerring, 1997). 
Traditionally, the various components that give this framework its structure are stylized 
according to a hierarchical system of ordering, “bearing some loose resemblance to the 
vertical line that might be pursued downward through an organization or political 
movement from the narrow cone of top leadership, through increasing numbers of 
subordinate officials” (Converse, 1964, pg. 2). This is not to say, however, that ideology is 
rooted in strict syllogistic reasoning, where attitudes are deterministically linked to other 
attitudes across value domains. Instead, the logic of ideology is sufficiently broad account 
                                                          
22 In part, this confusion is the result of the divide between critical and value-neutral 
approaches to the study of ideology, or the difference between a embracing a “critical, even 
judgmental tone in describing and analyzing ideologies” and adopting a more value-neutral 
position that can be indiscriminately used to describe any particular belief system of 




for some countervailing preferences, although “ideologies must not repeatedly violate their 
canons of sensibility” (Mullins, 1972, pg. 510).  
Obviously, these frameworks are not value-neural. Parsons (1951, pg. 24, italics 
mine) describes ideologies as “the shared framework of mental models that groups of 
individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a 
prescription as to how that environment should be structured.” More recently, Krochick 
and Jost (2010, pg. 146) write that ideology is a “socially shared belief system about how 
society should conduct itself (and how it conducts itself at present).” In this way, ideology 
reflects the underlying structure of beliefs inasmuch as it communicates the particular 
character that they take, which reflects Freeden’s (1998) description of ideology as a 
configuration of political concepts that decontests the indeterminate meanings that 
inherently characterize such terms, enabling the construction of meaningful political 
worlds.  
Taken together, then, it is possible to conceptualize ideology as both the structural 
framework of an individual’s worldview and as a normative blueprint relating to 1) the 
appropriate allocation of power, and 2) the ends such power might be utilized to achieve 
preferred goals. Put another way, ideology has been used to describe both the shape or 
structure and, simultaneously, the character of one’s beliefs. This is a subtle, but perhaps 
overlooked distinction that may be responsible for some amount of the confusion related 
to this concept. As ideology relates to this project, however, I am less interested in the 
interrelationship of attitudes inasmuch as I am concerned with how an individual’s liberal-
conservative preferences fit within left-right political space relative partisanship. Thus, in 
this application, ideology is treated as a blanket term that embodies an individual’s beliefs, 
attitudes, and sense of group identity within the liberal-conservative framework.23  
 
2.3.1 The liberal-conservative conflict 
In its contemporary American use, ideology reflects conflict among two countervailing 
political perspectives embodied in the concepts “liberal “and “conservative,” which 
                                                          
23 It should be noted, of course, that other ideologies exist—many even within the more 
general liberal-conservative framework. For now, however, simplicity is our guide and this 
distinction is the quantity of interest. When speaking about liberal-conservative identity or 




juxtaposes philosophical differences in approaches to social change and the distribution of 
economic goods within a single “left-right” dimension (Jost et al., 2009).24 Historically, 
this conflict dates back at least as far as the French Revolution, where liberalism conveyed 
support for freedom from state intervention in social and economic domains and opposition 
to the influence of the monarchy, Church, and aristocracy, conservatism reflected, if not 
outright support, then cautious skepticism over dismantling those monarchical, religious, 
and aristocratic institutions (Davies, 1996). In modern American political discourse, 
however, these relationships are essentially inverted: the promotion of free markets and 
minimal government is now associated with conservative approaches to governance and 
the protection of governing institutions with liberalism. 
At present, the terms “progressive,” “system change,” and “equality” are often 
associated with the “left,” while terms like “system maintenance,” “order,” and 
“individualism” are connected to the “right.” In American political discourse, the liberal-
conservative distinction is often used interchangeably with this left-right understanding of 
political concepts. While a full accounting of the historical development of ideology in 
America is beyond the scope of the present project (for a historical overview, I point 
interested readers to Noel’s (2013) excellent book, Political Ideologies and Political 
Parties in America), the purpose of the following section is to present the culturally-
standard summaries of these concepts in order to contextualize how ideology matches with 
to partisanship in the modern American political context.  
 
American liberalism  
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, it was proposed that institutions could redress 
collective action problems associated with complicated social and economic dilemmas. 
Government, according to then-President Franklin Roosevelt, was the principal agent 
responsible for redressing these problems. Thus, he framed his New Deal programs in the 
verbiage of “liberal” priorities, so chosen for the word’s positive connotations—free from 
                                                          
24 More specifically, whereas liberalism conveyed support for freedom from state 
intervention in social and economic domains and opposition to the influence of the 
monarchy, Church, and aristocracy, conservatism reflected, if not outright support, then 
cautious skepticism over dismantling those monarchical, religious, and aristocratic 




any link to concepts like fascism, socialism, and communism that were both threatening 
and unpopular in the mind of the public (Rotunda, 1986). According to Roosevelt (1941)  
 
as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power 
of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes the 
duty of Government itself to find new remedies with 
which to meet them. The liberal party insists that the 
Government has the definite duty to use all its power and 
resources to meet new social problems with new social 
controls.  
 
These sentiments enjoyed great initial success in their implementation, forming the 
backbone of the New Deal and Great Society programs, but, over time, the general 
popularity of this assemblage of philosophical ideals waned. In fact, Stears (2007, pg. 87) 
writes that “following decades of racial tension, student unrest, rising crime, and profound 
difficulties in international affairs, explicitly liberal political ideals found few adherents.”  
Nevertheless, these liberal ideals have played important long-term roles in shaping matters 
of public policy: a plurality of Americans have long-preferred various government 
interventions in the economy (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).25  
At its core, modern American liberalism proposes that the assistance of the state is 
central to shaping and promoting the welfare of a citizenry, drawing much of its intellectual 
material from egalitarian principles. In terms of social policy, liberals have prioritized 
freedom from coercion or intrusion on private decision-making. Often, this has centered 
on maintaining a healthy separation of church and state insofar as liberals have resisted the 
pressures that organized religion exert on matters of social policy. In particular, liberals 
have advocated for fewer restrictions on matters of women’s health, including access to 
birth control and abortion. Further, their sensitivity to the rights of disadvantaged groups 
often leads them to advocate for special legal protections of African American’s, women’s, 
and LGBTQ rights.  
Economically, this egalitarianism conveys that success should not be governed by 
the circumstances of birth, but by the application of one’s talents and abilities. Although 
American social life is perhaps not as deeply stratified by class as other countries, liberals 
                                                          
25 There is obvious bleed-over between American liberalism and the more general 





generally hold the position that an individual’s accomplishments in life are nevertheless 
governed by the lottery of birth. Government, then, is viewed as a tool to utilize in evening 
this unequal playing field (rather than the private sector). Specifically, government ought 
to act in the economy in a variety of ways, to permit collective bargaining, to ensure a 
minimum wage, and to guarantee that benefits such as old age pensions and health care 
insurance are available to all. Moreover, because these programs are expensive, liberals 
endure greater taxation to secure these services. Finally, while liberals support the premise 
of the free market, governmental regulation is viewed as the appropriate brake on private 
economic power that might, if left unchecked, be used to secure unfair benefits by 
corporations and the rich. Thus, the government’s role is “to regulate the economic 
environment to prevent such abuses” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 4).  
 
American conservatism  
The concept of conservatism was somewhat slower to develop than its liberal counterpart 
in American political discourse, even as Roosevelt and his supporters employed the term 
as a mild rebuke throughout the 1930s (Rotunda, 1986). This negative usage didn’t stick, 
however, and literary critic Lionel Trilling (1950, pg. ix) would later surmise that “it is the 
plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general 
circulation.” In fact, it wasn’t until the late 1950s that conservatism developed any real bite 
as an intellectual alternative to the prevailing hegemony of public liberalism; in turn, it 
took Goldwater’s presidential candidacy in 1964 to bring conservatism into the mainstream 
and Reagan’s campaigning and presidency in the 1980s to crystalize what is now 
recognizable as modern American conservatism.26  
Three prominent strains of preferences can be traced throughout much of the 
history of the conservative movement (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell, 2011). In his book, 
The New American Right, Daniel Bell (1955, pg. 47-48) laid the foundation for a form of 
social conservatism that “sought to impose older conformities on the American body 
politic.”27 On a tangible level, this social conservatism emphasized that private citizens, 
                                                          
26 It is worth noting, however, that this modern conservatism is perhaps dimensional, as 
well, including derivatives like paleo- and neo-conservatism. 
27 Perhaps less charitably, his approach ostensibly boiled down to an attempt to “stuff a 




families, and even communities were better judges of appropriate social norms than the 
federal government, although the irony of this preference for traditional social life is that 
it still required a strong federal government to enforce this version of social order.28 
A second strand of influence within conservatism deals with the particular 
influence of the Christian right, which imbued public conservatism with a moral quality 
that is separate from a simple opposition to progressive social trends. Thorne (1990, pg. 8) 
writes that “all contemporary American conservative thinkers hold two fundamental ideas: 
a certain view of human nature and a certain conception of…moral order.” Although this 
comity between religion and conservatism was a later development than the more general 
suspicion of social progressivism outlined above, by the late 1980s, evangelicals had 
imbued conservatism with a particular vision of moral and, therefore, social, order 
(McGirr, 2001). Their influence ranged from attempting to ban the teaching of evolution 
and sex education in schools to opposition movements over same-sex marriage, abortion, 
and gambling to their support for the death penalty (see Blee and Creasap, 2010 for an 
excellent review).  
Finally, conservatism is associated with limited governmental interference in the 
marketplace. While conservatives take seriously the notion of equal opportunity, they 
generally argue that reducing inequality is best achieved with an open market rather than a 
regulatory government (Friedman and Friedman, 1990). Ellis and Stimson’s (2012, pg. 6) 
describes these economic preferences thusly: “free markets, whatever excesses they might 
have, are seen as the single greatest pathway to long-run economic growth and prosperity, 
and government intervention in them stifles both innovation and the ability of a citizenry 
to allocate resources in a way that it sees fit.” Thus the policies preferred by conservatives 
are generally designed to minimize the footprint of government on the activities of the 
marketplace, informing a preference for private insurance, low government spending (with 
the exception of defense spending), and lower taxes.     
 
                                                          
conservative, small-town vision of the good” (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell, 20xx, pg. 
328). 
28 This resistance to change also carried certain racial connotations, although the extent to 
which this informs modern conservatism is heavily debated (Ansell, 2001). In particular, 
it is difficult to separate how ostensibly nonracial values—like the appropriate role of 




2.3.2 The dimensionality of ideology 
Given these brief sketches of the stereotypic qualities of liberal and conservative ideology 
outlined above, it seems theoretically parsimonious to juxtapose the labels liberal and 
conservative as conceptual foils that could be arrayed as opposite intellectual approaches 
within a single ideological continuum. Certainly this approach has historical roots. In a 
1938 “fireside chat,” FDR intoned 
 
Be it clearly understood, however, that when I use the 
word “liberal,” I mean the believer I progressive 
principles of democratic, representative government... the 
opposing or conservative school of thought, as a general 
proposition, does not recognize the need for Government 
itself to step in and take action to meet these new 
problems. 
 
In fact, President Barack Obama’s more recent claim that “There’s not a liberal America 
and a conservative America—there’s the United States of America” notwithstanding, 
differences between liberals and conservatives can be observed across a variety of policy 
domains (Jost et al., 2009).29 Yet there is, perhaps, a problem with this portrayal of 
liberalism and conservatism as conceptual opposites in that this approach implicitly 
assumes that liberals and conservatives share the same perceptual frameworks, where the 
single difference separating these ideological approaches is that “their view is from 
opposite sides of the field” (Conover and Feldman, 1981, pg. 619). Is this a reasonable 
assumption? Does a single dimension adequately describe, much less guide, the mass 
public’s preferences where liberals and conservatives are simple proscriptive opposites? 
The answer to these questions is complicated and depends upon one’s level of 
inquiry. A uni-dimensional, liberal-conservative framework does guide elite preferences. 
Since the late 1960s, the voting behavior of Congressional legislators has exhibited limited 
dimensionality, effectively reducing conflict to a single “liberal-conservative” dimension 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). More recently, 
Lupton, Myers, and Thornton (2015) find evidence that this single dimension adequately 
structures highly sophisticated Congressional delegates’ political preferences. 
There is limited evidence, however, that the mass public thinks in these 
distinctions. Converse (1964), for example, concluded that liberal-conservative-thinking 





was perilously low throughout the mass public. Elsewhere, Weisberg and Rusk (1970) find 
that “social” issues like marijuana use, abortion, and the Equal Rights Amendment, which 
crept into the political agenda during the 1970s, did not, at least initially, fit into the liberal-
conservative spectrum. Moreover, a growing body of work in both political science and 
psychology conveys that this one-dimensional framework insufficiently captures the 
significant heterogeneity within the mass public’s ideological beliefs (Feldman and 
Johnston, 2014). Consider, for instance, the finding that individuals’ ideological self-
descriptions can be functionally independent of their actual policy preferences. It is odd 
that individuals who self-identify as conservatives would prefer, on balance, liberal policy 
preferences, yet this discordance is precisely what Ellis and Stimson (2012) observe. This 
dovetails with research that indicates that citizens impose varying substantive 
interpretations the liberal-conservative spectrum (Zumbrunnen and Gangl, 2008), that 
economic and social preferences are often independent or distinct (Layman and Carsey, 
2002; Rokeach, 1973; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Duckitt, 2001), and that mass attitudes 
are, more generally, characterized by a general lack of constraint among issue positions 
(Myers, Lupton, and Thornton, 2015).30  
This is not to say, however, that individuals’ attitudes are uninterpretable or do not 
conform to any particular pattern. In fact, while Feldman and Johnston (2014) present 
considerable evidence that there is enormous heterogeneity among citizens’ ideological 
preferences, they find that a multidimensional solution to the structure of ideology 
partitions individuals into coherent groups. Like Conover and Feldman (1984) and, more 
recently, Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004), they argue that the reductionist tendency to 
squeeze policy preferences into a simple linear continuum runs the risk of misrepresenting 
how individuals actually think in practice. Instead, it appears that individuals’ attitudes are 
at least minimally governed by a two-dimensional approach that only modestly relates to 
the condensed, bipolar liberal-conservative continuum.31 In other words, the terms liberal 
                                                          
30 Zaller (1992) and Zaller and Feldman 19xx) offer that individuals may not hold fixed 
attitudes at all; rather, survey responses are a mix of ambivalence and, occasionally, 
opposing attitudes whereby individuals sample whatever information is most easily 
accessible (i.e. top-of-the-head considerations).  
31  Still, this not to say that the liberal-conservative framework is an anachronism. A robust 
body of findings has demonstrated the usefulness and remarkable reliability of the liberal-
conservative ideological framework over time (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005; Bobbio, 




and conservative may be parsimonious theoretical foils, but, empirically, the mass public’s 
attitudes may only weakly fit within this one-dimensional framework.  
 
2.4 Disentangling ideology for the study of sorting 
After more than fifty years of research on ideology, scholars remain frustrated at the lack 
of resolution in the debate over 1) whether mass preferences conform to a general, idealized 
spectrum, and 2) whether these preferences are related to each other in any systematic way. 
This has not been for lack of trying (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). There have been a 
variety solutions targeted at resolving these issues, ranging from Achen’s (1975) 
sophisticated work on instability in individuals’ survey responses vis-à-vis the reliability 
of the survey instruments themselves to more recent work using latent empirical 
approaches to identify dimensionality in ideology (Moskowtiz and Jenkins, 2004; Ellis and 
Stimson, 2012; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Claussen et al., 2015). Still, the lack of clear 
consensus on the character of ideology has recently provoked the conclusion that “there is 
little to be gained by rehashing a debate that has still not been resolved after more than 50 
years of political science research” (Carmines and D’Amico, 2015, pg. 210).  
Although this frustration is understandable, I disagree with its conclusions. The 
implications of the extant body of work on ideology present some difficulty for the study 
of sorting for an obvious reason: the criterion on which sorting is based—the left-right 
ideo-political framework—is inherently one-dimensional, yet the components that 
comprise sorting may not share this limited dimensionality. If these issues cannot be 
resolved, then sorting, which literally relies on a one-dimensional, left-right classificatory 
scheme, is a poor, if not irredeemable, approximation of the extent to which ideological 
preferences do, much less ought to, map onto partisanship.  
Thankfully, however, we need not throw the baby out with the bathwater, as a 
number of solutions to address the complexity of ideology within the context of sorting are 
available. Recent research that questions the suitability of the liberal-conservative 
ideological framework notwithstanding, the left-right model of ideological structure has 




empirical utility” (Jost et al., 2009, pg. 310).32 Yet there is a key distinction between facets 
of ideology that has serious implications for the study of sorting: ideological identity is 
more strongly related to partisanship than is issue-based ideology—perhaps because while 
liberal-conservative identity is effectively one-dimensional, liberal-conservative attitudes 
are not. 
In fact, ideological self-descriptions and the attitudes that populate belief systems 
are not interchangeable concepts.33 While most contemporary samples of American survey 
respondents convey that ideological self-identification within the liberal-conservative 
space is reliably correlated with a varied range of policy preferences—including 
preferences for decreased (increased) social welfare spending, progressive (traditional) 
cultural-moral stances on issues like same-sex marriage and abortion, and decreasing 
(increasing) the size and strength of the military (Malka and Llekes, 2010)—this does not 
mean that liberal-conservative identity is a mirror-image concept of liberal-conservative 
ideology. Specifically, even though the traditional understanding of the liberal-
conservative labels assumes that ideological self-identification is the product of issue 
orientations or preferences, much of the mass public may not associate these terms with 
issue-based meanings (Klingemann, 1979; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Conover and 
Feldman, 1981).34 The classic example of this disconnect can be observed in the “symbolic-
                                                          
32 An immense literature demonstrates that the validity of ideological labels is high, 
reliably predicting partisanship (citation), electoral choice (citation), news consumption 
preferences (citation), and even elective affinities (citation). 
33 The meaning of ideological self-identification has puzzled scholars. As Conover and 
Feldman (1981 , pg. 621) ponder, if this concept is not issue oriented, that is, if issues are 
only weakly related to why individuals choose to associate themselves with these groups, 
then “what is the meaning associated with ideological labels?” On the one hand, ideological 
identity shares some relationship to partisanship. Levitin and Miller (1979) note that 
ideological self-identification seems to be some comment on the parties and their positions, 
yet, on the other hand, ideology exerts independent force on behavioral outcomes relative 
to partisan identification. Whatever commonality these items share, the question of their 
shared nature remains.  
34 Abramowitz and Saunders’ (2006) work is emblematic of the approach that holds that 
issue attitudes are intimately related to ideological self-identification. Analyzing 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients that account for coherence among policy issue attitudes 
common to NES surveys and liberal-conservative self-placements, they find that these 
items have become more internally consistent over time. But this work remains agnostic 
on the point of whether issue attitudes or ideological self-identification are derivative from 




operational paradox,” which implies that Americans’ overwhelming favor the conservative 
ideological label in spite of holding policy preferences that are, on balance, liberal (Ellis 
and Stimson, 2012; Free and Cantril, 1967).  Although symbolic ideology, the particular 
ideological group with which individuals may align, is clearly related to their constellation 
of particular issue attitudes, what has been termed operational ideology, a growing body 
of research argues that these concepts should be analyzed separately on their own merits 
(Conover and Feldman, 1981; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Popp and Rudolph, 2011; Devine, 
2015; Mason, 2016). 
One explanation for the meaning of ideological identification is to conceptualize 
this response as a symbolic group attachment. Put another way, ideological identification 
as a liberal or conservative is a powerful symbolic attachment to a particular group that 
orients group members to their surroundings. Drawing again on social identity literature, 
which notes that in-group identification, intergroup differentiation, and in-group bias result 
from defining oneself as a group member, liberal-conservative identity should motivate 
individuals to generate strong positive and negative feelings toward those individuals who 
do not belong to their chosen ideological family. Roccas and Brewer (2002, pg. 50) 
describe this process as one in which individuals “come to perceive themselves more as 
the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities.” 
Ideological self-identification, then, can be defined in light of these social or expressive 
functions rather than particularistic attitudes. In other words, self-categorization as a 
“liberal” should constitute a social identity where an individual’s self-perception as a 
liberal draws from the shared experiential similarity with in-group members and as a point 
of collective difference with those persons who identify with other ideological groups (e.g. 
conservatives; e.g. Devine, 2015).  
Separate this symbolic form of ideology, issue-based ideology reflects the beliefs 
and dispositions that generate concrete choices regarding the appropriate role of 
government (Ellis and Stimson, 2012). This is ideology as conventionally construed when 
individuals talk about ideological position-taking and is emblematic of the many 
considerations that individuals hold when they think about politics. They are what Erikson 




how it can be achieved.”35 This is an elegant description in theory, but, in practice, the 
operationalization of issue-based ideology is a great deal more complex in that does not 
conform to uniform standard of a one-dimensional scale like that of elites. Instead, issue-
based ideology appears to be something of a potpourri of countervailing or cross-pressured 
preferences that only weakly convey a semblance of organization according to the 
traditional understanding of the left-right continuum (Treier and Hillygus, 2009). 
In light of these distinctions, theorizing about, much less measuring, sorting 
requires greater attention to the underlying complexity of ideology. I propose that a better 
way of considering the extent to which Americans’ ideological preferences match to 
partisanship requires separating the relationship of between these two facets of ideology 
and partisanship. In the next chapter, I begin to build the empirical case that shoehorning 
both forms of “ideological” preferences into the calculus of sorting is a misguided approach 
to measuring sorting. Drawing on the distinctions laid out in this chapter, I will argue that, 
at least minimally, sorting should be broken into two separate components: an issue-based 
form of sorting, which reflects the degree to which particular policy preferences overlap 
with the partisan orientation, and a symbolic form of sorting, that accounts for the 
convergence between ideological and partisan identity. 
 
 
                                                          
35 Any discussion of issue-based ideology must ultimately account for the quality of 
attitudes found in opinion surveys. The idealized conception of public opinion 
communicates that individuals hold well-founded, carefully constructed opinions about a 
variety of socio-political phenomena. This description, however, is tenuous given 
longstanding realities about low levels of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996), sophistication (citation), and psychological tendencies that allow citizens to 
simultaneously hold both negative and positive dispositions toward attitude objects 
(Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen, 2012; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Approaching issue-
based ideology from a dispositional perspective, that is, examining whether latent domains 
structure opinions, releases researchers from holding a priori expectations about the 




Chapter 3: Defining Identity- and Issue-based Sorting 
 
Sorting is a changing correlation between partisanship and ideology, so that, in 
a sorted electorate, party and ideology are more closely related (more correlated) 
than in an unsorted electorate. 
~Levendusky, The Partisan Sort36 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The raw materials of sorting are a mix of evaluations, attitudes, and symbolic identities, 
and, as the previous two chapters indicate, quantifying the extent to which partisanship has 
converged with ideology requires taking these complexities seriously. Compositionally, 
extant research relies on a simple expression of sorting: “conservative” responses to policy 
questions and ideological identification are matched to identification with the Republican 
Party, while “liberal” responses to these items are matched to Democratic Party affiliation. 
The more items that fit into the appropriate partisan “bin,” the greater the sorting that must 
exist. This approach is certainly an important part of the sorting calculus; correct 
classification of terms is vital to the composition of sorting. Yet, focusing solely on 
matching without also accounting for the distribution of opinion hemorrhages valuable 
information about the extent to which individuals’ underlying attitudes and identities are 
“extreme,” thereby blunting the insights that sorting can offer about the character of public 
opinion—a key feature that lies at the heart of the larger debate regarding mass 
polarization.   
In this chapter, I argue that prior work on sorting suffers two serious 
shortcomings—one theoretical, the other, empirical—and outline an approach to 
measuring sorting that addresses these issues. Our first task is to recover the meaningful 
variation that is lost when we treat the concept of sorting as a relationship between discrete 
quantities. In effect, past work on partisan sorting treats the independent, leaning-partisan 
who possesses extreme and consistent ideological preferences as empirically identical to 
the strong partisan who possesses weak, though consistent, ones (c.f. Levendusky, 2009). 
                                                          




The problem with collapsing this variation should be obvious in that it confounds values 
that are theoretically distinct yet treated as empirical analogs.37 
Concurrent to addressing these measurement issues, our second task in this chapter 
is to disaggregate partisan sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs.38 As I have 
alluded, the pivotal criteria for making this distinction hinges on the multifaceted nature of 
ideology. Departing from The Partisan Sort’s approach, I argue that it is possible to 
construct a measure of policy-based sorting to complement the identity-based one utilized 
elsewhere (e.g. Mason, 2015; Davis and Dunaway, 2016).39 These concepts, while related, 
are not mere analogs. In the next chapter, I empirically defend this line of reasoning, but, 
for now, my goal is simply to outline the composition of these forms of sorting.  
Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion about how the approach to quantifying 
sorting outlined in this chapter offers insights into the disconnect between warring 
interpretations of mass polarization. On the face of it, the narrative that the American mass 
public is and has become more sorted over time is accurate. However, accounting for the 
underlying extremity of both partisan and ideological preferences paints a less dramatic, if 
not conclusive, portrait of mass opinion. While Americans are more likely to match their 
partisanship to their ideological preferences, the extent to which the mass public has sorted 
is modest. Thus, the common ground that sorting represents in the fight over whether 
attitudes have become more or less extreme is not quite the panacea that scholars 
sometimes suggest. If anything, convergence among the mass public’s preferences in the 
aggregate remains, on balance, quite superficial. 
 
 
3.2 Identity-based sorting 
At its core, identity-based sorting reflects the integration between two forms of political 
identities, the partisan and ideological self-concepts. As individuals become “better” 
                                                          
37 Further, extending the data utilized by Levendusky (2009) by two additional election 
cycles, I show that the predicted growth in sorting across a variety of issues has not 
happened for half of the issues analyzed. 
38 I use the terms “issue sorting” and “policy sorting” interchangeably.  
39 While some research has examined identity sorting on its own merits (e.g. Mason, 2015; 
Davis and Dunaway, 2016), issue-sorting has received virtually no attention outside of 
Levendusky’s (2009) original work. Further, no research explicitly juxtaposes these two 




sorted, their political identities move into alignment within left-right space, where 
Democrats identify as liberals and Republicans, conservatives. In this section, I first discuss 
the prevailing operationalization of partisan and ideological identities before specifying the 
mathematical expression that captures how these identities combine. 
 
3.2.1 Liberal-conservative ideological identity 
Symbolic ideology, or liberal-conservative identification, is a “representation of how 
citizens think about themselves: whether they consider their views to be liberal, 
conservative, moderate, or something else” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11).40 While there 
are a number of approaches to understanding the nature of this self-description, recent 
research argues that ideological identity reflects a form of social identity (Devine, 2015).41 
Within social psychology, an identity comprises conceptualizing the self as a member of a 
particular category, a process termed “self-categorization” (Terry, Hogg, and White, 2000; 
Turner, 1991). A given identity exists at a certain place and time and is, at least partially, a 
function of the cultural and discursive contexts that are unique to that time and place 
(Huddy, 2001). For example, “categorizing oneself as a “‘conservative’ will…constitute a 
social identity when one’s self-perception as conservative is experienced as a point of 
similarity with other ingroup members and as a point of collective difference with outgroup 
members” (Malka and Llekes, 2010, pg. 160). In this telling, the particular meaning of the 
ideological self-concept conveys an emotive, symbolic attachment to a particular 
ideological group. 
When pollsters ask individuals to report on the nature of their ideological self-
concept, however, the survey item often used to capture their responses does not explicitly 
frame ideological affiliation in terms of these group-based attachments. Instead, 
individuals are simply asked to place their views within a spectrum or scale ranging from 
“liberal” to “moderate” to “conservative” (one could be forgiven, then, for treating 
                                                          
40 This self-reflection might be objectively “accurate” in the sense that the many things an 
individual believes actually comport with this label, but, as I have previously noted, it is 
possible for this self-concept to be functionally independent of issues. 
41 Although this is not to say that this label is wholly devoid of policy-based meaning. 
These labels are not merely rhetorical devices, but do probably reflect some sort of 
“summary” of one’s underlying policy preferences. That said, for the average politically 
unknowledgeable and disinterested citizen, the quality of the issue content of these labels 




responses to this question as a “summary evaluations” rather than an indication of a unique 
form of social identity). Be that as it may, I will later demonstrate that these responses 
exhibit properties associated with social identities, even though the instrument is somewhat 
vague. Within this response set, left-leaning orientations comport to lower values and 
higher values conservative ones, ranging from “extremely liberal,” coded 1, to “extremely 
conservative,” coded 7.42 
 
 
Source: ANES 1984-2012 Time-series surveys 
Notes: Weighted sample frequencies 
 
Figure 3.1. The Traditional Measurement of Ideological Identification 
 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of responses to the traditional liberal-
conservative self-placements within the 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series surveys. Strikingly, 
the modal response category for this survey question is “moderate,” although pooling all 
“liberal” and “conservative” responses together indicates that a plurality of the mass public 
                                                          
42 While this response set is more or less continuous, Treier and Hillygus (2009) go so far 
as to argue that ideological self-identification should be operationalized as a nominal rather 
than an ordinal variable. In their estimation, moderates are not wholly moderate, which 
gives a false impression about the directionality or mixture of their preferences. Be that as 


























identifies with one of the two major ideological groups.43 However, it is worth noting that 
there are few individuals who readily identify with the ideological extremes compared to 
the more modest categories—an observation that immediately casts some suspicion on 
claims that the mass public is ideologically “extreme.” 
 
3.2.2 Partisan identification 
As the prior chapter suggests, partisan identification has been simultaneously 
conceptualized as both an evaluative orientation in that it compromises a generalized and 
enduring response to an object (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) and as a form of group 
attachments (Campbell et al., 1960). These are not necessarily mutually-exclusive 
interpretations (Greene, 2002), but the measurement of partisanship does introduce some 
amount of ambiguity as to the nature of what, precisely, scholars’ measurement tools are 
picking up when they attempt to quantify an individual’s partisan attachments. 
Nevertheless, it appears to be the case that the traditional approach to measuring 
partisanship “is better suited to measuring partisanship as group belonging than as an 
attitude” (Greene, 2002, pg. 174), if for no other reason that it explicitly asks individuals 
to first categorize themselves as a group member. This step is a critical component of the 
general social identity approach to measuring group identities in that such self-
categorization is vital to uncovering group membership (Tajfel, 1978).  
The traditional measurement of partisanship utilizes a branching set of survey 
items that first ask respondents whether they consider themselves to be a “Democrat,” 
Republican,” or an “Independent.” If individuals select one of the two party offerings, they 
are then asked to identify how strongly they feel about those group ties (this is where the 
“Michigan” measurement strategy muddies the water between group identity and 
evaluative attitude). For those individuals who first selected Independent identification, a 
                                                          
43 Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the actual framing of these questions is important to the 
responses given. Robinson and Fleishman (1988) find widespread evidence of “house 
effects” in the measurement of the liberal-conservative self-concept, noting that, while 
varying the number of response categories does not necessarily alter the observed ratio of 
liberals to conservatives, the middle response category does see systematic movement 
depending on how polling firms describe the midpoint of this scale and whether they give 






follow-up question asks whether these respondents “lean” toward one of the parties.44 
These persons are classified as “partisan leaners,” while those who do not deviate from 
Independent identification are treated as “pure” Independents.  
Values on this seven-category partisanship item range from 1, “strong Democrat,” 
to 7 “strong Republican.” Figure 3.2 portrays the distribution of these responses within the 
1984-2012 ANES Time-Series. Democrats comprise the plural group with which 
individuals associate. Unlike the more normal distribution of ideologues presented in 
Figure 3.1, the proportion of partisans in the varying categories of partisan strength tends 
to increase as we transition from weaker identities to stronger ones. Finally, note that 




Source: ANES 1972-2012 Time-series surveys 
Notes: Weighted sample frequencies 
 
Figure 3.2. The Traditional Measure of Partisanship 
 
3.2.3 Constructing a measure of identity-based sorting 
To construct a measure of identity sorting, I first construct a measure of overlap between 
partisan and ideological identification. I then take the product of the resulting overlap term 
                                                          
44 From a practical standpoint, these leaners are not that dissimilar to regular—and even 





























and the “strength” of the two identity items used to generate that value (c.f. Mason, 2015). 
To generate the overlap between identities, we simply subtract a respondent’s score on 
ideology from their score on partisanship and take the absolute value of the resulting 
number to account for the degree to which a person’s preferences are matched.  
 
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂) 
 
Empirically, if partisanship and ideology are scored on seven-point scales, ranging from 
low values (left-leaning: Democrat, liberal) to high ones (right-leaning: Republican, 
conservative), then complete overlap or perfect “sorted-ness” computes to zero—for 
example, scoring a seven on ideology (i.e. extremely conservative) minus a score of seven 
on partisanship (i.e. “strong Republican) yields a score of zero. Conversely, a person who 
exhibits extraordinarily low overlap would yield a high value according to this equation: 
subtracting the value 1 on partisanship (i.e. “strong Democrat”) from the value 7 on 
ideology (i.e. “extremely conservative”) produces a score of 6 . To reclaim a more sensible 
ordering of these values, we simply reverse-order them and then add “1” to these scores so 
that perfect overlap takes the highest value (7) and the least overlap the smallest value (1).45  
Having accounted for the extent of overlap between identities, we should now 
account for the extremity of them. To do this, we will multiply the overlap score by the 
“strength” of these attachments, which requires folding the identity varaibles at their 
midpoint. Here, the moderate / Independent categories take the value of 1, weak 
identification the value 2, moderate identification, 3, and, finally, strong group attachments 
a value of 4. After multiplying the overlap score by these strength values, I then rescale the 
measure of sorting to range from 0 to 1. Thus, this final score represents the degree of the 
overlap between an individual’s identities multiplied by the strength or extremity of both 
of those items.  
 
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 × 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 
 
                                                          
45 I add “1” to these scores because multiplying the value “0” by the forthcoming strength 
measures will naturally constrain all scores to a value of 0. If an individual scores a 0 as a 
function of strong, countervailing preferences, we are unable to recover the effects of the 
strength of those constituent preferences because multiplying a value of 0 by any integer 







Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of sorting scores, overlaid with three examples 
of different configurations of partisan and ideological identities. The scale is anchored by 
those persons who classify themselves as “pure” Independents and “pure” ideological 
moderates (0). As values increase, a number of things occur: 1) identities transition from 
neutral to one-sided, be that Republican (Democrat) or conservative (liberal), and 2) the 
correspondence or overlap between identities increases. Middling values, then, are 
indicative of moderately strong and cross-cutting identities (e.g. conservative Democrat), 
while higher values convey very strong and matching identities (e.g. conservative 
Republican). Unlike the discrete measure popularized by Levendusky (2009) in the 
Partisan Sort, which scores matching identities as “1” and all other combinations “0,” this 
coding scheme is theoretically sensible across empirical values and produces a metric of 




Source: ANES Time-Series, 1984-2012 
Notes: Variables have been rescaled to range from 0 (unsorted) to 1 (perfectly sorted). 
  
Figure 3.3. Distribution of Identity-based Sorting Scores 
 
 With these distinctions in mind, Figure 3.4 illustrates a comparison between the 
proportion of respondents whose ideological identity matches their partisan one, matching-
only, and the identity sorting variable described above. On the face of it, individuals have 




over time. From 1984 to 2012, the matching of liberal-conservative identity to partisanship 
within the mass public grew more than 20 percent. This is an impressive increase, but, 
when contextualized against the fuller identity sorting measure, it should be clear that this 
sorting is more modest when we account for the underlying distribution of the constituent 
items. From 1984 to 2000, sorting on ideology waffles back and forth around the value 
0.25 and peaks in 2008. By 2012, identity sorting has increased by about 10 percent relative 
the starting value in 1984, which is less than half the change observed across matching-
only item. The cautious conclusion that we might draw, then, is that while identity-based 
sorting has increased over time, a matching-only approach to sorting overstates the strength 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Solid vertical line indicates 
where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 















3.3 Issue-based sorting 
Peeling away liberal-conservative identity away from the omnibus sorting index found in 
extant research, we are now left with a series of issues that include respondents’ attitudes 
toward the government provision of healthcare, the scope of government and defense 
spending, the role of government in providing jobs and aid to minorities, rates of legal 
immigration, and the propriety (legality) of abortion and same-sex marriage. Taken 
together, these items contribute to a form of ideology that is “grounded more explicitly in 
concrete decisions, what citizens think the government should or should not be doing with 
respect to important matters of public policy” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11). In other 
words, these are the particular beliefs, attitudes and opinions that populate the network of 
an individual’s belief system. In this section, I turn to considering how we might apply the 
logic of sorting outlined above to create a complimentary (and novel) type of sorting rooted 
in the extent to which individuals’ policy opinions are matched to their partisanship.  
 Although I have made the case that partisanship can be conceptualized as an 
identity-based construct, and, therefore, that it should enjoy a special or unique relationship 
to ideological identity, there is a sizeable literature that argues that party affiliation is more 
appropriately construed as a summary evaluation of one’s political preferences—or that, at 
minimum, the cognitive content shared between partisanship and ideology is similar (Sharp 
and Lodge, 1985). In this telling, partisanship functions as a running tally of how the parties 
perform, an instrumental attachment of sorts rooted in the ideological proximity of an 
individual to their ideal party. As Fiorina writes (1981, pg. 84), partisanship can be 
described as a “running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and 
performance.” This account places particular importance on the connection between 
partisanship and issues, bolstered by recent work that finds that partisanship now contains 
a stronger issue-based foundation than previous years (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; 
Abramowtiz, 2010). Thus, we might still observe robust sorting on issues even after 
purging ideological identity from such a metric. 
 Operationalizing a policy-based approach to sorting is relatively straightforward 
using the ANES Time-Series issue placements because the response sets for those items 
resemble the same seven-category ones that comprise both ideological identity and 
partisanship. In this case, we wish to first account for the overlap between an individual’s 




partisanship and the individual issues are measured using seven-category, ordinal scales, 
the values of which can be roughly interpreted as ranging from liberal to conservative 
responses, generating a measure of overlap requires simply adhering to the coding scheme 
outlined in the previous section. We then simply multiply this overlap value (eq. 3) by the 
strength of the issue attitude and partisanship (eq. 4).46  In each respective section, I 
juxtapose the resulting issue sorting score with a matching only one that merely reflects 
whether the policy preference is correctly-matched to the respondent’s partisanship, coded 
1, or not, coded 0. 
 
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
 
𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 × 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 
 
 
3.3.1 Sorting on individual issues 
There are a number of policy issues that we might examine in the pursuit of constructing 
an issue-based form of sorting, limited only by the content included in survey 
questionnaires. Customarily, however, the ANES Time-Series surveys have routinely 
featured only a limited number of policy issues over a sufficiently long duration of time. 
Six policy items, however, have been regularly included on these surveys dating back to 
1984. They include perspectives on aid to minorities, the provision of government 
healthcare, whether the government should guarantee citizens jobs, abortion, and defense 
and social welfare spending. 
 
Aid to blacks / minorities  
I begin with the question of whether government ought to offer targeted aid to African 
Americans. This question was intended to capture whether or not individuals believe that 
government assistance is needed to counterbalance prevailing inequalities that exist among 
certain minority racial groups. Rooted in the legacy of Civil Rights era policy changes, the 
                                                          
46 An alternative approach to operationalizing “issue sorting” includes building an Item 
Response model that computes a latent, policy-based form of ideology. This is more or less 
the approach Ellis and Stimson (2012) take in constructing their “operational” ideology 







policy debate over the question of affirmative action within the mass public has remained 
divisive, even though elected officials periodically claim that the mass public is staunchly 






Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Y-axis is interpreted differently 
for the different variables. For “matching-only” estimates, y-axis conveys 
percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-sorting,” 
estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Estimates weighted 
by population weights. Solid vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky 
(2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.5. Issue sorting on “Aid to blacks and minorities” 
 
 
                                                          
47 Like any question that taps into a sensitive matrix of economic, social, and even religious 
material, the phrasing of language used to capture preferences related to affirmative action 
matters a great deal. Steeh and Krysan (1996) assemble a great range of data from varying 
polling firms that indicate that couching this question in terms of quotas in both 
employment and admissions settings produces variation in positive responses to the 
question of affirmative action compared to more generalized phrasing regarding “aid” to 
blacks and minorities. However, because the overarching support for these policies is low, 













In the mid-1980s, the ANES began fielding a version of an affirmative action item 
that asked individuals to place themselves along a seven-category scale that ranges in the 
degree to which individuals think that government should intervene to redress these 
inequalities. Specifically, the question put to respondents is worded as follows: “Some 
people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the 
social and economic position of blacks…others feel that the government should not make 
any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about it?”48 
The solid dark line in Figure 3.5 depicts how responses to this policy question 
match to partisanship. This illustration reveals that matching on this item has increased 
modestly over time. In the early 1980s, roughly 40% of individuals conveyed responses to 
this question that were matched correctly to partisanship. Although sorting on such aid 
varies considerably, 2004 represents the high watermark for matching on these responses. 
Turning to the measure of issue sorting, a similar upward trend manifests, although the 
actual amount of sorting on this issue is markedly superficial. A more direct comparison 
between the change in sorting over time communicates that the issue-based measure of 
sorting increases roughly 7 percent compared to about six-and-a-half percent for the 
discrete term. Interestingly, this is the only issue on which the change in issue sorting 
surpasses the change matching, a finding that is perhaps related to the racialization of this 
policy by the Obama presidency (e.g. Tesler, 2012).  
 
Government healthcare 
Public debate on the issue of whether government should provide healthcare dates as far 
back as the mid-1800s.49 Support for the issue moved to the center of the modern policy 
                                                          




49 As a component of the broader progressive movement, reformers pushed to improve 
social conditions of the working class through the provision of social insurance, but, 
without a strong working class consciousness, support for these measures was relatively 
low. Combined with stiff opposition to nationalized insurance programs from doctors, 
interest groups (specifically, the American Medical Association [AMA]), labor groups, 




agenda, however, in the aftermath of FDR’s death and Truman’s subsequent elevation to 
the Presidency. Although Truman supported shifting state-administered systems of health 
care toward a national one, a brief Democratic majority in Congress wasn’t enough to push 
legislation through the House of Representatives, stymied, in part, by the American 
Medical Association and Republicans’ characterization of a national health system as 
“socialist.” With the growth in Cold War tensions over socialism, the mere whisper that a 
broad, government-funded health insurance program might reflect socialist programming 
was enough to doom the passage of any such proposal. These fault lines remained largely 
intact over the next fifty years, preventing any meaningful movement toward a nationalized 
system of health insurance through at least a half-dozen presidencies. Eventually, Bill 
Clinton’s Administration would come close to seeing universal coverage extended to 
Americans, but it was not until 2010 that President Barack Obama and Congressional 
Democrats passed the Affordable Care Act through a use of procedural rules to extend 
medical and insurance benefits to millions of previously-uncovered Americans.   
Unsurprisingly, public attention to the issue of whether government or the private 
sector should provide health insurance has waxed and waned considerably over time, even 
as little actual legislative progress occurred. The ANES has surveyed respondents on this 
issue as far back as the early 1970s, but, here, we pick up the issue in 1984. The verbiage 
of this survey item has evolved subtlety over time, but is generally specified as follows: 
“There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people 
feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and 
hospital expenses for everyone…Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by 
individuals through private insurance plans. Where would you place yourself on this scale, 
or haven't you thought much about this?”50  Possible responses to this item are anchored 
by two opposing perspectives: at the left-leaning or liberal end, a preference for 
government health insurance; on the right-leaning or conservative end, a preference for a 
completely privatized system of insurance.  
                                                          
through the early 1940s largely failed to move the needle on support for government 
intervention in the provision of health insurance. 







Figure 3.6 illustrates that the matching of respondents’ attitudes to partisanship has 
steadily risen from 1984 to 2012, although when we account for overlap and strength, this 
change looks less impressive. While the raw overlap between partisanship and insurance 
attitudes has increased almost 14 percentage points over time, the change in issue sorting 
is roughly 50% less than that estimate. In other words, while respondents are more likely 
to give an ideologically-correct answer to this survey item, the strength of sorting on this 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Y-axis is interpreted differently 
for the different variables. For “matching-only” estimates, y-axis conveys 
percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-sorting,” 
estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid vertical line 
indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.6. Issue sorting on “Provision of health insurance” 
 
Government provision of jobs 
The question of whether the government should offer jobs to its citizens juxtaposes whether 
individuals prefer a more expansive federal government, where government provides work 
to jobless citizens and maintains basic standards of living, or whether individuals believe 
that prosperity and employment are best left to an unencumbered private sector. Proponents 















a fundamental role in shaping social and economic inequalities by providing marketplace 
assistance in the form of vocational training, public service employment, institutional 
training, or even job creation and placement programs. Over time, a number of programs 
that encompass the practical manifestation of this approach have been legislated through 
Congress, including the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Progress Administration, 
and, more recently, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act program. 
Conversely, detractors of these policies and programs argue that they are a violation of 
certain principles that guarantee an open and free marketplace and freedom from the type 
of coercive governmental regulation that ostensibly accompanies the former approach. 
Instead of providing net increases in job creation and employment, this perspective conveys 
that “new governmental jobs will instead attract individuals who are already employed in 
the public economy, but at lower rates of pay than the new positions being devised by 
government” (Wanniski, 1978, pg. 84).  
Support for either of these perspectives is measured through a survey item that 
juxtaposes governmental intervention relative personal responsibility as these concepts 
relate to the provision of jobs. In the ANES, this question is usually operationalized as: 
“Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person 
has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each 
person get ahead on his/her own…Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't 
you thought much about this?”51 
On balance, Figure 3.7 reveals that matching on this item has remained largely 
static over time, decreasing during certain presidential cycles (2000) and increasing during 
others (2004). The full measure of issue sorting reveals a similar pattern insofar sorting on 
this item has either remained constant (2008) or actually fallen slightly (2012) in recent 
years. Given the unstable nature of the economic environment throughout these years, 
which covered the worst major economic recession since the Great Depression, sorting on 
this item probably fell as those individuals feeling the impact of job loss and employment—
who were otherwise Republicans—selected slightly more liberal preferences on this item. 
                                                          







Turning to the issue sorting measure, which accounts for the strength of these attitudes, we 
see a somewhat similar pattern. Be that as it may, the extent to which individuals are sorted 
on the provision of jobs only increased by about two percent from 1984 to 2012, about 50 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Y-axis is interpreted differently 
for the different variables. For “matching-only” estimates, y-axis conveys 
percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-sorting,” 
estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1).  Solid vertical line 
indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 




The size and scope of federal spending is one of the bread and butter issues of American 
public policy, and has generated a sizable academic literature (e.g. Cook and Barrett 1992; 
Gillens, 1999; Jacoby, 1994, 2000; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). Although the scope of 
federal spending is ultimately tied to budgetary appropriations, it is rarely connected back 
to the question of the taxes necessary to provide for programmatic spending. In fact, as is 
often the case when the question is placed before respondents, the item effectively asks 














spending will be paid for. This is, of course, the ironic twist to attitudes toward spending, 
which Citrin (1979) famously describes as “wanting something for nothing.”  
  In general, the American citizenry reliably supports the federal government 
providing social goods and services. As Faricy and Ellis (2014, pg. 56-57) write, “[t]the 
idea the government should play a role in providing housing for the poor, pensions for the 
elderly, education for all children, and a variety of other social benefits is popular with the 
public, even among Republicans and Conservatives.” Yet while the public tends to support, 
on balance, a government that pursues some modest amount of “redistribution” (e.g. Page 
and Jacobs, 2009), individuals still tend to hold rather negative opinions of the government. 
In fact, while there is a commitment to social spending for the aforementioned groups, the 
public holds intuitively countervailing preferences for a leaner and small government (Ellis 
and Stimson, 2012).  
 The ANES Time-Series surveys approach the question of government spending by 
juxtaposing two perspectives. One end of a seven-category response set is anchored with 
“Some people think government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health 
and education, in order to reduce spending.” On the other end of the spectrum is the 
statement “Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more 
services even if it means an increase in spending.”52 Respondents are then asked to pick a 
value between those two points that best represents their feelings toward the provision of 
government services and spending.  
 Figure 3.8 illustrates that matching between policy attitudes and partisanship has 
gradually increased over time, while the change in issue sorting is effectively flat. Further, 
the estimates actually seem to diverge after 2004—although the raw overlap between 
partisanship and issue positions increases, once we account for the underlying extremity of 
these components, we observe issue sorting actually decreases. Table 1 buoys this visual 
presentation by presenting the percentage change in these concepts over time. Here, we 
observe that matching increases roughly nine percent from 1984 to 2012, while issue 
sorting only increased by about three percent. 
 
                                                          









Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Y-axis is interpreted differently 
for the different variables. For “matching-only” estimates, y-axis conveys 
percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-sorting,” 
estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid vertical line 
indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.8. Issue sorting on “Government spending” 
 
Defense spending 
The United States’ armed forces are unparalleled, but a mighty military does not come 
cheap. In fact, the United States spends more money on its military than the next fifteen 
countries…combined. And even though the United States’ population is only roughly five 
percent of the global population, it produces almost 50 percent of the world’s total military 
expenditures (Thompson, 2010).53 Over the previous decade, defense spending has 
increased more than 100 percent, a higher rate of transfer than even the monies allotted to 
the military complex during the height of Reagan’s presidency during the Cold War. In 
other words, defense spending is higher today than at any other time since the Second 
                                                          
53 Whence does this money come? Military spending is a component of the discretionary 
budget, or the money that Presidential Administrations and Congress have direct oversight 
over and must act to spend each year (as opposed to mandatory spending, or monies that 
are spent to remain in compliance with laws already on the books, e.g. social security, 














World War—even as the overall economy contracted. To put this output into perspective, 
the Pentagon spends more money on warmaking activities than all 50 states together spend 
on health, education, and welfare.  
While federal spending is easy to classify within the liberal-conservative 
framework, public attitudes toward defense spending somewhat resist this left-right 
classification. While it is true that opinions toward defense spending should be related 
toward perspectives on government spending, public attitudes toward defense expenditures 
bedevil such simple comparisons. Instead, the mass public generally appears to support 
defense spending on balance, although there is no real broad consensus among ordinary 
Americans regarding whether the federal government spends too little, too much, or just 
about the right amount on military spending. Baretls (1994, pg. 497) provides some 
evidence that even in light of major geopolitical upheaval in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
“both the level and the structure of defense spending preferences among the least informed 
60 percent of the public have changed only marginally.”54 The ANES Time-Series surveys 
measure attitudes toward defense spending by asking respondents to place themselves 
along a seven-category continuum ranging from “Some people believe that we should 
spend much less money for defense” to “Others feel that defense spending should be 
greatly increased.”55  
Figure 3.9 shows variation in sorting on this item over time. There is a general 
downward trajectory for both matching and issue sorting until 2004, at which point the 
proportion of individuals correctly matching policy to partisanship increases. Ostensibly, 
this change was the result of Republicans becoming better sorted as the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars reached a crescendo. However, in the intervening years since 2004, we 
                                                          
54 However his postulation that the downward inertia of a willingness to spend more money 
on defense among the informed might reduce the scope of such spending has not borne 
out—military spending has proven remarkably resilient even in the face of a modest 
aggregate preference to reduce it, perhaps because of its connection to the military-
industrial business complex or the subsequent explosion of defense spending in the wake 
of 9/11. 








observe a decrease in matching and issue sorting. In the aggregate, changes in sorting are 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. For “matching-only” estimates, 
y-axis conveys percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-
sorting,” estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid 
vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.9. Issue sorting on “Defense spending” 
 
Abortion 
The issue of abortion is one of the most singularly divisive issues of social policy in modern 
political discourse, which asks “What role should the federal government play in 
determining whether, if not when, a woman is allowed to willingly terminate a pregnancy?” 
The question over the legality of abortion is inextricably linked to Roe v. Wade, in which 
the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy provided by the 14th Amendment’s due 
process clause extended to a woman’s reproductive choices, with one important caveat—
the state has a legitimate interest in balancing both the health of a woman against protecting 
the potentiality of life. This logic was further refined in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court attempted to explicitly demarcate the 













pregnancy. Eschewing the trimester template originally established by Roe v. Wade, which 
stipulated the state could regulate abortion in the third trimester of pregnancy, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey determined that viability could occur as early as 24 weeks, and, thus 
that the government (state) has a compelling reason to reject allowing the termination of a 
pregnancy beyond that point.  
In light of these developments, surveys generally measure public opinion on 
abortion by juxtaposing the perspective that abortion should never be allowed with a series 
of responses that vary the permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances and 
culminating with a response that communicates that abortion access should be effectively 
unrestricted. The ANES Time-Series’ method for capturing individuals’ attitudes toward 
the issue of abortion fits this approach and provides four categories that respondents may 
select: 1) By law, abortion should never be permitted, 2) The law should permit abortion 
only in case of rape, incest, or when a woman’s life is in danger, 3) The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after 
the need for abortion has been clearly established, and 4) By law, a woman should always 
be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.56 
Given that abortion is coded using this four-category scheme, operationalizing 
both a discrete and continuous measure of sorting on this issue demands a bit of creativity 
in arraying these values so that they fit the seven-category scheme of partisanship. Here, I 
array the two more permissive response categories of abortion attitudes at values 1 and 3, 
respectively, the most restrictive category of abortion at 5, and the response that abortion 
should never be legal at 7. For the purposes of creating a “matching” item, Democrats 
match to values 1 and 3 and Republicans 5 and 7.57 Measuring issue sorting follows the 
basic template provided in the previous section: I calculate an overlap score between 
                                                          
56 One drawback to this approach is that it does not ask respondents about viability related 
to the duration of the pregnancy; still, this template provides substantially more information 
than simply asking respondents whether they identify as “pro-choice” or “pro-life.” The 




57 Readers may balk at matching extremely limited abortion provisions to Republican 
identification, but a nontrivial proportion of Republicans would allow for the termination 




abortion attitudes and partisanship. Folding the abortion responses in half provides two 





Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. For “matching-only” estimates, 
y-axis conveys percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-
sorting,” estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid 
vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.10. Issue sorting on “Abortion” 
 
Figure 3.10 presents the average amount of matching and issue sorting on abortion 
over time. There is a clear increase in the amount of sorting across both measures, although 
the increase in the extent to which individuals are sorted on abortion is less extreme than 
we might expect. From 1984 to 2012, issue sorting has increased by about six points. This 
is about 40 percent less than the change in the simple overlap between abortion issue 
preferences and partisanship.  
 
3.3.2 Constructing a measure of issue-based sorting 
Having developed and reviewed separate measures of matching-only and issue sorting 















based sorting that reflects the total sorting across these various policy items. In theory, this 
composite variable should reflect a type of cohesiveness within an individual’s ideological 
worldview in that this item encompasses the extent to which an individual is able to make 
connections or abstractions between their partisanship and many policy preferences. The 
aggregate measure of issue sorting presented in Figure 3.11 accounts for both the overlap 
between partisanship and ideological preferences and the extremity (or strength) of these 
items. Combining the separate policy sorting items together results in an index that ranges 
that also ranges from 0 to 1 (see eq. 5).  
 





As scores transition from minimum (0) to maximum values (1), not only does overlap or 
“sorting” increase, but so, too, does the extremity of these underlying considerations. In 
other words, this variable more appropriately accounts for Independents with moderate 
views, “confused” partisans whose attitudes appear to be the function of simple random 
selection, cross-pressured partisans with a variety of strong views, and sophisticated, strong 
partisans with highly-consistent opinions. 
Figure 3.11 contextualizes how issue sorting within the mass public has changed 
over time relative a matching-only approach. According to a minimalist specification of 
sorting in which attitudes and partisanship need only match, there does appear to be robust 
issue sorting within the mass public—even beyond the levels observed by Levendusky 
(2009). For all the debate over the distribution of mass opinion over time, sorting on a 
series of multifaceted policy issues seems to have occurred. If the relationship between 
partisanship and ideological preferences conveys the quality of public opinion, then this 
finding suggests that moderate coherence within mass opinion exists.  
Figure 3.11 contextualizes how issue sorting within the mass public has changed 
over time relative a matching-only approach. According to a minimalist specification of 
sorting in which attitudes and partisanship need only match, there does appear to be robust 
issue sorting within the mass public—even beyond the levels observed by Levendusky 
(2009). For all the debate over the distribution of mass opinion over time, sorting on a 





partisanship and ideological preferences conveys the quality of public opinion, then this 





Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. For “matching-only” estimates, 
y-axis conveys percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-
sorting,” estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid 
vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends. 
 
Figure 3.11. Issue sorting over time 
 
However, as we turn our attention to the measure of issue sorting, this conclusion 
is somewhat tempered. Notice that the predicted values for this variable stay relatively flat, 
occasionally increasing in some years (e.g. 1994, 2004) only to significantly decrease in 
others (e.g. 2000, 2012). In fact, from 2004 to 2012, sorting has not appreciably changed, 
even as congressional legislators have become increasingly polarized. This is not at all 
what we would have expected according to the traditional account of sorting, and it draws 
into relief the notion that public opinion is characterized by both heterogeneity and 


























Government spending +8.9 +3.1 
Defense spending +1.4 -0.7 
Aid to blacks +6.6 +7.0 
Abortion +10.1 +6.3 
Government healthcare +13.5 +5.8 
Government jobs +4.2 +2.1 
 Avg. percent ∆ in sorting  +7.45 +3.93 
 
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Percent change is value of sorting metric in 2012 less value in 1984. 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
The extent to which individuals have become more sorted over time pales compared to 
changes in discrete sorting. Individuals may be more skilled at matching partisanship and 
ideology in 2012 than they were some 30 years previous, but this connection is appreciably 
weak. Further, the rate of change in sorting across identity and issue sorting over time is 
muted relative changes in the simple matching of ideology to partisanship. This finding is 
consistent with a robust literature that persuasively argues that ideological constraint does 
not describe the cognitive capabilities of the mass public (e.g. Converse, 1964; Zaller, 
1992; Lupton, Myers, and Thorton, 2015). 
This evidence offers some caution for scholarly (Levendusky, 2009) and popular 
depictions of sorting (Pew, 2014), which allege that this phenomenon is a prominent feature 
of public opinion—“what has happened in the United States,” argues Morris Fiorina, “is 
not polarization, but sorting.”58 This is true. The American public has become better sorted 
over time. 
Yet, the data presented here show very little evidence of extremity in the extent to 
which individuals are sorted. In other words, there is little evidence for what is traditionally 
understood as mass polarization. Thus, when we correct the discrete measure of sorting to 
more appropriately account for Independent persons and the underlying strength of mass 






preferences, even the degree to which the mass public appears “sorted” is lower than 
expected. If anything, convergence among the mass public’s preferences in the aggregate 
has been and continues to be quite modest. Further, the alleged benefits of elite 
polarization—more citizens who align their preferences to match those of their party’s 
(Levendusky, 2010)—have not necessarily borne the expected proverbial fruit. 
Polarization within Congress has reached all-time highs (voteview.com), yet, according to 
a matching-only approach to sorting, the mass public is not appreciably better at matching 
ideology to partisanship in 2012 relative 2004. It seems that there is a limit to the upper 
threshold of how individuals connect their ideology to their partisanship. Whatever 
expected “benefits” of such elite polarization exist, they have somewhat run their course.   
Still, there are a number of questions that remain after the presentation of this 
descriptive data. The careful reader may wonder whether these constructs are statistically 
independent, mere clones, or, perhaps, instead, two sides of a common coin. In the next 
chapter, I present a series of analyses that demonstrate why and how these forms of sorting 
are related, though distinct facets of partisan sorting.  
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Chapter 4: Partisan Sorting: Are Identity- and Issue Sorting Two Sides 
of the Same Coin? 
 
…all measurement is theory testing. Therefore, measurement always constitutes 
a tentative statement about the nature of reality. 
~Jacoby (1999, pg. 271) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As the prior chapter outlines, the justification for disaggregating partisan sorting into 
identity- and issue-based constructs is grounded in conceptual differences between liberal-
conservative identity and liberal-conservative policy preferences. This chapter, in turn, 
presents an empirical case for this distinction and proceeds in three parts. First, I explore 
the relationship between identity and policy sorting. I find that, while the correlation 
between these forms of sorting has increased in the aggregate, there is little systemic 
evidence at the individual level to suggest that individuals’ policy attitudes become more 
or less well-matched to partisanship over time. In contrast, however, I show that citizens’ 
liberal-conservative and partisan identities exhibit signs of convergence as time passes.  
Second, I investigate how political acumen or knowledge is related to sorting. 
Because sorting utilizes “left-right” space as its organizing criterion, successfully 
navigating this ideological dimension should, at minimum, shape how individuals think 
about their preferences in relation to their partisan affiliation. In particular, I explore the 
connection between what individuals know about this space—where the parties and their 
policies “fit” in the left-right dimension—and sorting. Predictably, a grasp of such 
information exerts differentiated effects on identity and policy sorting.     
Finally, in order to emphasize differences between identity and policy sorting, I 
explore how these two forms of sorting differ in their capacity to shape group-based 
affinities. A core finding in social psychology conveys that group attachments are tied to 
the extent to which an individual’s in-group is narrow or restrictive. When an individual’s 
preferences are cross-cutting, or do not overlap, tolerance toward members of other groups 
is generally higher than when an individual does not belong to a diverse set of groups 
(Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Brewer, 1999)—i.e. when an individual is unsorted. I find, 
however, that the prevailing operationalization of partisan sorting mispredicts such 
tolerance. Even in the absence of a series of highly-consistent policy preferences, moderate 
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levels of identity-based sorting are a sufficient condition for observing severe levels of 
ideological biases.  
Taken together, this evidence draws the arguments of the prior chapters into sharp 
relief. While identity and policy sorting are not orthogonal, they nevertheless represent 
separate facets of partisan sorting. As a result, any account of the ongoing sorting of the 
American mass public, to say little of predictive analyses that examine the effects of such 
sorting on various political phenomena, must take these differences seriously.  
 
4.2 Is all sorting, sorting? 
To distinguish identity- from issue-based sorting, I begin by analyzing four simple, 
bivariate relationships: 1) the correlation between liberal-conservative identity and policy 
consistency, 2) the correlation between liberal-conservative and partisan identity, 3) the 
correlation between policy consistency and partisanship, and, 4) the correlation between 
identity and policy sorting. Beginning with Panel A in Figure 4.1, I present a jittered 
scatterplot in which responses to ideological self-identification, arrayed on the x-axis, are 
juxtaposed by “issue ideology” scores, arrayed on the y-axis.59 This latter variable is an 
additive index of the policy items outlined in the previous chapter, which includes abortion, 
social and defense spending, aid to minorities, healthcare, and employment preferences. 
Remaining agnostic about the underlying dimensionality of these data, this measure of 
“issue ideology” merely accounts for the consistency of opinions across these policy areas, 
where liberal opinions take low and conservative opinions take high values. Thus, 
individuals who espouse multiple very conservative or very liberal policy preferences 
would be located at the respective liberal or conservative poles on the x-axis; individuals 
who possess a heterogeneous configuration of policy preferences will be drawn toward the 
center of this axis.  
 
                                                          
59 “Jittering” is merely a change to the proportion or “weight” of each observation within 
the scatterplot so as to allow for maximum visual clarity. Without jittering, these panels 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Scatterplot estimates have been jittered to account for the sheer volume of responses. 
Figure 4.1. Scatterplots of the relationship between ideology and partisanship 
 
 
To the reader familiar with the ongoing measurement debate surrounding such 
forms of “ideology,” there is some research that argues that individuals with strong 
countervailing views are not “moderate” in the sense that their apparent moderation is 
simply a feature of mathematical computation (Broockman, 2016; Ahler and Broockman, 
n.d.). This seems logically correct insofar as moderation, according to a strict definition, 
implies neutrality. However, in this application, I am not wholly concerned about whether 
these persons are “true” moderates insofar as moderation represents neutrality or 
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indifferent preferences. Instead, I’m only interested in testing whether this form of 
attitudinal consistency is matched to ideological self-identification. As Panel A illustrates, 
the relationship between these two concepts is modest (r = 0.45). The central category of 
“moderate” self-identification on the y-axis indicates that there is significant heterogeneity 
among the policy preferences of individuals who consider themselves to be ideologically 
unaffiliated. In fact, these individuals are highly emblematic of the problem with treating 
issue- and identity-based conceptions of ideology as analogues: a great many symbolic 
ideologues, those persons who claim to be “liberal’ or “conservative,” possess sharply 
countervailing views.60 
Given this variation, it is likely that the relationship between partisanship and these 
two forms of ideology should also vary. Moving to Panels B and C, I present two 
scatterplots that depict the correlation between partisanship and issue ideology and 
partisanship and liberal-conservative identity, respectively. Beginning with Panel B, it is 
clear that issue consistency, again arrayed on the x-axis, fits rather poorly with partisanship, 
arrayed on the y-axis. The correlation between the two variables is modest (r = 0.33), 
conveying that the items share only about 11 percent of their variance. To illustrate the 
heterogeneity among the policy preferences of partisans, let us consider those individuals 
who classify themselves within the second strongest category of Democratic identification, 
the second row of jittered estimates from the bottom. While these partisans tend to hold 
somewhat liberal policy preferences, a modest proportion of individuals in this category 
hold views that are, on balance, conservative-leaning. This variation should not necessarily 
come as a surprise, however, given what we know about the tenuous coupling of self-
professed ideological labels and particularistic beliefs (Converse, 1964; Sides, 2012; Ellis 
and Stimson, 2012). Partisanship may partially embody a summary representation of policy 
preferences, but it is rather weakly related to consistency within the organizational structure 
of an individual’s policy attitudes. Simply, we observe less sorting among policy 
preferences than we might otherwise assume.    
Turning to Panel C, the relationship between ideological and partisan identification 
is comparatively stronger (r = 0.47). Given that both ideological and partisan self-
                                                          
60 At any rate, we could just as easily rename this axis’ midpoint “mixed” preferences as 
opposed to “moderate.” And, indeed, a great deal of individuals who identify as extreme 
liberals or conservatives appear to possess mixed policy views. 
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identification are seven-category items, the graphic presents 49 separate spheres—one for 
each categorical match between the various categories of partisan and ideological 
identification. Light grey spheres contain fewer dots and represent categorical matches that 
have low frequency; where fit between categories is high, the sphere is darker and appears 
almost opaque. As Panel C illustrates, we observe that the correlation between these items 
is positive. The upper-right and lower-left quadrants, which reflect correct and strong 
matching between ideological and partisan identification, contain a significant proportion 
of respondents.  
If the extent to which partisanship and ideology are related to each other varies by 
the type of ideology, then what is the relationship between these the two forms of sorting 
as specified in the prior chapter? Panel D in Figure 4.1 plots the relationship between 
identity and policy sorting. Here, we observe that a substantial proportion of estimates are 
located in the bottom-left quadrant of this graphic, which conveys that a modest plurality 
of individuals are unsorted across both their policy preferences and their chosen political 
identities. Further, while the relationship between identity and policy sorting is positive 
and moderately strong, it is not clear that simply being sorted across one’s political 
identities is sufficient (or even necessary) for concomitant sorting across issue preferences. 
Because Figure 4.1 encapsulates responses to all Time-Series surveys dating back 
to 1984, it may be the case that the relationship between these forms of sorting is obscured 
by pooling this data together. To this end, Figure 4.2 portrays the relationship between 
issue and identity sorting over time by depicting the correlation coefficient for these items 
at four-year intervals. The strength of their relationship decreases slightly after 1984, rises 
in 1996, and then plummets in 2000. It rises sharply in 2004 only to dip precipitously again 
in 2008. Finally, in 2012, the relationship between issue and identity sorting reaches its 
peak within the 1984 to 2012 timeframe (r = 0.65). As the dotted fit line indicates, there is 
a slight upward trend over time in the extent to which these concepts are related, yet these 








Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series surveys 
Notes: Point estimates reflect Pearson’s product-moment correlation in a given 
year, weighted using general population weights.  




However, because the above data are cross-sectional, it is difficult to interpret 
precisely how individual-level sorting changes from one point in time to another, much 
less whether the correlation between these forms of sorting changes for individuals 
between time periods. Ideally, we could look at how individuals’ political identities and 
attitudes covary over a long duration of time to determine whether or not there is 
convergence among them. Unfortunately, however, the panel data needed to test this 
relationship is relatively limited. Still, two datasets can be utilized in creative ways to 
explore these relationships.  
The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study was a ground-breaking, decades-long 
exploration of how individuals’ social and political preferences and behaviors varied over 
time. Spanning the better part of 40 years, the study included four separate waves that 
sampled, without replacement, the same group of American citizens from 1965 to 1997. 
Fortuitously, the 1973, 1982, and 1997 waves included both the seven-category liberal-
conservative and partisan self-placement instruments necessary to observe how the 



















strength of the relationship between partisanship and liberal-conservative identity grows 
over the course of the study. By 1997, the final wave of the study, the shared 
correspondence between partisanship and ideology—a rough reflection of “sorting”—
almost doubles from the first wave in which these questions were first asked.    
 
Table 4.1. Correlation between liberal-conservative and partisan self-
placement over 2nd-4th waves 
Pearson’s r…   




0.35 1973 (2nd wave) 
0.51 1982 (3rd wave) 
0.61 1997 (4th wave) 
Source: 1965-1997 Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study 
Notes: Entries constitute Pearson’s r correlation coefficient. Liberal-conservative 
self-placement was not surveyed in the 1965 wave.  
 
 
The rub with this data, however, is that the surveys did not include the needed 
policy items to explore issue sorting. Thus, I turn to the 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study 
provides the opportunity to observe changes in sorting among the same cohort of 
individuals over a period of four years and, importantly, compare how issue and identity 
sorting vary over time. To this end, Figure 4.3 presents a set of point estimates that illustrate 
changes in identity and issue sorting from 1992 to 1996.  I find that the average change in 
issue sorting is a little less than one point, although the difference is not significant by 
virtue of the confidence interval’s lower bound crossing the 0.00 threshold. However, the 
change in identity-based sorting from 1992 to 1996 is statistically significant, representing 
roughly an eight percent increase in sorting. Further adding an interesting wrinkle to the 
claim that these forms of sorting are appreciably different, the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient between identity and issue sorting in 1996 is actually weaker (r = 0.21) than in 
1992 (r = 0.33). Thus, while the correlation between identity- and issue-based sorting has 
increased in the aggregate, the individual-level estimates imply that the passage of time 
does not inevitably beget concomitant changes in the relationship between ideological 






Source: 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study 
Notes: Point estimates are difference-in-difference change in sorting from 1992 
to 1996. Solid lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 4.3. Changes in respondent issue and identity sorting over time 
 
 
4.3 The informational correlates of sorting 
Having explored the compositional relationship between identity and policy sorting, the 
data indicate that, while these items are clearly related, they constitute different facets of 
the relationship between ideology and partisanship. One way of further teasing apart these 
differences is to consider how the correlates of these forms of sorting differ. In particular, 
if identity and policy sorting are only modestly related, then the information that structures 
how individuals connect ideological and partisan preferences may differ, as well. In this 
section, I consider how an individual’s ability to navigate and knowledge of the left-right 
political space shapes the extent to which they are sorted.  
 
4.3.1 Sorting and left-right space 
An impressive body of literature demonstrates that at least one major ideological dimension 
reliably structures political discourse across a variety of mature democratic contexts: the 
generalized “left-right” continuum (e.g. Gross and Sigelman, 1984; Kroh, 2007). This axis 


























meaning from a variety of socio-cultural and economic forces (Inglehart and Klingemann, 
1976). Conceptually, it is customary to interpret the left-right distinction as one that 
juxtaposes equality, autonomy, and openness to change—emblematic of the “left”— with 
the preservation of the status quo, the exercise of control, and a general tendency to resist 
change—emblematic of the “right” (Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov, 2011; Jost, Federico, 
and Napier, 2009). While these are broad generalizations, this left-right scheme is an 
elegant solution for simplifying and comparing complex, multilayered realities (Maier, 
2007) and functions as an efficient mechanism through which citizens and elites 
communicate (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990).61 
Still, the degree to which this space accurately embodies political conflict and 
discourse varies across contexts. In fact, as Maier (2007, pg. 211-212) writes, “while 
European or Anglo-American voters, observers, and even political actors themselves may 
be happy to use the terms left and right, it is not always [clear] that they all share the same 
meaning of the terms.” In locations where the left-right dimension is less salient, it is 
generally the case that some other, well-established schema orients the dominant political 
culture. In the United States, for example, the “liberal-conservative” dimension is the 
prevailing scheme that structures such conflict. However, over time, the language of the 
“left-right” ideological space has been increasingly overlaid onto this liberal-conservative 
schema (Laponce, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1981).62 As Jost and colleagues (2009, pg. 
311) write, “it is becoming increasingly common to substitute ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ 
for ‘left’ and ‘right,’ respectively.” 
If the left-right ideological space serves a collective purpose, then it functions as a 
symbolic frame of reference that orients individuals to political groups. Given the close 
correspondence between the left-right and liberal-conservative spaces, successfully 
navigating one space ought to be related to understanding the other and, by extension, 
identity sorting (which is composed of such symbolic orientations). While this expectation 
                                                          
61 While it is true that elites generally employ these terms, Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) 
demonstrate that a not insubstantial proportion of the mass public are able to understand 
the meanings of “left” and “right,” although this is highly contingent upon education (this 
matches other empirical findings that convey that politically-sophisticated individuals are 
usually more adept at understanding these labels, e.g. Sniderman et al. [1991]). 
62 Beginning in the early and mi-1970s, the terms “left” and “right” were increasingly used 
to describe the symbolic distinction between liberal and conservative political approaches, 
in part thanks to the Nixon and McGovern campaigns (Inglehart 1989, pg. 367).  
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does not preclude a relationship between left-right orientations and issue-based sorting—
for example, left-right placements generally predict issue positions (Huber, 1989)—prior 
research finds that  “symbolic factors clearly played a more important role than issue 
positions in determining the evaluation of ideological labels” (Conover and Feldman, 1981, 
pg. 634). This research has two implications for the present study. First, successfully 
understanding where the parties fit within this space ought to predict greater identity 
relative policy sorting. Second, I expect that the effect of “correctly” understanding one’s 
self-placement within this left-right scale should beget greater identity- relative issue based 
sorting (in part, because this requires understanding the underlying logic of sorting in the 
first place).  
 
Operationalizing left-right ideological space 
Because scholars of American politics are primarily interested in the liberal-conservative 
ideological framework, survey instruments that capture how citizens think about the left-
right dimension of politics are rare (unlike surveys in other parts of the West, where the 
left-right ideological framework is the prevailing dimension that structures ideological 
conflict). Fortuitously, however, the 2012 ANES Time-Series survey appended a series of 
questions that capture this information as part of a module sponsored by the Cooperative 
Study of Electoral Systems. Two separate questions ask individuals to place the Republican 
and Democratic Parties in left-right space, while a third requests individuals to select where 
their own political preferences fit within this continuum. Values for all three variables 
originally span an 11-point continuum, ranging from 0 “left” to 10 “right.”  
Figure 4.4 illustrates where respondents place the parties and themselves within 
left-right space. Predictably, a majority of individuals associate the Republican Party with 
the “right” label and the Democratic Party with the “left.” However, while the average 
individual reliably understands where the parties fit within this space, there is still a modest 
proportion of people who either a) do not perceive that the parties are very “extreme,” 
much less b) are able to correctly place the parties at all.63 For purposes of analysis, I 
                                                          
63 Interestingly, the correlation between these placements and the traditional “liberal-
conservative” party placements is modest at best. The weighted correlation between 
Democratic Party left-right and liberal-conservative placements is r = 0.45, while the 
correlation between Republican Party placements is r = 0.38. Moreover, even among 
sophisticates (respondents in the highest category of political knowledge), the correlation 
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reverse-code the Democratic Party placements so that “left” (correct) responses correspond 
to higher values; this allows them to exist in common space with Republican Party 
placements in that higher values convey both “correct” and “more extreme” placements. 
These variables are both rescaled to range from 0, “strong, incorrect placements,” to 1, 
“correct, strong placements.”  
 
 
Source: 2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: For Panels 1 and 2, x-axis represents where respondents place individual in left-right space 
prior to transformation into “correct” placements. In Panel 3, the x-axis conveys the extent to 
which respondent’s own self-placement in left-right space matches partisan self-placement. 
Estimates weighted according to population weights.  
 
Figure 4.4. Left-right self and party placements 
 
 
To construct an item that captures how successful individuals are at navigating this 
left-right space, I begin by taking an individual’s self-placement within left-right space, 
ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right), and subtract the value (5). This transforms the original 
values so that they range from -5 (left) to 5 (right). I then multiply a respondent’s score by 
                                                          
between these items is not substantially different. Presumably, these concepts are 
overlapping insofar as they should both reflect an individual’s understanding of the 
connection between ideological labels and the parties, yet it is difficult to claim that the 







































a three-category partisanship item that ranges from -1, “Democratic PID,” to 0 “pure 
Independent,” to 1 “Republican PID.”64 This measurement strategy purges the left-right 
valence from the resulting variable and instead reflects the extent to which an individual’s 
left-right placement is correctly-matched to their partisanship—in effect creating an 
alternative metric of “left-right sorting.” Values on this item are then rescaled so that it 
ranges from -1 “extreme placement in left-right space, but incorrect match to partisanship,” 
to 1, “extreme placement in left-right space that correctly matches to partisanship.” 
The third panel in Figure 4.4 displays the distribution of this variable. Values to 
the left of the scale’s midpoint reflect those individuals who chose an ideological label that 
was opposite their partisanship, while values to the right of the midpoint, then, reflect those 
persons who chose the label that correctly corresponded to their partisanship. The bell-
shaped distribution of responses indicates that individuals only modestly connect their 
partisanship to these left-right placements. Not only do less than half of all respondents 
place themselves “correctly,” with the largest proportion of individuals falling into the 
modal, neutral mid-point, but most individuals who do place themselves correctly within 
this space do not convey that their left-right self-concept is particularly strong.65 In fact, 
less than 10 percent of all respondents place themselves at the extreme end of the left-right 
spectrum and profess partisan attachments that match those ideological preferences.   
 
Results 
Table 4.2 presents a series of models that depict sorting as a function of left-right 
placements and controls.  In the first set of columns, I analyze how correct placement of 
the parties and correct self-placement in left-right space contributes to “partisan sorting,” 
a metric of sorting that accounts for how liberal-conservative identification and policy 
attitudes match to partisanship. This variable closely resembles Levendusky’s (2009) 
specification of sorting. The key difference, here, however, is that the underlying 
components of this variable are all operationalized according to my definition of sorting 
that accounts for both matching and extremity. This transition away from Levendusky’s 
                                                          
64 I aggregate strong, weak and leaner partisans into the respective categories and assign 
only “pure” Independents the value 0. 
65 This is not dissimilar from how individuals answer the more traditional liberal-
conservative self-placement in that the modal category is almost always “moderate.”  
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matching-only scheme is necessary to provide a fair test of the disaggregation of partisan 
sorting into identity and policy components: in keeping the underlying measurement 
strategy common across all items, I attempt to reduce confusion in interpreting the effects 
of the covariates of interest on the dependent variable. Thus, the magnitude of any given 
coefficient is roughly comparable across models.  
In Model 1, I observe that, while correctly placing the Republican Party in left-
right space is related to an increase in partisan sorting, placements of the Democratic Party 
exert no discernible effect on this item. Recalling that these party placements vary from 0 
to 1, a person who perceives that the Republican Party is maximally located toward the 
“right” end of the left-right spectrum is 16 points more sorted than a person who 
misperceived that Republicans were very “left.” Likewise, in Model 2, partisans who 
correctly place themselves in left-right space are substantially more sorted than those who 
selected the most extreme, incorrect label.  
 On its face, this evidence suggests that accurate placement on the political parties 
in left-right ideological space is strongly related to an individual’s propensity to sort. 
However, when we disaggregate issue from partisan sorting in Models 3 and 4, the 
magnitude of these coefficients shifts precipitously. The effects of correct Republican Party 
and respondent self-placements on issue sorting are roughly 60 and 30 percent smaller. To 









(issues + identity) Issue sorting Identity sorting 




 0.01 -----  0.04 -----  0.11** ----- 




 0.16** -----  0.05* -----  0.10** ----- 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  
Correctly place self 
in left-right space 
-----  0.19** ----- 0.12** -----  0.25** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Political knowledge   0.11**  0.09**  0.06** 0.05**  0.08**  0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Interest  0.10**  0.07**  0.12** 0.10**  0.17**  0.13** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Evangelical ID  0.01  0.00  0.05** 0.05**  0.06**  0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education  0.08  0.07 -0.01 -0.02  0.06  0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
White   0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01  0.04  0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black   0.06*  0.09**  0.05** 0.08**  0.03  0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Income  -0.02 -0.02  0.03 0.02  0.01  0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male  -0.04** -0.04** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02* -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  0.26**  0.38**  0.15** 0.22** -0.06  0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
R2 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.25 
N 4,935 4,972 4,926 4,972 4,521 4,559 
Source: 2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01  
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The answer lies in the relationship between these left-right placements and identity 
sorting. Given the close correspondence between left-right and liberal-conservative 
ideology, identity sorting should be especially sensitive to how individuals navigate 
symbolic ideological space. Indeed, both sets of party and the individual self-placements 
within left-right space exert sizeable effects on the extent to which individuals’ political 
identities converge in Models 5 and 6.66 Not only is the size of the coefficients for the party 
placements in the identity sorting models larger relative to those in the analyses of policy 
sorting, but the effect of correctly placing oneself within left-right space on identity sorting 
is even greater than the magnitude of the associated effect of those placements on partisan 
sorting in Model 2.67  
 These differences, however, are easily obscured. In fact, partisan sorting 
artificially overstates the relationship among partisanship, issue preferences, and the left-
right space. Whatever images Americans conjure up when they think about ideology in 
terms of “left” and “right”, the way in which they navigate this space informs connections 
between ideology and partisanship in different ways. Simply, understanding the left-right 
ideological dimension increases identity-based sorting considerably more than it does 
sorting on issues.  
 
4.3.2 Parties, issue positions, and sorting 
The prior section indicates that sorting does not happen in a vacuum—some degree of 
familiarity with the structure that gives ideology its meaning is a minimum informational 
requirement for sorting to “work.” By extension, if an individual neither knows nor 
                                                          
66 Of additional note is the extent to which the data explain the total variance in the 
dependent variable. Disaggregating partisan sorting into its constituent issue- and identity-
based parts actually increases the total variance explained by the included covariates.  
67 The careful reader may ask “But is the difference in the magnitude of these coefficients 
across the issue and identity sorting models statistically significant?” Briefly, yes. To test 
the equivalence between coefficients, we may use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), 
which differs from other forms of simultaneous equation models in that SUR strictly 
models exogenous regressors (Zellner, 1963). Further, because SUR treats the error terms 
of each equation as if they are correlated, this modeling approach is suitable for testing 
differences between these coefficients across forms of sorting, given that the latter terms 
likely have correlated error terms. In the interests of brevity, full modeling results of these 
analyses are not reported here, but we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients reported in the two models are equal (χ2 = 146.22, p = 0.000).  
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understands where the parties stand on a bundle of salient public policies, then it is unlikely 
that that person would be able to logically connect their own preferences back to their 
partisan identity. Let us now turn to an exploration of the relationship between issue-party 
placements and sorting. 
 For the better part of three decades, the ANES Time-Series surveys have queried 
individuals about the policy approaches associated with the Republican and Democratic 
Parties. Much like the policy self-placements that comprise sorting (see Chapter 2), 
respondents are asked to place where they think the parties fall on a bivalent continuum of 
policy prescriptions that juxtaposes a “liberal” and “conservative” policy solution. While 
these responses have been used to generate subjective impressions of party extremity (e.g. 
Davis and Dunaway, 2016), they have also been treated as a form of objective political 
knowledge: the parties have a quantifiable preference to a range of issues and knowing 
something about these issues is indicative of a facet of political acumen or knowledge 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993).  
As a quantity of interest, political knowledge is a somewhat convoluted concept in 
political science (Mondak, 1999, 2001). Yet, while prior work has argued for a tight 
connection between party-policy knowledge and sorting (Levendusky, 2009), there is 
reason to think that this type of political acumen is unevenly related to identity and issue 
sorting. Converse’s (1964) classic finding that citizens use labels and groups to orient 
themselves within political space, as opposed to policy information, still rings true in other 
applications that test how different forms of information shape public opinion (Druckman, 
Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Nicholson, 2012).  
Nevertheless, what individuals know—or, at least, think they know—about the 
parties is a key piece of working knowledge reflective of familiarity with the inner-
workings and structure of the wider party system. Although I dig deeper into how different 
types of group assessments shape identity sorting in Chapter 4, for now, I focus on how 
party-policy knowledge affects sorting. In particular, I expect that placing Democrats to 
the “left” of Republicans in policy space ought to increase policy, but not identity sorting. 
 
Operationalizing party-policy knowledge 
To construct a metric of party-policy knowledge, I utilize party placement items that 
require individuals to ascertain where a given party sits on a response continuum that 
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juxtaposes two countervailing policy solutions. These items include jobs, insurance, 
affirmative action, defense spending, and welfare provisions policies and are coded such 
that liberal policy solutions take lower and conservative solutions higher values. 
Individuals receive a value of “1” if they place the Democratic Party to the left of the 
Republican Party on a given item and “0” otherwise. In addition to these five items, I also 
examine whether individuals correctly place Democrats to the left of Republicans on the 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates represent the average percentage of respondents who correctly place Democratic 
Party to “left” of Republican Party on five policy items and symbolic, liberal-conservative ideology.  
 
Figure 4.5. Percentage of Respondents who correctly place Democrats to “left” of 
Republicans 
 
Figure 4.5 presents both the proportion of people who correctly place the parties 
on the individual items (Panel A) and a summary index that aggregates the number of 
correct placements that individuals make (Panel B). The proportion of correct placements 
varies markedly across items. As Panel A indicates, individuals are far more likely to 
correctly place the parties within symbolic liberal-conservative space than they are, for 
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as a whole, Panel B indicates that individuals are quite poor at correctly recognizing 
differences between the parties on multiple items. An overwhelming majority of 
respondents are unable to place the parties on as many as two items and fewer than one 
percent of respondents correctly place the parties on all six party-policy dyads. 
 
Results 
Table 4.3 models sorting as a function of the aforementioned comparative placements. The 
first column analyzes the relationship between party-policy knowledge and partisan 
sorting. As expected, placing the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on 
aid to blacks, defense spending, and social spending translates into a modest increase in 
sorting. However, the magnitude of these effects is dwarfed by correctly placing Democrats 
to the right of Republicans on the liberal-conservative ideology scale. 
To ascertain whether differences in this party-policy knowledge contribute to more 
or less identity relative issue sorting, I turn to Models 2 and 3. In the analysis of policy 
sorting (Model 2), placing Democrats to the left of Republicans on the various policy dyads 
increases sorting by an average of two points, such that, taken together, an individual that 
correctly places the parties on each pairing would be about 10 points more sorted than 
someone who failed to correctly link the parties to these policies at all. Notably, however, 
while placement of the parties on liberal-conservative ideology produces a modest, positive 
coefficient, the magnitude of this effect pales in comparison to the associated effect 
observed in Model 1. This difference helps illuminate not only differences between forms 
of sorting, but informational differences among these placements (ignored in earlier work).  
This point is drawn into sharper relief when we examine the effects of party-policy 
knowledge on identity sorting in the third model. While we observe that policy placements 
are modestly related to identity sorting, the magnitude of the correct party-liberal-
conservative placement is substantial—more than three times as large as the associated 
effect on issue sorting. Clearly, the close relationship between these placements and the 
symbolic components of identity-based sorting are driving the magnitude of the effect of 
liberal-conservative placements on partisan sorting. This finding that comports with the 
one presented above in that identity sorting is more sensitive to an individual’s awareness 




Table 4.3. The effect of recognizing party differences on sorting (item-by-item) 
 
Correctly place Democratic Party to 
the “left” of Republican Party on… 
 
Partisan sorting 





Job creation 0.03 0.02* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Insurance  0.03 0.02* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Aid to blacks 0.04** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Defense spending 0.05* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Social spending 0.06** 0.03** 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Liberal-conservative ideology 0.14** 0.04** 0.14** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -3.02 -1.48 -3.27 
 (3.25) (1.63) (1.63) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.13 
N 23,287 23,287 17,813 
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Control variables excluded from analysis for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses have 
been clustered by year; *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
4.4 Sorting and group biases 
Finally, having shown that compositional differences between these forms of sorting exist, 
I conclude this chapter’s analyses with an exploration of how identity and policy sorting 
contribute to different evaluative behaviors. Prior work shows that identity-based sorting 
produces a considerable amount of partisan bias, or favoring one party toward the detriment 
of the other (Mason, 2015). Yet extant work has not considered how different forms of 
sorting might produce differentiated levels of intergroup bias.  
Because group identification is driven by an innate desire to distinguish one’s in-
group in a positive light, group members reliably privilege and judge as superior the 
members of their own group (c.f. Tajfel and Turner 1979). This pattern, however, cuts both 
ways: while individuals describe their in-group as favorable and desirable, they also rate 
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competing groups in a much more negative light (e.g. Iyengar, Llekes, and Sood, 2012). 
To the extent that an individual’s political identities, evaluations, and emotions overlap, 
these biases are presumed to grow stronger as the in-group narrows and the out-group 
becomes larger (Brewer and Pierce, 2005; Roccas and Brewer, 2002).  
These expectations draw on the theory of cross-pressures, or competing forces that 
pull individuals in competing directions. For example, an individual might be pro-life 
(right-leaning policy preference) and a member of a union (left-leaning membership)—
considerations that pull an individual’s political preferences in competing ideological 
directions. The process of becoming better sorted removes these “cross-cutting cleavages” 
that otherwise might mitigate social conflict (Lipset, 1960; Powell, 1976). When 
preferences align and these cross-pressures are removed, individuals become less tolerant, 
more biased, and display less magnanimity toward outgroups (Brewer, 1999; Roccas and 
Brewer, 2002). Hence, the finding that identity sorting increases affective bias (Mason, 
2015). 
 While much extant research is focused on how group memberships affect partisan 
biases, our the unifying theme of this project is ideology. Thus, we might question whether 
different forms of sorting affect ideological group biases. Specifically, does sorting on 
identities produce greater bias than sorting on attitudes? I expect that, because the referents 
of these assessments are the ideological groups, themselves, sorted identities should 
produce significant levels of ideological bias—even in the absence of sorted attitudes.  
 
4.4.1 Measuring ideological group affect (bias) 
How individuals feel about groups reflects a dimension of the emotional attachments that 
accompany group memberships. While specific group appraisals are interesting on their 
own merits, psychologists are often interested in the relative nature of inter-group 
assessments, or the preference gap between two competing groups (for recent examples, 
see: Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012; Mason, 2015). Commonly termed “affective 
polarization,” this form of social polarization reflects the extent to which an individual 
emotionally favors one group over another. If an individual rates one group very warmly 
(positively) and another group coolly (negatively), then the amount of bias is presumed to 
be high, as the Euclidian distance between the two assessments is significant. If, on the 
other hand, the individual feels equally positively, negatively, or indifferent toward two 
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groups, then inter-group bias is low. Thus, this measure allows researchers to purge “the 
tendency of citizens to pull their punches, or to give groups representing the legitimate 
political opposition the benefit of the doubt when making evaluations” (Knight, 1983, pg. 
319). 
 For our purposes, ideological bias is measured by asking individuals how they feel 
toward the ideological groups. On a scale ranging from 0 to 100, respondents are asked to 
rate whether they feel warmly (100) or coolly (0) toward “conservatives” and “liberals.” 
To construct a measure of ideological bias, I simply take the absolute value of the 
difference between liberal and conservative scores. I then rescale this item to range from 
0, “no biases,” to 1, “maximum biases.”  
 
 
Source: 1984-2012 CANES Time-Series 
Notes: Graph portrays ideological group biases broken down into deciles. Biases 
are the absolute difference between liberal and conservative feeling 
thermometers, where value 0 conveys no affective difference toward either group, 
and value 1 conveys complete one-sided preference for group.  
 





Table 4.4. OLS estimates for the effects of sorting on ideological biases 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Partisan sorting 
(issues + identity) 0.29** ----- ----- 
 (0.05)   
Identity sorting ----- 0.48** 0.21** 
  (0.02) (0.04) 
Issue sorting (deciles) ----- 0.01** 0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Identity sorting × 
issue sorting ----- ----- 0.04** 
   (0.01) 
White  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black  -0.05** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income  -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  0.01 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Political interest -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political knowledge 0.13** 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education  0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Protestant  0.02** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year  0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -5.90* -4.82* -4.38* 
 (2.06) (1.69) (1.63) 
R2 0.22 0.33 0.34 
N 10,705 8,742 8,742 
 
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 




Pooling ANES Time-Series surveys from 1984 to 2012, Figure 4.6 presents the 
distribution of these scores. By a substantial margin, the modal category is “0.00,” which 
represents inter-group indifference or a lack of ideological (affective) polarization on the 
part of the respondent. Further, most respondents possess only modest bias between the 
two groups. The 75th percentile of scores translates to roughly 0.50 on this index, which 
conveys that only modest amounts of ideological bias are observed within the mass public. 
 
4.4.2  Results  
To provide a fuller illustration for why aggregating identity and issue-based sorting 
together is problematic, I explore how the predictive capacity of these items differ in the 
context of ideological group biases. Table 4 depicts three models of ideological bias. In 
Model 1, ideological bias is modelled as a function of partisan sorting. Model 2 separates 
the effect of sorting into the constituent issue and identity constructs, while Model 3 
portrays the effect of these biases as the multiplicative function of identity and issue 
sorting.   
The results shown in the first column are straightforward: the more items on which 
an individual is sorted, the more ideological bias we observe. Panel A in Figure 4.7 
illustrates the contours of this effect. As individuals become more sorted, the extent to 
which they both intensely like one ideological group and dislike the other increases 
dramatically. Specifically, transitioning from being completely unsorted to fully sorted 
results in an increase of almost a full standard deviation in ideological bias. 
 However, the exact shape of the relationship between sorting and these biases is 
less straightforward when we disentangle sorting into identity and issue-based parts. 
Consider the second model, which portrays ideological bias as a function of the two 
separate forms of sorting. For purposes of illustration, I have recoded the issue sorting item, 
which is approximately continuous across hundreds of values ranging from 0 to 1, into 
deciles. While both entries produce positive coefficients, the magnitude of these effects 
varies considerably. At the highest level of policy sorting, we observe that ideological bias 
increases by about 10 points; conversely, at the highest level of identity sorting, where 
ideological and partisan identities both overlap and are strong, ideological bias increases 
by almost two full standard deviations—almost 50 points. Given the results of the first 
model, it appears that the effect of aggregating these forms of sorting together is incredibly 
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inefficient. Not only is the model fit in Model 2 substantially better than Model 1, but the 
effect of sorting on ideological biases appears to be artificially depressed when sorting is 
treated as an omnibus construct.  
Model 3 takes the results of Model 2 and modifies the relationship between these 
forms of sorting and ideological biases by adding in an interaction term to capture the joint 
effect of issue and identity sorting on the exhibition of ideological bias. To ease in the 
interpretation of this effect, Panel B in Figure 4.7 visually illustrates the effects of issue 
sorting on ideological biases when identity sorting is held at minimum and maximum 
values. Predictably, the relationship is a great deal more complex than the simple “additive” 
approach to sorting utilized in Model 1.  
 
 
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates bracketed by 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel A corresponds to Model 1, 
Table 4; Panel B corresponds to Model 3, Table 4. 
 
Figure 4.7. The effect of sorting on ideological biases 
 
Consider the case of a hypothetical person whose ideological identity is “slightly” 
conservative, whose identifies as a “leaning” Democrat, but who possess a consistent set 
of strong policy preferences that are mostly left-leaning (e.g. historically, the consummate 
“Southern Democrat”). Effectively, this person scores near the minimum value on the 
identity sorting scale (weak identities, low overlap), yet scores near the maximum value on 
the policy sorting item (strong policy preferences correctly matched). According to the 
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partisan sorting approach, this person would have correctly matched an overwhelming 
majority of their political preferences to their partisanship. Looking at the x-axis in Panel 
A, Figure 4.7, the amount of ideological bias that we would expect this person to possess 
should be near the upper threshold of the estimates, around, say, 0.30.  
However, according to Panel B in Figure 4.7, this is not the “correct” amount of 
bias that this person actually espouses. At minimal levels of identity sorting, even well-
sorted policy preferences are only tenuously linked to ideological biases. This very same 
person with the same configuration of identities and attitudes would score, instead, 0.15 
units of ideological bias—almost 50 percent less than Model 1 predicts.  In other words, 
individuals do not exhibit the same levels of bias when their own group memberships are 
weak and poorly synched. While this expectation is entirely consistent with social identity 
theory (see Huddy, 2013 for a review), partisan sorting misrepresents the predictive 
capacity of these concepts. Far from interchangeable constructs, these forms of sorting 
produce fundamentally different levels of psychological affect, further demonstrating that 
identity and issue sorting reflect distinct patterns of coherence among one’s political 
preferences.    
 
4.5 Sorting and behavioral motivations 
Aside from differences in the effect of these facets of sorting on group biases, what role do 
these forms of sorting play in relation to behavioral motivations? Do the effects of identity 
and issue sorting on political participation vary? While past research shows that sorting 
decreases the likelihood of casting split-tickets (Davis and Mason, 2016), it has not 
examined how sorting might shape the prior decision to actually cast a vote in the first 
place. 
 Scholars know a great deal about the correlates of casting a vote for a presidential 
candidate (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2008 for a review). In particular, past research almost 
uniformly observes that partisans cast votes at higher rates, participate in campaigns, and 
follow politics more closely than otherwise-unaffiliated persons (Converse, et al., 1960; 
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Why? The expectation that 
sorting should increase an individual’s propensity to participate draws on the expressive 
functions of partisanship (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). As I outline above 
and in Chapters 2 and 3, this perspective involves treating political identities as forms of 
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symbolic social identities, wherein group members are motivated to act on behalf of their 
groups. Gerber, Huber, and Washington (2010), for example, use field experiments to 
demonstrate a strong, causal relationship between partisan identity and turnout.  Elsewhere, 
Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) find strong support for an expressive interpretation of 
partisanship. They demonstrate that campaign activity is a function of partisans positively 
expressing their identities and a diminished role for issue stances and ideological identity.  
 This latter point raises an interesting question. While this research reveals the 
power of partisanship in contributing to political participation, what happens when these 
identities converge? Given the tension between instrumental and expressive treatments of 
partisanship (Archeneaux and Vander Wielen, 2013), how do different forms of sorting 
that account for these different approaches affect turnout? I expect that identity sorting 
should be associated with greater turnout beyond the effect of consistent party-issue 
preferences.  
 
4.5.1 Measuring turnout 
Research in the survey literature shows that more respondents say they intend to vote than 
actually end up casting a ballot (e.g., Bernstein et al. 2001; Silver et al. 1986). This issue 
is problematic insofar as individuals with stronger identities may feel additional social 
pressure to confirm that they participated, thereby inflating the effect that we wish to detect. 
Unfortunately, the CANES data do not contain validated voting records, which would help 
resolve tendencies to over-report. However, given the limited availability of the necessary 
survey instruments (i.e. the cohort of issue questions), the CANES provides the opportunity 
to make a strict comparison of identity and issue sorting that matches the above analyses. 




Table 4.5. The effects of sorting on turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Partisan sorting 
(issues + identity) 1.28** ----- ----- 
 (0.18)   
Identity sorting  ----- 1.15** 1.99** 
  (0.19) (0.36) 
Issue sorting 
(deciles) ----- 0.10** 0.12** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Identity sorting × 
issue sorting  ----- ----- -0.12** 
   (0.03) 
White  0.23** 0.33** 0.33** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Black  0.75** 0.67** 0.66** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
Education  1.42** 1.44** 1.43** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
Income  1.17** 1.24** 1.24** 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) 
Male  -0.22** -0.27** -0.27** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age  0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South  -0.24** -0.16* -0.17* 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Political interest  0.33 0.14 0.13 
 (0.82) (0.77) (0.77) 
Political knowledge 1.54** 1.33** 1.34** 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Protestant 0.06 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Year 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -7.56 -3.97 -5.23 
 (8.94) (13.46) (13.18) 
N 11,298 9,047 9,047 
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 






The results presented in Table 4.5 depict the effect of sorting on self-reported turnout. 
Model 1 is designed to test how partisan sorting, which includes both the issue and liberal-
conservative elements, affects the likelihood of casting a vote. The large positive and 
statistically-significant coefficient indicates that sorting exerts the predicted effect on 
turnout. Given that log-odds ratios are not readily interpretable, the first panel in Figure 4.8 
illustrates the contours of this effect. Simply, as an individual correctly connects more 
items to their partisanship, the likelihood of political participation increases.  
 However, this effect is more nuanced than we otherwise might assume. The second 
model in Table 5 indicates that the effect of identity and issue sorting exert independent 
effects on self-reported turnout, albeit the magnitude of these coefficients is similar. To 
assess how these facets of sorting work in conjunction, Model 3 analyzes turnout as a 
function of the different sorting terms, in addition to an interaction variable that captures 




Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Estimates bracketed by 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel A corresponds to Model 1, 
Table 5; Panel B corresponds to Model 3, Table 5. 
 





The second panel in Figure 4.8 illustrates the shape of this effect. Let us consider 
a few practical examples of particular configurations of identities and issues in order to 
better understand these predicted values. The light-grey shaded area conveys the marginal 
effect of maximum levels of identity sorting at varying deciles of issue sorting. For the 
person with strong and matching political identities, having minimal levels of issue-
sorting—i.e. making very few and weak matches between policy and partisanship—does 
not undercut the power of sorted identities. These individuals are roughly as likely to cast 
a vote as those persons with strong and sorted issue preferences. 
Interestingly, however, the effect of sorting on issues does matter in this setting. 
Unlike the estimates presented in Figure 4.7, where issue-sorting had negligible impact on 
ideological biases, here, the presence of well-sorted issue preferences is sufficient to 
generate a higher likelihood of reported voting. Even when an individual’s identities are 
unsorted, say, a leaner Democrat who identifies as a moderate, possessing a strong and 
consistent set of issue preferences generates a modestly strong propensity for political 
participation.   
 
4.6  Discussion and conclusion  
The relationship between ideology and partisanship lies at the heart of the question, “What 
is sorting?” As the culmination of the distinctions broached in the previous chapters, these 
analyses form the empirical backbone of the claim that Americans can, and often do, sort 
independently within two distinct domains. Further, I demonstrate that artificially 
constraining these political preferences into an omnibus metric—as prior research has 
done—not only misrepresents the knowledge-based foundations of the ongoing sorting of 
the American mass public, but that this approach risks fundamentally misspecifying the 
downstream consequences of this sorting. These findings warrant three conclusions.  
First, the relationship between issue and identity sorting is both modest and 
positive, much like the relationship between the underlying materials that comprise these 
constructs. In fact, although the correlation between forms of sorting rises and falls over 
time, the general trend of the relationship between these items is positive in the aggregate. 
In general, Americans exhibit greater sorting on both identities and attitudes today relative 
the early 1980s. Still, given the enormous heterogeneity among the average individual’s 
policy preferences, the evidence for within-subject changes in individual-level issue 
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sorting over time is meager, at best. Instead, individuals are much more likely to constrain 
their symbolic political identities than they are to become sophisticated, policy-matching-
partisans.  
What explains this disconnect? The temporal effects at play could have something 
to do with both micro- and macro-level processes. Given what we know about how 
individuals answer surveys, that attitudes appear to be the manifestation of “top-of-the-
head” considerations (Zaller and Feldman, 1992), it is unlikely that, barring some sort of 
extreme event that placed a number of issues at the forefront of survey-takers minds, we 
should observe increased sorting between two time periods. However, given the highly 
symbolic and salient nature of political labels, it makes a great deal of sense that, as the 
parties became more polarized from 1992 to 1996, individuals would also become reliably 
better sorted. This, in turn, helps to explain the modest growth between these constructs in 
the aggregate: the parties, as they have polarized, have communicated where they stand on 
a variety of issues.  
Relatedly, second, the results produced in this chapter offer some insight into the 
core informational requirements of sorting. Understanding where the parties fit within left-
right ideological space contributes to greater identity relative policy sorting; in contrast, 
knowing something about the relationship between parties and their policy platforms is 
related to greater issue relative identity sorting. This is a significant disconnect missed by 
earlier work on sorting. As we turn to a fuller study of identity sorting in Part 2 of this 
dissertation, I revisit this finding to map the exact contours of how elite cues contribute to 
the convergence between Americans’ political identities. Needless to say, the conventional 
wisdom regarding the connection between perceived polarization and sorting is also 
plagued by these differences in the meaning and interpretation of these forms of 
information.  
Finally, the difference between the effects of sorting on ideological biases and 
turnout portrayed in the final set of analyses is noteworthy. The prevailing metric of 
partisan sorting woefully mispredicts both outcome variables. I find that maximal levels of 
identity sorting at near-minimum levels of issue sorting produce just as much bias toward 
ideological groups as the measure of sorting advanced by Levendusky in The Partisan Sort. 
While this empirical finding is welcome in the sense that it underscores the utility of 
separating issue from identity sorting, these results are normatively troubling in that the 
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average citizen will exhibit prominent levels of affective biases in the absence of a 
meaningful integration of policy preferences. Recalling that even middling levels of issue 
sorting will produce significant group biases provided that identity sorting is high, the 
emotional ties that bind individuals to their groups do, indeed, appear to be tribal. Although 
this bias increases dramatically as more policy attitudes come to match one’s partisanship, 
this baseline level of bias is concerning in that individuals might reliably prejudice their 
ideological out-group without ever holding attitudes that are congruent to their in-group or 
counter to their out-group. Further, even in the absence of matching issue-preferences, 
individuals with highly-sorted identities are roughly as like to report casting a vote as those 
sorted persons with consistent, matching, and strong issue preferences—confirming the 
finding that these identities are raw and emotive, capable of spawning behavior even in 




Having provided both a theoretical and empirical justification for splitting partisan 
sorting into separate issue and identity-based components, I now turn to an in-depth 
analysis of identity sorting, which embodies the tribal (Mason, 2015) and symbolic 
attachments that drive much political behavior (Achen and Bartels, 2016). In Part 2, I  focus 
the remainder of this dissertation on digging deeper into the foundations and consequences 
of identity sorting. Although prior work on sorting provides some general insights that are 
applicable to the study of the convergence between political identities, I find that the 
identity sorting is not only context dependent, but that it is a direct response to a particular 
form of elite cues. In turn, this sorting has two serious, downstream consequences that have 
serious ramifications for American political behavior that have been insufficiently 
explored. Identity sorting not only decreases individuals’ baseline commitments to 
compromise as a social good, but it fundamentally alters the particular criteria that 
individuals use to select elected representatives. Understanding the incivility and 
intractability of modern political discourse and representation, then, requires further 





Chapter 5: Elite Cues, Group Memberships, and Sorting 
 
Elite Cues, Group Memberships, and Sorting 
 
“A wise man gets more use from his enemies than a fool from his friends.” 
- Baltasar Gracián, The Art of Worldly Wisdom  
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
The prior chapters have laid a foundation for understanding the content of sorting. I now 
turn to exploring why this sorting occurs. In particular, this chapter investigates the factors 
that contribute to the convergence between political identities, which are the currency of 
modern politics. Let us begin with the acknowledgement that individuals are not born 
partisans or ideologues. Political preferences are, to some degree, learned.68 In particular, 
the political socialization literature implies that elites play a primary role in shaping 
citizens’ attitudes and orientations (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). As Downs (1957) notes, 
the average person simply cannot be an expert in many areas of policy, so “he will seek 
assistance from men who are experts in those fields, have the same political goals he does, 
and have good judgment” (pg. 233). This cue-taking underscores the leading explanation 
for the growth of sorting within the American mass public: as the political parties have 
polarized, individuals receive clearer cues about the “correct” correspondence between 
their partisan and ideological preferences (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, pg. 581; 
Levendusky, 2009, pg. 39).  
While intuitive, this logic is flawed. First, the average citizen is neither politically 
sophisticated nor logically extrapolates information across many policy domains 
(Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Kahan and Braman, 2006). As a result, 
individuals struggle to conform to Downs’ idealized notion of cue-taking, often relying, 
instead, upon symbolic or group-based cues to navigate the political landscape (Bullock, 
2011)—a tendency that undercuts the depiction of sorting as citizens following policy-
                                                          
68 A Lockean epistemology notwithstanding, however, a growing body of work at the 
intersection of neuro- and political science also demonstrates that such orientations are, at 




based elite cues (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). Second, citizens’ spatial perceptions of elites are 
often biased and asymmetric. Not only does the average American tend to misperceive the 
extent of policy polarization (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016), but ideological placements 
of in-party and out-party elites and copartisans are not uniform (Ahler, 2014). 
Consequently, these tendencies undermine the linkage between perceptions of party 
polarization and sorting (e.g. Davis and Dunaway, 2016). 
In this manuscript, I demonstrate that the conventional stylization of the 
relationship between elite cues and sorting cannot fully account for why identity sorting 
occurs. I begin by showing that the convergence between Americans’ political identities is 
tenuously related to policy polarization or how individuals understand policy space. Rather, 
symbolic cues within the polarized political environment are almost wholly responsible for 
identity-based sorting (Study 1). Linking this finding to a social identity approach to 
intergroup behavior, I then demonstrate that identity sorting is not driven by comparative 
group assessments, or what is commonly termed “perceived polarization,” but by beliefs 
about out-group dissimilarity and extremity (Study 2).   
These findings not only require a new framework for understanding how elite cues 
shape sorting, but point to a sobering conclusion. Effectively, given the social identity 
foundations of sorting, it may matter little whether or not elites are objectively divided or 
moderate across many issues and policy domains. Provided that political elites continue to 
wage symbolic wars of ideological tribalism, this sorting—and its attendant downstream 
effects like partisan bias (Mason, 2015) and electoral polarization (Davis and Mason, 
2016)—show no sign of slowing. 
 
5.2 Elite cues and sorting 
The accumulated wisdom regarding the development of mass opinion points to a general 
“elite cue theory,” which suggests that individuals derive their political opinions in light of 
elite discourse (e.g. Key, 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 
2009; Lenz, 2012; Brader, Tucker, and Duell, 2012). In the aggregate, for example, 
Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate that changes in party elites’ behavior toward 
racial issues in the 1960s generated subsequent divisions within the mass public’s attitudes, 
while the crystallization of abortion attitudes can be similarly traced to elites taking less 




as information-laden signals that citizens use to infer what to believe and how to act (Lupia 
and McCubbins, 1998; Cohen, 2003, Study 1; see also: Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). 
However, while this literature seems to provide a firm foundation for the relationship 
between cue-taking and sorting, in the forthcoming sections, I deconstruct the conventional 
specification of this cue-taking mechanism and theorize a new social-identity driven 
framework for understanding why American’s political identities have converged. 
 
5.2.1 The conventional explanation for elite-driven sorting 
With the movement of George Wallace’s conservative, working class defectors to the 
Republican Party and John Anderson’s liberal Republicans to the Democratic Party, the 
late 20th Century realignment of the political parties cemented into place two ideologically-
coherent parties. Whereas conflict among legislators was once multidimensional, the 
prevailing cleavage within Congress now resembles a single dimension of conflict, where 
Republican legislators are uniformly conservative and Democratic legislators, liberal 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). As these liberal-conservative divisions extended 
across numerous issues, scholars predicted that the coherency of public opinion would 
respond accordingly. Layman and Carsey (2002, pg. 799) write that 
 
[i]f Democratic and Republican elites take positions on 
multiple issue dimensions that are consistently liberal and 
consistently conservative, respectively, then politically-
aware party identifiers will receive cues that their views 
on different issue agendas should go together and they 
should move toward polarized stands on each of those 
dimensions. 
 
While the extent to which these changes have polarized mass opinion is a matter 
of some debate, the relationship between elite polarization and sorting rests on firmer 
footing.69 Indeed, this account underscores Levendusky’s (2009, pg. 3) conceptualization 
of the mechanism that constrains whether an individual’s ideological preferences are 
congruent with their professed partisanship. According to this logic,  
                                                          
69 Whether or not this has generated any meaningful, compensatory issue polarization, is 
another matter, although substantial evidence suggests not (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 
2006; Fiorina and Abrams, 2010; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006). But increased 





[a]s elites pull apart to the ideological poles they clarify 
what it means to be a Democrat or a Republican. Ordinary 
voters use these clearer cues to align their own 
partisanship and ideology. Elite polarization, by 
clarifying where the parties stand on the issues of the day, 
causes ordinary voters to sort. 
 
However, as it relates to the convergence between partisan and ideological 
identities, this narrative hinges upon a number of idealized (and problematic) expectations. 
First, it assumes that individuals are not only able to recognize salient policy differences 
between political candidates or parties, but that they should be able to extrapolate that 
information in meaningful ways—an assumption that rests on somewhat awkward 
empirical grounds given the low levels of political knowledge and sophistication that are 
characteristic of the mass public (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; 
Kahan and Braman, 2006). Further, this account implies that the average citizen will 
objectively assess the degree to which elites are polarized—i.e. that individuals’ 
comparative assessments of the parties are bereft of well-known biases that stem from 
group memberships. These are not insignificant assumptions, and they generate two 
questions that the prevailing sorting literature has not sufficiently addressed: 1) Are all cues 
uniformly related to sorting?; and, 2) If not, then do group memberships shape the 
informational utility of these cues?  
 
5.2.2 Different cues, different sorting? 
On a basic level, cues are simply information—yet not all information is equal. As Bullock 
(2011) notes, cues may be informal and symbolic, for example, “the Democratic Party is 
liberal,” or they may be explicit and particular, say, “the Democratic Party is pro-choice.” 
Both statements provide information about Democrats. In the first case, knowing that the 
Democratic Party is liberal may conjure up a variety of expectations about the 
(stereotypical) policy positions of that party; in the latter case, the knowledge of 
Democrats’ position regarding reproductive choice conveys specific information about that 
single policy domain. The extent to which the above cues might resonate with citizens, 
and, importantly, the extent to which they will provide the type of information necessary 




message and whether this information is readily or easily interpretable by the target 
audience (Bullock, 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013). In particular, this 
extant research generally distinguishes between symbolic and policy-based cues.70  
With this in mind, let us briefly return to the Levendusky’s (2009) depiction of the 
linkage between elite cues and mass sorting. In his analysis, cues are operationalized as an 
index of correctly placing Democrats to the left of Republicans on a variety of items, 
ranging from perspectives on government spending to the parties’ liberal-conservative 
identities. As a result of aggregating these placements together, both policy and symbolic 
cues are treated as functionally-equivalent in their relationship to the convergence between 
partisan and ideological preferences. 
 On its face, this simple coding decision seems innocent enough.71  But a great deal 
of evidence points to serious problems with combining these two very different types of 
information. Specifically, there is significant scholarly consensus that ideological labels 
and the particular attitudes that populate belief systems are not interchangeable concepts. 
In fact, while most contemporary samples of American survey respondents find that 
ideological self-identification within liberal-conservative space is reliably correlated with 
a varied range of policy preferences—including preferences for decreased (increased) 
social welfare spending, progressive (traditional) cultural-moral stances on issues like 
same-sex marriage and abortion, and decreasing (increasing) the size and strength of the 
military (Malka and Llekes, 2010)—extant research indicates that ideological labels and 
issue-based indices of ideology are not directly analogous constructs (Conover and 
                                                          
70 While this appears to be a firm distinction, it is true that some policy cues are more or 
less “symbolic” in the sense that they are intertwined with ideological labels. I return to 
this point in further detail in Study 1.  
71 A derivative concern with this strategy, however, is that perceived cues are treated as 
“discrete” phenomena. That is, individuals either correctly place the parties or they do not. 
This decision may help to reduce some of the error variance inherent in a response-limited 
continuum—is the difference between degrees of ideological extremity interpreted as 
monotonic by respondents?—but it nevertheless loses valuable information about the 
extent to which individuals perceive that the parties are polarized. Further, this strategy is 
not particularly objective in that a respondent might place Democrats to the left of 
Republicans, but still select a “conservative” response for Democrats (i.e. a response that 
falls to the right of the midpoint on the associated response set). This person would be 
awarded points for correctly placing Democrats to the left of Republicans, even as the 




Feldman, 1981; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Popp and Rudolph, 2011; Devine, 2015; Mason, 
2015b; Broockman, 2016).72  
Relatedly, while the conventional explanation for sorting implies that all forms of 
elite conflict ought to generate greater correspondence between partisan and ideological 
preferences, these discrepancies imply that ordinary citizens may not derive the same 
informational utility from symbolic and policy-based cues. Given the assessability and 
power of symbolic cues as heuristic devices (Valentino, Huthcings, and White, 2002; 
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013), I expect that exposure to symbolic cues—e.g. 
describing elite polarization in terms of liberal-conservative ideological divisions—ought 
to generate greater convergence between partisan and ideological identities than policy-
based ones—e.g. describing party polarization within the context of the debt ceiling 
crisis.73  
 
H1: The effect of symbolic elite polarization on sorting 
should be stronger than the effect of policy-based 
polarization. 
 
5.2.3 A social identity framework for understanding elite-driven sorting 
The extant evidence for the linkage between elite cues and sorting comprises showing that 
individuals who perceive many differences between the elites should exhibit higher levels 
of sorting. The expectation outlined above, however, implies that perceptions of liberal-
conservative party differences (i.e. perceived symbolic polarization) should beget greater 
sorting than perceiving that the parties are divided on a variety of issues (i.e. perceived 
issue polarization). Yet, a second problem lurks in the specification of the relationship 
between these “cues” and mass sorting.74 Given that perceptions of elite polarization are 
                                                          
72 This disconnect is further revealed in both the “symbolic-operational paradox,” which 
implies that Americans’ overwhelming favor the conservative ideological label in spite of 
holding policy preferences that are, on balance, liberal (Ellis and Stimson, 2012), and the 
observation that individuals’ own attitudes don’t reliably cohere within a single dimension 
(e.g. Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015). 
73 Further bolstering expectation is the finding that individuals generally ignore or discount 
policy information in their political evaluations when given party labels (Rahn, 1993; 
Cohen, 2003). 
74 Prior research treats these assessments as more or less indicative of the overall power or 
salience of elite cues, even as these assessments are not, strictly speaking, cues themselves 




operationalized as the simple distance between placements of the parties in ideological 
space, scholars have effectively treated these assessments of polarization as unbiased 
appraisals (e.g. Davis and Dunaway, 2016). This decision, however, is questionable given 
the selective, motivated, and biased nature of information processing. First, partisans do 
not evenly interact with informational sources (Stroud, 2010). Second, a substantial 
literature on motivated reasoning indicates that individuals expend a great deal of energy 
counter-arguing evidence that is incongruent to their political preferences (Taber and 
Lodge, 2006; Nyhan and Reifler, 2010), which dovetails with the observation that affective 
biases fundamentally shape perceptions of basic ideological proximity (Iyengar, Sood, and 
Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). 
Recent work pays closer attention to how these psychological tendencies shape 
misperceptions of both mass and elite polarization. Ahler (2014) notes, for example, that 
individuals often wrongly attribute elite polarization to rank-and-file ideologues, while 
Levendusky and Malhotra (2016) show that individuals exaggerate the extent of mass 
polarization. Further, consider the curious asymmetry in perceptions of elite ideology. As 
Figure 5.1 illustrates, there is roughly a 10 point gap between the extremity of respondents’ 
liberal-conservative placements of the in- and out-group party. In other words, respondents 
perceive the out-group party to be almost 15 percent more extreme than they perceive the 
in-group party. If basic ideological placements of the parties are asymmetric, then it 
logically follows that perceptions of elite polarization, or the Euclidean distance between 
ideological placements of the parties, are biased downwards in the sense that, while both 
parties have objectively polarized, individuals do not recognize these changes evenly. This 
finding presents an obvious challenge for the conventional sorting calculus, which treats 






Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series  
Notes: Individuals are asked to describe whether the parties are liberal or 
conservative on seven-point scales, which are transformed to range from 
0, “incorrect, extreme placement” to 1, “correct, extreme placement.” 
Estimates are weighted means for respective year. 
 
Figure 5.1. Perceived ideological extremity of parties by group 
membership 
 
Social identity theory, however, provides an alternative approach to engage these 
asymmetries in relation to sorting by linking such appraisals to group memberships.  If 
partisanship is a particular form of social identity (Huddy, 2001; Greene, 1999), then 
prototypic group members (e.g. political elites) provide the archetype to which group 
members should pattern their preferences. This expectation, however, cuts both ways. 
Social comparisons also produce contrast effects between groups (Campbell, 1967). Both 
Turner et al.’s (1987) and Brewer’s (1991) work, for example, implies that the 
categorization processes that distinguish in- from out-group membership motivate 
individuals to emphasize the distinctive features of out-groups in order to establish 
intergroup boundaries that separate peers from opponents.  
While classic versions of social identity theory emphasize that individuals desire 
to emulate in-group prototypes (e.g. Tajfel, 1959), thereby prioritizing the role of in-group 
cues, more recent applications of social identity theory in political science find that out-
group cues are particularly powerful. Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009), for example, 

















Nicholson (2012) demonstrates that out-group cues polarize individuals’ attitudes beyond 
the effect of exposure to in-group cues. What explains the power of these cues? Consider, 
first, that social comparisons literally hinge on distinctiveness, necessitating an 
appreciation for the features that distinguish out-groups (Brewer, 1991). Second, Tversky’s 
(1977) work suggests that the illusion of out-group homogeneity—the perception that an 
out-group is uniformly undesirable—emphasizes the objectionable features of out-group 
members relative the attractiveness of in-group characteristics. Finally, Atkinson’s (1986, 
pg. 132) work posits that group differences play an important evaluative role; because 
“similarity and difference are not related by a perfect inverse function, the question arises 
as to which is the more basic process. Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to 
consider which is more likely to be noticed. The tentative answer would be difference since 
the judgment reflects distinctive over common features.” 
By extension, one productive way of thinking about how group memberships 
shape perceptions of elite cues is to consider this common focus on out-group 
distinctiveness. Given that optimizing distinctiveness is a core, if not primary, feature of 
intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999), combined with the more general finding that negative 
information is weighted more heavily than positive information (Ito et al., 1998), I expect 
that sorting is actually a reactionary, identity-driven process contingent on a sensitivity to 
out-group differences. When individuals perceive greater differences between themselves 
and their political opposition they learn precisely what they do not believe or wish to 
emulate. As Nicholson (2012, pg. 4) writes, “In an environment characterized by 
intergroup disagreement, the desire to seek difference with the outgrup will likely be 
strong.” Accordingly, I expect that perceived out-group ideological dissimilarity should 
generate greater sorting than perceived in-group similarity or simple group differences 
(what is traditionally labelled “perceived polarization”).  
 
H2: Perceived out-group dissimilarity should generate 
greater sorting than perceived in-group similarity.  
 
 
5.3 Study 1: What “type” of cues cause sorting? 
To investigate how elite cues shape sorting, I use an experimental design that juxtaposes 




configurations of polarization affect sorting. The data for this experiment are drawn from 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) workforce during March, 2016. While mTurk 
utilizes an opt-in sampling frame, which results in a non-random sample, prior research 
finds that such online convenience samples present modest problems for experimental 
research (Berinksy, Huber, and Lenz, 2010).75 The resulting sample of 1,102 American 
adults is young (the average age is 36 years old with a standard deviation of 12.8), educated 
(modal educational attainment is a college degree), and white (78 percent of the sample). 
Aggregating leaners into the partisan categories, 58 percent of subjects identify as 
Democrats, 28 percent as Republicans, and 14 percent as “pure” Independents. 
 
5.3.1  Experimental design  
Using a multi-condition between-subjects design, participants were either assigned to a 
“symbolic” or “policy” cue condition; subjects were then randomly presented an 
illustration / vignette combination that varied only in the pictorial presentation of 
polarization—the text vignettes accompanying the portrayals of polarization are identical 
across the respective policy and symbolic cue treatments. In the interest of brevity, I present 
contrasts between observed sorting in three conditions that utilize a common, spatial 
depiction of party polarization: (1) average symbolic polarization, (2) average policy 
polarization, and (3) a control group.76 
Figure 5.2 illustrates two of the different substantive treatments that individuals 
could receive. In the symbolic cue treatment (N = 194), the labels “liberal” and 
“conservative” are used to describe divisions between the parties; meanwhile, the policy 
cue treatment uses an agree-disagree format to illustrate where the two parties are divided 
on the issue of the debt ceiling (N = 182). This particular policy issue was selected 
purposefully. The debt ceiling has become a fulcrum in Congress in recent years, resulting 
in multiple “crises” that brought the function of the federal government to a grinding and 
                                                          
75 In fact, in this application, the higher levels of education and political interest that are 
generally associated with this worker pool actually work against observing treatment 
effects insofar as sorting in the baseline control group is likely to be higher than the 
average levels of sorting in the mass public—thereby decreasing the likelihood of 
observing significant contrasts.  
76 The remaining treatments depict polarization using different pictorial representations of 
polarization; the contrasts presented here, however, are a fair representation of how extant 




much-publicized halt (see Jacobson [2013] for an expanded treatment regarding this issue’s 
close relationship with polarization and gridlock). However, even if the debt ceiling is a 
medium salience-issue among the minds of average citizens, presenting the parties as 
intractably divided should still trigger sorting if mere partisan conflict provides the needed 
material to cause convergence between ideological and partisan preferences.  
To further minimize presentational characteristics that might act as confounds, the 
“average” location of both the Democratic and Republican Parties on the linear axis that 
accompanies each vignette are identical across treatments (i.e. the parties are placed at the 
same location on the axis in both the policy and symbolic conditions). The sole differences 
between treatments, then, are the content of the vignette and the information displayed 
upon the associated axis depicting the parties as polarized. If there are observable 
differences in sorting that result from exposure to these treatments, then we can be 
confident that it is the content (i.e. type) of the cues and not the visual portrayal of party 
polarization that drives these differences.77 
 
5.3.2 Measurement 
Dependent variable. The outcome of interest is partisan-ideological sorting. Sorting is, 
ultimately, a process of categorization. In its simplest form, it merely accounts for whether 
an individual’s political preferences are correctly matched: liberal (conservative) 
preferences correspond to Democratic (Republican) partisanship. In past research, these 
ideological preferences comprise both symbolic and policy-based preferences (e.g. 
Levendusky, 2009). Yet while it may be attractive to craft an omnibus measure of sorting, 
there are serious problems with this approach (see Appendix B for an expanded discussion 
of this point). Instead, it seems both theoretically and empirically preferable to parcel 
sorting into separate issue- and identity-based constructs. The forthcoming analyses focus 
on this latter construct, partisan-ideological sorting, which captures the convergence 
between political identities (c.f. Mason, 2015a; Davis and Dunaway, 2016).  
  
                                                          
77 That said, it is possible that there are variations even among policy cues as to their 




A. Policy-based cue (polarization 
 
A recent study conducted by the Center for Congressional Studies sheds new light on the policy 
preferences of Congress.  
Researchers found for example, that the parties are divided on the issue of public debt. Democrats 
prefer to increase the debt ceiling; Republicans, on the other hand, do not support raising the debt 
ceiling.  
The figure above depicts the average position that Democrats and Republicans in Congress have 
taken on this issue. Some legislators take more moderate positions, but, Democrats and Republicans 
are clearly split on whether or not to increase the debt ceiling.  
 
B. Symbolic cue (polarization  
 
 
A recent study conducted by the Center for Congressional Studies sheds new light on the ideological 
preferences of Congress. 
The figure above depicts the average ideological position of Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress. As you can see, the parties are divided by ideology: Democrats are liberal, and 
Republicans are conservative. Although some legislators are more moderate, liberal Democrats and 
conservative Republicans dominate their respective parties.  
This means that Democrats and Republicans rarely agree on the right approach to a number of 
different issues. Instead, Democrats prefer more liberal solutions to problems facing our country, 
while Republicans prefer more conservative approaches. 
 





Following the measurement scheme outlined in Mason (2015a), I first calculate 
the overlap between partisanship and ideological self-placement, which are both measured 
using the traditional seven-category response sets that range from Democratic / liberal 
identification (low values) to Republican / conservative identification (high values). The 
overlap between the two items is expressed by subtracting a subject’s score on the 
ideological identification item from their score on the partisanship one. Low values on the 
resulting measure communicate perfect (“correct”) overlap between the two items, while 
high values convey an extreme mismatch between partisanship and ideological 
identification. Next, I rescale this item so that high values will be associated with greater 
overlap. This score is then multiplied by the strength of both the partisan and ideological 
identities (measures that are derived by folding the partisanship and ideological 
identification items in half). The final index is rescaled to range from 0, incorrectly sorted 
and weak identities, to 1, perfectly sorted and strong identities. 
Controls. Participants’ race is broken into a series of dichotomous variables where 
identification as white or black is coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age is a continuous variable 
corresponding to subjects’ actual age in years. Education is a five-category item ranging 
from elementary education, coded 0, to a post-graduate degree, coded 1. Male is coded 1 
for men and 0 for women. Income is an ordinal variable ranging 1, “less than $10,000,” to 
12, “more than $150,000).” Internet is coded 1 for individuals who consume the majority 
of their news from online sources. News consumption is a seven-category item that captures 
how many days a week a respondent watches, listens, or reads about the news. Finally, 
political knowledge, is an index of recognition items that includes correctly identifying the 
Speaker of the House, who nominates Supreme Court Justices, and which party controls 
the House of Representatives during the time of data collection. This item is rescaled to 
range from 0, “no correct responses,” to 1, “all correct responses.” 
 
5.3.3 Results 
To investigate whether different types of cues cause greater convergence between partisan 
and ideological identities, I regress treatment assignment and a series of covariates on 
partisan-ideological sorting, thereby providing a strict comparison between the effects of 
policy and symbolic cues. As the coefficient entry for the policy cue treatment in Table 5.1 




to increase the overlap and extremity of partisan and ideological identities. Figure 5.3 
illustrates that the marginal effect of exposure to the policy cue treatment is insignificant 
given that the estimate’s confidence interval closely overlaps with zero. 
However, individuals in the symbolic cue treatment were more sorted than subjects 
in both the control and policy cue conditions. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, presenting the 
parties as being polarized within liberal-conservative ideological space generates greater 
partisan-ideological sorting. Not only is this the marginal effect associated with assignment 
to that condition distinguishable from zero, but the paired contrast between policy and 
symbolic polarization is also significant (b = 0.07, t = 1.86). Further, the magnitude of this 
difference is large; the effect of exposure to symbolic polarization, for example, is 
equivalent to two full units of educational attainment.  
 
Table 5.1. Elite cues and partisan-ideological sorting 
 b s.e. 
Symbolic cue  0.067** (0.039) 
Policy cue -0.004 (0.040) 
White  0.096** (0.040) 
Black  0.124 (0.080) 
Age -0.002** (0.001) 
Education  0.033** (0.019) 
Male  0.110** (0.032) 
Income -0.001 (0.005) 
Internet -0.038 (0.036) 
Political knowledge  0.047 (0.058) 
News consumption   0.016** (0.008) 
Constatnt  0.219** (0.097) 
 
Source: Amazon mTurk sample, June, 2016 




The careful reader may ask: Why do these results differ from past research? First, it is 
important to note that prior experimental research has largely concerned itself with how 
polarized elites affect attitudinal consistency and simple matching of policy attitudes vis-




between partisan and ideological identification, which the metric of identity sorting used 
here captures. Second, consider the informational nature of policy and symbolic cues. To 
use the parlance of Ellis and Stimson (2012), policy cues provide information about the 
instrumental or “operational” nature of the parties. We know, however, that the average 
citizen’s own symbolic liberal-conservative identity is modestly independent of their 
combined bundle of operational preferences (e.g. Conover and Feldman, 1981; Devine, 
2015; Mason, 2016). In this case, merely presenting the parties as intractably polarized 
does little to grease the convergence between partisanship and ideological identification, 
ostensibly because 1) this policy information is more tenuously related to how individuals 
conceive of the relationship between partisanship and ideology, and 2) the symbolic cue 
condition literally preloads subjects with these connections by establishing the link 




Notes: Solid lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals; contrast 
between conditions is significant (b = .07, t = 1.86).  
 
Figure 5.3. The effect of elite cues on sorting 
 
  
However, as I will show in the next study, the relationship between symbolic cues 
and sorting is still more complex than this finding. In fact, there is nothing particularly 
unique about polarization as an informational precursor to sorting. Instead, perceptions of 




















dovetailing with recent research that illustrates the pervasive nature of the in-group / out-
group paradigm (e.g. Nicholson, 2012; Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012), I find that greater 
correspondence between partisan and ideological identities has much less to do with 
comparative party differences—i.e. elite polarization—than it does with perceptions of 




5.4 Study 2: Group memberships and sorting  
In this second study, I seek to establish two novel features of the relationship between elite 
cues and sorting: 1) perceptions of symbolic cues should again exert greater influence on 
sorting than policy-based ones, and 2) these assessments should vary in their relationship 
to sorting according to group membership. 
 
5.4.1 Data and Measurement 
The data for Study 2 are drawn from the 1972-2012 American National Elections Studies 
(ANES) Time-Series surveys and 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study, respectively. The 
outcome of interest in these analyses, partisan-ideological sorting, is identical to the 
dependent variable utilized in Study 1. However, in these analyses, I focus not on the 
effects of exposure to elite cues—what might be considered the “direct effects” of partisan 
polarization—but rather the indirect effect of perceptions of these cues on sorting through 
the lens of group memberships.  
 
Symbolic group cues  
The ANES surveys ask individuals to rate whether and to what extent the Democratic and 
Republican Parties are either liberal or conservative. Responses to these items range from 
1, “extremely liberal,” to 7, “extremely conservative.” To construct the first type of group 
assessment, perceived party polarization, I subtract a respondent’s Democratic Party 
ideological placement from the Republican one. As used elsewhere by Davis and Dunaway 
(2016), this operation yields a variable that ranges from -6, which conveys that a 
respondent perceives that the parties are fully polarized, yet completely opposite of their 




are extremely liberal), to 6, which conveys that the individual correctly identifies the 
parties’ ideology and views this quality as extreme (i.e. Democrats are extremely liberal / 
Republicans are extremely conservative). Values of or near zero, then, represent either 
perceiving the parties to be moderate or perceiving the parties to be effectively 
indistinguishable from each other. To ease the interpretation of this variable’s relationship 
to sorting, I have rescaled it to range from 0 (perceives parties as fully polarized but 
wrongly assigns ideological labels) to 1 (correctly perceives parties’ ideology and views 
the two groups as maximally polarized).78  
Panel A in Figure 5.4 illustrates the distribution of this variable’s scores. Roughly 
10 percent of respondents incorrectly perceive the relative nature of party polarization 
(scores to the left of “no difference.” The vast majority of individuals see “correct” 
differences between the parties, although only about 3 percent of respondents perceive that 
the parties are maximally polarized (i.e. Democrats extremely liberal and Republicans 
extremely conservative).  
 Next, I disaggregate this “comparative” group cue into perceptions of in-party and 
out-party ideological extremity according to respondent partisanship. Recalling that 
individuals are asked to rate the parties on seven-point scales, ranging from liberal to 
conservative, I reverse-code an individual’s Democratic Party ideological placement in 
order to “match” the assessment of the Republican Party’s ideological placement insofar 
as this recode ensures that higher scores on both party placements convey “correct” 
perceptions of ideological extremity (i.e. Democrats are perceived to be “extremely 
liberal,” and Republicans “extremely” conservative). These variables are then rescaled to 
range from 0, (strong, incorrect assessments of a party’s ideological nature) to 1 (which 
conveys that an individual correctly perceives that the respective party is ideologically 
extreme. Recall that these values were displayed in Figure 5.1.  
 
                                                          
78 One could take the absolute value of these assessments, but this would wrongly constrain 
perceptions that the parties are ideologically extreme in the incorrect direction (i.e. Dem’s 
extremely conservative / Rep’s extremely liberal) with perceptions that the parties are 






Source: 1984-2012 ANES   
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights.  
 
Figure 5.4. Perceptions of the parties 
 
 
The fourth and fifth forms of group cues reflect the perceived distance between an 
individual’s own ideological self-placement and the corresponding placement of the in-
party, the party to which the respondent belongs, and out-party, the party with which an 
individual does not identify. In other words, these variables not only account for the 
perceived ideological character and extremity of a particular party, but how these qualities 
relate to the respondent’s own ideological identity. Perceived in-party similarity is created 
by subtracting the ideological placement of an individual’s party from her own ideological 
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so that larger values will represent greater similarity. Values on this variable range from 0 
(maximum ideological differences between the self and in-group) to 1 (which conveys no 
differences between self and group ideological placements). According to Panel B in 
Figure 5.4, most respondents believe that their in-party shares their own sense of 
ideological self-placement. Almost 70 percent of individuals fall into one of the two highest 
categories on this item.  
Perceived out-party dissimilarity is constructed by subtracting the ideological 
placement of an individual’s out-party from their own self-placement and taking the 
absolute value of the resulting score. This transformation is necessary to ensure that 
Republican and Democrat identifiers’ scores exist within common space and yields a 
variable that, after rescaling, ranges from 0 (no differences between self and out-group 
ideology) to 1 (maximum differences between self and group ideology). Panel C in Figure 
5.4 illustrates that the spread of values on this item is approximately normal, with fewer 
than five percent of all partisans perceiving maximum ideological differences between their 
and the out-party’s liberal-conservative placement.  
 
Policy-based cues 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the ANES began asking respondents about their perceptions 
of the parties’ issue positions on a number of policy items. Upon being given seven-
category continua that juxtapose a “liberal” and “conservative” solution to these particular 
policy issues, individuals are asked to place where they think the parties’ approaches to 
these issues fit within these bivalent response sets. I first average together individuals’ 
Democratic Party policy placements across the five items that are routinely included on 
Time-Series surveys (health insurance, provision of jobs, aid to minorities, spending on 
government services, and spending on defense). I then do the same for the Republican Party 
policy placements, and, finally, for each respondent. In effect, the resulting variables 
represent a “latent” approximation of the perceived “liberal” or “conservative” nature of 
the policy preferences of both the parties and the respondent, which resemble, at least in 
their underlying measurement structure, the symbolic assessments outlined above.79  
                                                          
79 Although prior research is not bullish about the limited dimensionality of individual-
level preferences (Johnston and Feldman, 2014; Lupton, Meyers, and Thornton, 2015), I 
am not strictly interested in whether this latent score is “ideological,” in the usual sense 




Following the approach outlined in the previous section, I then create a number of 
different cues based off of these indices. Because the perceived policy placements fit within 
the same seven-category scale as liberal-conservative ideology, the actual construction of 
these variables follows the exact same template detailed in the preceding section. Thus, the 
five items derived from the policy placements include: 1) perceived policy polarization, 2) 
in-party policy extremity, 3) out-party policy extremity, 4) perceived in-party policy 
similarity, and 5) perceived out-party policy dissimilarity.80  
 
Controls 
A number of control variables are employed. In light of the legacy of the Southern 
realignment, I include a dichotomous variable, Old South, for persons who reside in states 
that were originally included in the Confederacy. A respondent’s age is measured in years, 
ranging from 17 to 99. Educational attainment conveys the highest level of schooling a 
respondent has undertaken and takes the form of a seven-part ordinal scale ranging from 0, 
“grade school,” to 1, “graduate degree.” The degree to which persons are interested in 
politics is coded 0 for “not much,” 1 for “some,” and 2 for “a lot.” Because religion is 
deeply intertwined with political convictions (Patrikios, 2008), I provide two variables that 
differentiate between religious identification and religiosity: 1) Protestant is coded 1 for 
individuals who identify as members of that group and otherwise 0, and 2) frequency of 
church attendance is coded as an ordinal scale ranging from 0, “never,” to 1 “attends 
multiple times a week.”81 Racial identification as white or black is coded 1 for identifying 
oneself as a member of that group and 0 for otherwise. Finally, although it is virtually 
impossible to find acceptable “political knowledge” items that are common across both 
early and recent ANES surveys, I utilize knowledge of House majority party as a proxy for 
this concept. 
                                                          
dimension). Instead, I’m only interested in the relative distance between this score and the 
scores given to the parties, allowing me to remain agnostic about the underlying constraint 
observed across attitudes. If there is multidimensionality within these preferences, then we 
should observe great fluctuations in the relative in-group / out-group (dis)similarity scores. 
80 For brevity, the depiction of the distribution of these items is available in the Appendix 
(Figure B2).  
81 While it would be ideal to employ a better measure of religious conservatism, 
unfortunately, the data do not provide any common metric by which to measure this 




5.4.2  Results 
Table 5.2 reports the results of a series of analyses that model identity sorting as a function 
of different configurations of the group assessments specified above. Model 1 employs the 
standard predictor of sorting, perceived party polarization (prior works often uses the terms 
“differences,” “polarization,” and “cues” interchangeably), with one caveat—these 
assessments have been broken down into symbolic- and issue-based components. The 
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients produced by these two items is startling. 
Correctly perceiving that the Democrats are very liberal and Republicans are very 
conservative—that the parties are, in effect, maximally polarized—exerts almost triple the 
effect on sorting relative perceiving the parties are fully polarized across a series of policy 
issues. These results handsomely match the findings uncovered in Study 1; the information 
derived from elite cues is not uniformly related to the convergence between political 
identities.82  
How do group memberships mediate the relationship between assessments (cues) 
and sorting? Turning to Model 2, I disaggregate perceptions of both symbolic and policy-
based polarization by a respondent’s group membership. Two conclusions are apparent. 
First, the effect of symbolic group assessments on sorting is again comparatively larger 
than the associated effects of policy-based assessments. Second, I uncover modest evidence 
that indicates that the relationship of these perceptions to sorting is differentiated by group 
membership. Consider a Democratic-identifier who perceives that Republicans are 
“extremely conservative” and Democrats are “extremely liberal,” numerically the most 
“extreme” perceptions associated with each party. Perceiving that an out-group is 
maximally-extreme results in a change in sorting that is roughly 30 percent larger than 
concomitant assessments regarding perceived in-party extremity.   
  
                                                          
82 One potential criticism that readers familiar with this research may raise is that these 
effects are a function of a different choice of dependent variable than the one used in prior 
research (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). I address this concern in Appendix A5. Essentially, 
policy cues predict issue-based sorting, while symbolic cues predict identity-based sorting. 





Table 5.2. Elite cues and Partisan-Ideological Sorting 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Symbolic assessments    
Perceived polarization 0.17** ----- ----- 
 (0.01)   
In-party extremity  ----- 0.17** ----- 
  (0.02)  
Out-party extremity ----- 0.22** ----- 
  (0.04)  
In-party similarity ----- ----- 0.17** 
   (0.03) 
Out-party dissimilarity ----- ----- 0.65** 
   (0.03) 
Policy assessments    
Perceived polarization 0.06* ----- ----- 
 (0.02)   
In-party extremity  ----- 0.05* ----- 
  (0.02)  
Out-party extremity ----- 0.07* ----- 
  (0.03)  
In-party similarity ----- ----- -0.04 
   (0.02) 
Out-party dissimilarity ----- ----- 0.02 
   (0.02) 
Controls    
Political interest 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Political knowledge 0.04** 0.03** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
protestant 0.02** 0.05** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant -2.21* -4.11** 0.62 
 (1.02) (1.23) (1.29) 
R2 0.13 0.14 0.50 
N 20,458 8,393 8,330 
 
Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series Surveys 
Notes: † Additional controls include race, age, gender, household income, and 
year counter (full models are available in the Appendix. Analyses employ robust 




However, the true power of group memberships is further revealed when we 
account for how these memberships mediate perceived party (dis)similarities. In Model 3, 
I convert the simple measures of ideological extremity into items that account for 
ideological group placements vis-à-vis the respondent’s own ideological moorings—
variables that instead reflect how ideologically (dis)similar a group is compared to the 
respondent. As expected, the effect of perceived out-group dissimilarity on sorting far 
surpasses the magnitude of perceived in-group similarity. In other words, it’s not so much 
that individuals observe their preferred in-group archetypes and sort accordingly, but that 
out-group information provides a particularly stark and powerful cue. When individuals 
recognize that the opposing party is ideologically different from their own identity, they 
are much more likely exhibit robust levels of sorting than even when they perceive that 
their own party is a perfect ideological fit.  
 
 
Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series 
Notes:  Originating regressions can be obtained in Appendix, but modeling conforms to 
the analyses presented in Table 2. Solid vertical bands convey 95 percent confidence 
intervals. Point estimates for in-group similarity correspond to moving from minimul to 
maximum overlap between in-group and respondent self-placement in liberal-conservative 
space. Point estimates for out-group dissimilarity convey moving from maximum to 
minium overlap between out-group and respondent self-placement in liberal-conservative 
space.   
 






Figure 5.5 illustrates the contours of these findings by plotting the coefficient 
estimates associated with in-party similarity and out-party dissimilarity over time. Unlike 
the pooled coefficient estimates presented in Table 2, each point estimate is derived from 
fitting a model to the data from the respective year in which it was collected. Aside from 
the observation that in-group assessments are a much weaker correlate of sorting than out-
group ones (in fact, the confidence intervals of the estimates associated with perceived in-
group similarity are insignificant more often than not), I find that the magnitude of the 
effect depicted in the second panel increase significantly over time. This observation tracks 
the real change in Dw-Nominate estimates that indicate that the objective level of elite 
polarization has dramatically increased during this window of time. Thus, not only is a 
sensitivity to out-group cues associated with a higher propensity to exhibit sorted political 
identities, but the magnitude of this effect has appreciably evolved over time. As elites 
have become objectively divided, so too has the strength of the relationship between 
subjective assessments and sorting increased. 
 
Table 5.3. The Effect of Changes in Group Perceptions on Sorting 
 




∆ Party Polarization  
0.097* 
0.025 
 (0.037) (0.040) 
∆ In-Party Similarity ------    0.141** 
  (0.039) 
∆ Out-Party Dissimilarity ------    0.181** 
  (0.043) 
Constant 0.039 0.063 
 (0.044) (0.042) 
R2 0.03 0.19 
N 319 306 
 
Source: 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are changes in values on variable from 1992 
to 1996, where positive values on all entries are coded to reflect an 
“increase” in respective item. Analyses weighted using full sample weights. 





To corroborate these findings, I investigate panel data from the 1992-1996 ANES 
Panel Study. Although these data were gathered over only a moderate duration of time, 
resampling the same respondents presents the opportunity to analyze whether explicit 
changes in group perceptions are related to changes in sorting. Table 3 presents a series of 
models that depict sorting as a function of perceived party differences (symbolic 
polarization) and assessments broken down by group membership. Recalling that these 
variables each originally range from 0 to 1, the coefficients presented in each model 
represent the effect of changing from a value of 0 in 1992 to a value of 1 in 1996. Thus, in 
Model 1, if an individual perceived no ideological differences between the parties in 1992 
but perceived maximum differences in 1996, then the result would be a change in roughly 
10 points of additional partisan-ideological sorting, all else equal. In Model 2, however, 
these assessments do not exert a significant effect on sorting. Instead, changes in perceived 
out-group dissimilarity are the strongest correlate of partisan-ideological sorting; the 
coefficient for changes in these symbolic assessments is double the coefficient of perceived 
party polarization in Model 1 and larger than the coefficient representing changes in 
perceived in-group similarity.  
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
These analyses indicate that perceptions of between-group differences, what is commonly 
termed “perceived polarization,” reveal only a partial portrait of how “elite cues” influence 
the convergence between ideological and partisan identities. Although a growing body of 
work reveals that individuals’ assessments of political groups are biased (Ahler, 2014; 
Levendusky and Mahlhotra, 2016) and that group memberships shape political attitudes 
(Nicholson, 2012), this study is the first to explore the consequences of how group 
memberships filter information through the ubiquitous “perceptual screen” of partisan 
memberships in the context of sorting. While the observation that perceived out-group 
ideological dissimilarities drive sorting is novel, this finding fits within the expectations of 
self-categorization and social comparison theories of intergroup behavior (Shaw and 
Costanzo, 1982; Park and Rothbart, 1982), which suggest that comparisons between the 
self and reference groups shape conformity among preferences whereas the recognition of 
between-group differences may not (e.g. Hogg, 1996; Turner et al., 1987). Individuals do 




ideological extremity are a partial function of their awareness of their own ideological 
identity.  
These results produce an important revision to extant work on sorting, and one that 
has far-reaching consequences for models of behavior that employ spatial analysis of 
ideology: perceived symbolic—not policy—cues facilitate the convergence between 
political identities. This distinction is a vital one. Prior research treats the recognition of 
party differences within liberal-conservative and policy space as if these domains share 
such commonalities that these cues can be aggregated together. Yet, descriptively, this 
assumption is tenuous. Recalling that dissimilarity scores range from 0 (no differences) to 
1 (maximum differences), individuals perceive far greater out-group symbolic ideological 
differences (x = 0.47) than they do concomitant policy differences (x = 0.29). Thus, not 
only are party placements within ideological space biased by group membership, but 
individuals are either not as well-equipped to navigate policy relative symbolic ideological 
space or else they derive fundamentally different types of actionable information from 
these cues (or, perhaps both). These results imply that, even as the parties have become 
objectively divided across a wide variety of issues, awareness of those divisions matters 
comparatively little in the calculus of sorting. Provided that individuals perceive stark 
symbolic differences between the parties, partisan-ideological sorting may occur 
independent of these policy-based cues.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The two studies presented in this manuscript reveal that the linkage between elite cues and 
sorting must be reconstructed. In Study 1, I show that the prevailing linkage between elites 
and sorting rests critically on the type of elite cues (information) presented to subjects. 
Merely communicating that the parties are polarized does little to improve the extent to 
which political identities are sorted. Instead, symbolic polarization is a necessary and 
sufficient cause of partisan-ideological sorting.   
Study 2 builds on this finding, showing how perceptions of these cues are then 
shaped by group memberships, offering a social identity-driven theory of sorting. Here, I 
demonstrated that perceptions of between-party differences—what scholars commonly call 
“perceived polarization”—exert much less impact on sorting than do perceived out-group 




drive identity-based sorting nearly as much as symbolic ideological differences between 
an individual and an out-group party. Why are individuals more likely to conform to the 
political characteristics of their in-group when they perceive that their political opponents 
deviate from their own group’s preferences? Self-categorization theory conveys that 
contextual comparisons between reference groups and the individual are efficient means 
for processing information quickly (Atkinson, 1986). Given the desire for positive social 
distinction (Turner et al., 1987) and the evaluative importance of group differences (Taylor, 
1981), Gracián’s admonition in the epigraph to heed one’s enemies proves prescient: 
sorting is the distilled endpoint of social pressures from out-group sources.  
Normatively, these findings are not a cause for optimism. In fact, Studies 1 and 2 
imply that policy moderation by party elites would do little to curb partisan-ideological 
sorting within the mass public. Even if cross-cutting issues perturbed the uni-dimensional 
policy space that currently characterizes Congressional polarization, the symbolic nature 
of partisan conflict has become such an ingrained feature of the political landscape that 
identity-based sorting may be orthogonal to most policy debate. Future work on sorting, 
then, would do well to consider whether certain types of issues have the power to inhibit 
or exacerbate the convergence of these identities.  
At any rate, these findings suggest that spatial models of politics, which rely on 
the assumption that individuals understand policy space and connect this information to 
their own preferences, must wrestle with the relatively weak relationship between policy 
information and the convergence between political identities demonstrated here. Although 
political commentators lament that candidates ought to focus on the issue facing ordinary 
Americans, these findings indicate that some divisive issues like federal spending and 
affirmative action generate little identity-based sorting. This, in turn, implies that political 
elites should concentrate on highly stylized approaches to campaigning, which may 
undercut the substantive discourse that elections should encourage. However, as long as 
party elites have an incentive to employ symbolic rhetoric—and the public buys the 
demand that symbolic ideological purity is the litmus test for electoral acceptability—the 
ongoing convergence between partisan and ideological identities within the mass public 






Chapter 6: Identity Sorting and Compromise 
  
Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best. 
-Otto von Bismarck 
 
"In Utopia, I'd like to see compromise but with the political environment that 
is going on now, that's impossible. It's a stand on principle and I don't give 
an inch.“ 
-Clinton voter (Wilmington, NC)83 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Having discussed how identity sorting occurs, we now turn to why it matters. Over the 
previous decade has been growing interest in the existence of “affective polarization,” or 
the type of social polarization that is embodied in a distrust, dislike, and disenfranchisement 
of an opposition party (e.g. Iyengar, Llekes, and Sood, 2012; Mason, 2015). In particular, 
an important facet of this type of emotional distaste for one’s opponents is manifested in 
individuals’ orientations toward working closely with the other team—in other words, how 
individuals think about compromise. In this chapter, I explore how identity sorting affects 




Politics is often described using game metaphors. Legislators and candidates are 
described as players, parties as teams, and participants as fans (c.f. Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler, 2002)—even the coverage of elections is presented using frames that are used 
to describe sporting events (Lawrence, 2000). Nevertheless, the utility of this analogy is 
weaker beyond the immediate electoral context. While the outcomes of sporting contests 
are discrete and final, outcomes in politics are less simple. Elections may determine 
winners and losers, but policymaking requires members from both groups to shed those 
labels as they work together to successfully pass legislation. 
Compromise, however, is increasingly viewed as capitulation rather than an ideal 
feature of deliberative political exchange. Recent examples of interparty intransigence are 







replete in American politics, ranging from the one-sided passage of the Affordable Care 
Act in 2010, to the government shutdown over the federal budget in 2013, to the Senate’s 
inability to hold hearings to fill the Supreme Court vacancy generated by Antonin Scalia’s 
death in 2016. In fact, while Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) may have 
admitted in a 2015 interview that “…nobody is a dictator here. We can’t do things, one 
party only, in a time of divided government,” bipartisanship is increasingly rare (Mann and 
Ornstein, 2012; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).84  
Relative the behavior of their elected officeholders, the American people fare only 
marginally better in their desire for and willingness to accept political compromise. In fact, 
while the mass public pays modest lip-service to the notion that political leaders shouldn’t 
always get everything they want, citizens often believe that their “side” is entitled to an 
enormous amount of political deference (Pew, 2014). In other words, when it comes to 
compromising in practice—or, when individuals are required to belly-up to the bargaining 
table to make hard choices—they are much less likely to cede resources to their political 
opponents than they are in principle. Thus, citizens rarely prefer “neutral” or “moderate” 
policy solutions (Ahler and Broockman, 2016), much less politicians who are willing to 
make concessions (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014; Grossman and Hopkins, 
2015; Ryan, 2015).  
Why do individuals resist compromise? In this manuscript, I explore how the 
extent to which individuals’ political identities are sorted affects the value that individuals 
place on compromise. I show that when partisan and ideological identities overlap, citizens 
are less likely support legislators who compromise, with one important qualification: this 
effect is isolated to persons with right-, but not left-leaning identities. However, when we 
transition to exploring the extent to which individuals are willing to cede ground to their 
political opponents in order to achieve their desired ends, the textured nature of this effect 
disappears. Even in the absence of a consistent set of ideological values, sorted persons are 
less willing to broker negotiated solutions to problems (in fact, there is some evidence that 
those citizens with left-leaning identities are even more unwilling to engage in such 
bargaining). 
                                                          







These findings highlight the curious disconnect between a commitment to abstract 
principles and episodic behavior demonstrated elsewhere (Sears and Citrin, 1982; Winter 
and Mouritzen, 2001; Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014). 
Simply, when push comes to shove, most people are willing to renege on their commitment 
to the abstract value of compromise and, instead, will directly punish the out-group party. 
Thus, while many Americans consent to compromise in principle, in practice, their 
behavior suggests a stiff resistance to bargaining with their political counterparts exists.  
 
6.2 Compromise and its correlates 
All governments must wrestle with the problem of distilling the competing preferences of 
its citizens into tangible policy outputs. If representatives must balance majoritarian 
policymaking rules with policy options that faithfully adhere to their constituency’s 
desires, then some type of bipartisan negotiation is usually required to resolve these 
competing demands. Habermas (1994, pg. 5) describes the place of compromise within 
liberalism thusly: 
[C]ompromises make up the bulk of political processes. 
Under conditions of religious, or in any way cultural and 
societal pluralism, politically relevant goals are often 
selected by interests and value orientations that are by no 
means constitutive for the identity of the community at 
large. 
As such, compromise embodies a practical resolution to conflict as “an agreement in which 
all sides sacrifice something in order to improve on the status quo from their perspective, 
and in which sacrifices are at least partly determined by the other side’s will” (Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2013, pg. 10).  
 While some political compromises are, of course, undesirable in that they may 
violate a community’s standards, the positive value of compromise is that it offers a 
meaningful political alternative to improve upon the prevailing status quo. Thus, not only 
does a general resistance to compromise implausibly presume that such change is 
uniformly undesirable,85 but it implies that bargaining in return for concessions is 
                                                          
85 Contestation, in fact, is a vibrant component to democracy—at least as important to 





objectionable, which ultimately privileges the status quo in a way that is incompatible with 
both liberal and conservative approaches to policy problems.86 Further, resistance to 
compromise undermines the shared trust and respect that are needed to effectively pursue 
self-governance, where such respect is vital in that it 1) buoys peaceable interactions even 
in the face of irresolvable moral disagreement and 2) embodies the type of cooperation 
necessary to engage in democratic exchange (Gutmann and Thompson, 2013).87 
 If compromise is valuable for both pragmatic and ethical reasons, then why are 
individuals unwilling to pursue it? Consider first the relationship between values and 
compromise. If compromise requires citizens to default on some of their strongly-held 
principles to find a consensual agreement, then it makes sense that individuals would resist 
this type of bargaining because it ostensibly violates these core values. George H.W. 
Bush’s aborted campaign promise to resist raising taxes in 1988, for example, was not only 
met by deep dismay from his supporters, but contributed to weak support during his 
reelection campaign. More recently, the success of the Tea Party during the 2010 midterm 
elections showcased how violators of party principles were dramatically punished at the 
polls. Simply, individuals resist reneging on their values and punish those who do. 
 Recent research suggests that moral values, a subset of value dispositions that are 
not necessarily filtered through a cost-benefit framework (Tetlock et al. 2000; Bennis, 
Medin, and Bartels, 2010), are particularly binding in relation to compromise. Ryan (2015) 
demonstrates that these attitudes fundamentally reorient how individuals approach political 
choices. Instead of approaching choice as utility maximizers, priming moral considerations 
causes individuals to instead adhere to strict rules. In turn, this reduces the likelihood that 
citizens prefer compromise.  
A second facet of social-psychological explanations for compromise is rooted in 
non-cognitive aspects of information-processing. Given the ubiquity and power of 
                                                          
86 Consider a tax policy that is not ideal for large swaths of a mass public. If altering that 
policy benefited constituencies for both parties, yet one party refuses to compromise on 
even slight alterations to that policy because in so doing they either lose some measure of 
leverage or violate second-order intellectual preferences, both constituencies suffer as the 
status quo prevails.  
87 As Gutmann and Thompson (2010, footnote 25) note, framing compromise’s value in 
terms of mutual respect helps to redress some of the criticism that a wholly “pragmatic” 
approach to compromise ignores the moral constraints that are imposed on the boundaries 





emotions like fear, anxiety, and hope, it is possible that these affective responses shape 
whether and how individuals acquiesce to mutually-beneficial (and mutually-costly) policy 
solutions. The relationship between fear and compromise, however, is complex. While fear 
related to the wellbeing of one’s group may be related to a decrease in the propensity to 
engage in compromise (Bar-Tal, 2001), fear of personal safety is less clearly-related to the 
extent to which an individual will compromise (Maoz and McCauley, 2005).88 
In contrast to these explanations, realist theories of group interactions argue that 
compromise is closely related to power inequalities and, by extension, threat. Drawing 
from research on interstate relations (Posen, 1993) and organization development 
(Bazerman and Neale, 1992), this approach assumes that group behavior is not so much a 
function of emotions, but is instead governed by the extent to which an in-group feels 
threatened by an out-group.89 In this telling, negotiation breaks down when group members 
view mutual decision-making as a zero-sum game—or a scenario in which one side wins 
only when the other side loses (Thompson, 1995). Research indicates, for example, that 
perceptions of threat increase political intolerance towards out-groups (Marcus et al., 1995) 
and punitive and aggressive behaviors toward out-groups (Huddy et al., 2005), which, in 
turn, decreases more moderate political outcomes (Gordon and Arian, 2001).  
While this framework helps explain intergroup behavior in severe ethnic conflicts, 
it also characterizes the nature of political exchange in American politics. Consider a recent 
editorial appearing in the New York Times, which likened Republicans’ and Democrats’ 
“zero-sum thinking” to the sectarian conflict between the two branches of Islam. “Because 
whether you’re talking about Shiites and Sunnis—or Iranians and Saudis, Israelis and 
Palestinians, Turks and Kurds—a simply binary rule dominates their politics: “I am strong, 
                                                          
88 Extending the textured nature of the relationship between fear and compromise, 
Spanovic et al. (2010) find that the status of conflict moderates the effects of fear on 
compromise: when a conflict is ongoing, fear decreases compromise, while feelings of 
fearfulness during the resolution of a conflict often portend greater compromise. As 
Halperin, Porat, and Wohl (2013, pg. 810) write, such “collective angst has 
pluripotentiality—it undermines willingness to compromise in some contexts, but will 
facilitate it in others.” 
89 The hard distinction between this approach to compromise and an emotion-based one is 
rooted in the longstanding differentiation between cognition and affect within social 
psychology. Whereas a realist perspective stylizes threat as a form of cognitive assessment, 
fear is instead conceptualized as a reaction to such perceptions of threat (Lazarus, 1991; 





why should I compromise? I am weak, how can I compromise?...Are we all just Shiites 
and Sunnis now?”90 While partisan politics in America are not wholly comparable to such 
sectarian conflict, recent work shows that partisan memberships are similarly binding. 
Citizens have difficulty in overcoming partisan biases in evaluating the desirability of 
public policy (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014).   
Taken as a whole, these are plausible explanations for why individuals might shun 
political compromise. However, this extant research on compromise has not yet grappled 
with how the ongoing sorting of the mass public has affected these orientations. Drawing 
explicitly on the group-based nature of party politics, I argue that as individuals’ political 
identities align, their willingness to voice that compromise is desirable and select 
legislators who engage in political bargaining ought to decrease. Detailing this theoretical 
linkage is the task to which I now turn. 
 
6.3 Sorting and compromise 
Social identities are powerful associations that involve the incorporation of a particular 
group membership into an individual’s self-concept. Tajfel (1981, pg. 255) describes these 
identities as the combination of objective group membership combined with the subjective 
“value and emotional significance attached to [such] membership.” Driven by a need for 
positive distinctiveness, social identities encourage individuals to favorably prioritize in-
group over out-group members in order to protect their group’s status.  
Political identities fit this description (Huddy, Mason, and Aaore, 2015). Not only 
do partisans intensely favor group members over non-group members (Mason, 2015), but 
partisan identification strongly biases how individuals interpret information (e.g. Bartels, 
2002; Leeper, 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Iyengar and Westwood, 
2014; Davis, 2016). Much like the passionate fans who cheer their favorite team in the heat 
of a competition, partisans’ internalized sense of partisan identity is intimately related to 
their group’s victories and defeats; it is personal, rooted deeply within an individual’s 
subconscious (Theodoridis, 2013).  
 In a similar respect, ideological or “liberal-conservative” identity also reflects 
these qualities. While ideology is often conceptualized in terms of individuals’ policy 






preferences, a growing body of research treats liberal-conservative identification as a form 
of social identity (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015; Mason, 2016). Like partisanship, 
ideological identity corresponds to a group-based understanding of politics and strongly 
reflects affective, symbolic attachments to the liberal and conservative labels (Conover and 
Feldman, 1981; Zschirnt, 2011). Simply, self-identification as an ideologue constitutes a 
social identity insofar as an individual’s self-perception as an ideologue is “experienced as 
a point of similarity with other in-group members and as a point of collective difference 
with out-group members” (Malka and Llekes, 2010, p. 160).  
 Given that the mere categorization of oneself as a group-member generates 
intergroup prejudice that reshapes economic exchange (Tajfel, 1970), political 
compromise, which hinges at least minimally on some degree of material, psychological, 
or status loss, ought to be sensitive to the strength of the underlying identities that structure 
intergroup relations. But while research has examined the relationship between 
compromise and partisanship (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014), political 
identities (partisanship, ideological identification) do not exist independent of each other. 
What happens to individuals’ attitudes toward compromise, then, when these identities 
converge? That is to say, how does sorting between partisanship and ideological 
identification affect citizens’ willingness to compromise?  
 
6.3.1 Behavioral consequences of sorting  
Most individuals possess multiple group identities, which variously affect a range of 
assessments and behaviors (Deaux, 1996; Brewer and Pierce, 2005). For example, 
individuals may evaluate out-group members on the basis of one dominant membership 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne, 1995), evaluate individuals as a function of some 
additive combination of their memberships (Brown and Turner, 1979), or even evaluate 
others based on a “compound category with emergent properties that are not predicted from 
the contributing categories separately” (Roccas and Brewer, 2002, pg. 88). Of the different 
permutations that an individual’s identities may take when combined, this latter compound 
category—what Roccas and Brewer term “intersected identities”—represents an 
arrangement of social identities where an individual simultaneously self-categorizes with 
more than one social identity, yet maintains a single supraordinate sense of an in-group / 





 Prior work on partisan-ideological sorting, or the overlap between partisan and 
ideological identities, indicates that the convergence of these group memberships most 
clearly reflects intersected social identities in that the in-group / out-group distinctions that 
characterize each individual identity are magnified when they are combined. For example, 
Mason (2015, 2016) finds that greater overlap between political identities is responsible 
for increased forms of social polarization, where strongly sorted individuals are more likely 
to possess affective bias toward out-group members. Elsewhere, Davis and Mason (2015) 
show that these biases have pervasive behavioral ramifications: as individuals become 
more sorted over time, they are less likely to support candidates of opposing parties (i.e. 
split their ticket).  
 If a lone social identity is sufficient to accentuate out-group memberships, then the 
combinatory nature of identity sorting ought to enhance biases toward out-group members. 
In the context of bargaining, which requires a willingness to release psychological or 
material group resources, such sorting should effectively narrow one’s in-group while 
simultaneously enlarging the out-group—in effect, generating behavioral rigidity and a 
disregard for actions that would lead to a potential loss of material or social status. 
Specifically, by amplifying the importance and salience of one’s interlinked group 
memberships, such sorting ought to decrease an individual’s preference for representatives 
that will barter with out-group members. 
 
H1: As the correspondence between an individual’s partisan and 




6.3.2 Differential effects?  
The argument offered in the previous section indicates that sorting, in general, should be 
sufficient to reduce individuals’ propensity to compromise. Yet, based on the underlying 
nature of particular political attachments, it may be the case that the effects of sorting are 
contingent upon the groups with which individuals identify. Consider the different 
motivations and compositional qualities of the Republican and Democratic Parties. The 
Republican Party has been described as unitary and hierarchical, where purity, deference, 
and loyalty to the party are prioritized and members are bound together by common 





comprised of a coalition of constituencies with varying social, economic, and political 
demands (Freeman, 1986). Thus, while “Republicans face an enduring internal tension 
between adherence to doctrine and the inevitable concession or failures inherent in 
governing—a conflict that is exacerbated by the presence of an influential cadre of 
movement leaders devoted to publicly policing ideological orthodoxy,” Democrats, 
alternatively, “lack a powerful internal movement designed to impose ideological 
discipline on elected officials, which gives Democratic officeholders more freedom to 
maneuver pragmatically…” (Grossman and Hopkins, 2015, pg. 120).  
These characteristics are important because they have produced sharply divergent 
approaches to policymaking. Whereas both parties have objectively polarized (e.g. 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006), which ought to generally reduce baseline rates of 
legislative cooperation for all elected officials, the Republican Party has especially teetered 
toward “near-automatic obstruction of initiatives proposed by the opposition” (Grossman 
and Hopkins, 2015, pg. 12). These are significant and salient cues, or informational signals 
that flow from elites to the public that might structure how members of these different 
groups approach compromise.  
 These institutional differences, however, do not exist in a vacuum. In fact, these 
divergent organizational approaches dovetail with other less political—though perhaps 
more fundamental—differences in how ideologues view reality. While conservatives and 
liberals possess distinct approaches to questions of morality (e.g. Haidt, 2009), Hibbing, 
Smith and Alford (2014) contend that the central organizational principle that underscores 
differences in everything from artistic tastes to the psychological desire for closure and 
from sensitivity to disgust to information-seeking behaviors is conservatives’ physiological 
and psychological tendency toward negativity. Specifically, “compared with liberals, 
conservatives tend to register greater physiological responses to such stimuli and also to 
devote more psychological resources to them” (297). If emotional and cognitive rigidity 
are congenital features of conservative identification, then the combination of conservatism 
with Republicanism, a party affiliation marked by a recent, yet distinct resistance to 
political negotiation, may moderate the effect of sorting on compromise. Thus, I expect 
that the negative effect of sorting on compromise ought to be particularly strong for those 






H2: Higher levels of sorting among those with right-leaning identities 
should reduce a preference for compromise more than those with left-
leaning ones. 
 
   
6.4 Data 
To test these hypotheses, I draw on two datasets: the 2012 American National Election 
Studies’ Evaluations of Government survey (ANES EoG) and the Pew Research Center’s 
2014 Political Polarization and Typology survey (Pew PPT). 
 
6.4.1 Operationalizing compromise 
There are a variety of ways one might think about individuals’ preferences toward 
compromise. One productive way to conceptualize these orientations is to distinguish 
between attitudes about compromise as a “normative” or “social” good, what we might 
term preferences toward compromise in principle, and attitudes toward the distribution or 
allocation of resources relating to actual political bargaining, what I frame as compromise 
in practice.  
I begin with the concept of compromise in principle, or the value that respondents 
assign to the importance of political compromise. Appearing on the ANES EoG, this 
question taps whether individuals are willing to consent to the idea that compromise is a 
valuable trait for elected officials to exhibit. Specifically, do respondents prefer a leader 
who sticks to their principles regardless of outcomes or someone who will compromise to 
change the status quo? Responses to this question are coded 0 for “wants leader who sticks 
to principles” and 1 for “wants leader who compromises.” 
In contrast to valuing compromise in principle, one practical way of thinking about 
compromise is to consider how much deference any one side should receive in a policy 
debate. Because successful policymaking often requires leveraging certain resources or 
favors in order to receive desirable concessions, we can assess the propensity of individuals 
to engage in practical instances of compromise by examining respondents’ attitudes toward 
their willingness to cede ground to their opponents. Specifically, the Pew PPT survey asks 
individuals what the distribution of sacrifice should look like when political leaders engage 
in policymaking: “When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most 
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?” Responses to this item 





The value 50, then, represents an equal distribution of the demands that both “sides” get 
during negotiations.  
I create a metric that reflects orientations toward practical instances of compromise 
by folding responses on the above variable at the value “50”.” Values on this new variable 
range from 0, or a preference for “pure compromise” where both sides yield equally, to 50, 
or a preference for uncompromising politics where one side receives all demands. As 
individuals transition from 0 to 50, the extent to which they believe that one side should 
receive total deference in the policymaking process increases. Thus, larger values can be 
interpreted by an aversion to an even trade or a general resistance to compromise.  
 
6.4.2 Identity sorting 
Prior research operationalizes identity sorting by measuring the overlap between 
ideological and partisan identification and then multiplying the resulting value by the 
strength of those identities (Mason, 2015; Davis and Dunaway, 2016). Liberal-
conservative and partisan identification both range from left- (1) to right-leaning 
orientations (7). By subtracting and taking the absolute value of one self-placement 
(ideology) from the other (partisanship), we can derive a measure of overlap where lower 
values convey perfect overlap and high values significant discordance between identities. 
To make better sense of this item, the overlap between identities is then reverse-coded so 
that larger (smaller) values represent greater (less) overlap. To this score I add the value 
(1) and then multiply it by folded measures of partisan and liberal-conservative strength. 
The final variable is then rescaled to range from 0, “low overlap, weak (cross-cutting) 
identities,” to 1, “perfect overlap, strong identities.” 
 
6.4.3  Control variables 
There are a number of covariates that might explain individuals’ orientations toward 
compromise for which we ought to account. One way of thinking about a resistance to 
compromise includes the extent to which individuals possess a coherent worldview. When 
it was first released to the general public, the Pew PPT survey received notable attention 
in the popular press for a series of graphics that showed how the mass public’s values 
orientations had become more consistent over time. Information on ten issues were 





government cares for the poor and needy, affirmative action, corporate profits, 
environmental policy, the size of the military, and same-sex marriage. Using these items, I 
construct a measure of partisan value-consistency, wherein individuals receive a value of 
1 on a given item if their expressed opinion matches their party’s and 0 otherwise.91 These 
items are then averaged into an additive index whose values range from 0, or “no values 
that match party,” to 1 “all values match party.” Because values on this variable can take 
an extremely wide range of theoretical values, this variable is rescaled into quartiles, such 
that value-consistency increases with each quartile, which take the values 1-4.92  
 A number of additional characteristics may also shape compromise. First, 
individuals with high levels of political knowledge may be more likely to understand that 
politics often requires compromise to achieve one’s ends. In the ANES EoG survey, 
political knowledge comprises an additive index of correctly identifying the Prime Minister 
of England, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and the area in which the US government spends the least amount of 
money. In the Pew PPT survey, a political knowledge index accounts for correctly 
identifying which party enjoys House and Senate majorities, as well as which party prefers 
tax increases. The resulting indices are coded consistently such that they range from 0, “no 
correct answers,” to 1, “correctly answers all knowledge items.”  
Similar to the relationship between political knowledge and compromise, we might 
expect news consumption and political interest to be related to compromise insofar as those 
persons who pay greater attention to political events may be more likely to perceive that 
compromise is a social good. The former item is simply the number of days that a 
respondent watches or reads the news, ranging from 1 to 7, while the latter variable ranges 
from 0, “not very interested,” to 1, “very interested.” 
A recent study of compromise also demonstrates its close relationship with moral 
values. Ryan (2015) shows how preferences grounded in strong moral convictions are 
much less malleable when it comes to compromising. In the ANES EoG survey, 
respondents are asked to what degree their attitudes on their self-professed most important 
                                                          
91 In effect, this is more or less a stylization of sorting among values / attitudes.  
92 This is done because the variable, while more or less continuous, is not really “ordinal.” 
However, this coding scheme is just as easily reworked into “deciles,” which do not affect 





issue is rooted in moral values. Responses range from 1 “not at all,” to 5, “a great deal.” 
Related to these values, I also control, where possible, for individuals’ religious identities. 
Individuals who consider themselves Evangelicals are coded 1 and otherwise 0. So, too, 
are those who identify as religiously secular or religious liberal.  
Finally, I control for a number of standard demographic covariates. Respondents 
who identify as white or black are coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age ranges from a minimum 
value of 17 to 97 years old. Education is coded somewhat differently across surveys, but 
values on this item are always recoded to rage from 0, “lowest category of educational 
attainment,” to 1, “highest completed degree.” 
 
6.5 Results  
The models presented in Table 6.1 depict the relationship between sorting and an 
individual’s propensity to prefer an elected official who either sticks with their principles 
or compromises to achieve their goals. I find that, for both referents (legislator, president), 
analysis of the full sample does not produce a significant coefficient estimate for identity 
sorting. Instead, the effect of sorting on the likelihood that an individual will value elected 
officials who compromise is isolated to those persons with right-leaning identities.93 
Translating the coefficient estimate for sorting from a log-odds ratio to a predicted value, 
the transition from minimum to maximum values of sorting results in roughly a 20 
percentage point reduction in the probability that a respondent prefers compromise to 
sticking to one’s principles. Although the average person is likely to prefer representatives 
who compromise rather than stick to their principles (y = 60%), greater convergence 
between right-leaning identities confers that, on balance, the highly sorted conservative-
Republican will prefer elected representatives who do not compromise. 
 
  
                                                          
93 Splitting the sample into these two groups makes immediate comparisons easier. 
However, models that include an interaction term between group type and sorting are 
available in the appendix. These analyses indicate that these differences are persist at the 






Table 6.1. The effect of sorting on preference for elected officials who compromise 
 
Would you prefer a ___ who sticks to his or her principles 
no matter what, or who compromises to get things done? 
 
 Representative in U.S. Congress U.S. President 
 Left Right Left Right 
Sorting  0.85 -0.80*  0.22 -0.79* 
 (0.55) (0.42) (0.48) (0.42) 
Political knowledge   1.06* -0.01  0.73*  0.39 
 (0.51) (0.41) (0.45) (0.41) 
News consumption  0.06  0.12**  0.02  0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education  0.58**  0.19  0.36*  0.12 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Religious ID: 
Evangelical   0.93 -1.21**  0.35 -1.15** 
 (0.57) (0.30) (0.49) (0.29) 
Religious ID: Secular  0.69  0.30  0.00 -0.99 
 (1.15) (1.64) (0.00) (1.52) 
Religious ID: Liberal -0.35  3.61** -0.50  0.77 
 (0.45) (1.23) (0.42) (1.29) 
Moral values -0.14 -0.22** -0.01 -0.17* 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Tea Party Member  0.00 -0.12  0.46 -0.42 
 (0.00) (0.37) (1.60) (0.37) 
White   0.84*  0.36  1.06**  0.64 
 (0.36) (0.38) (0.32) (0.38) 
Black   0.99  0.00  1.15*  0.00 
 (0.51) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) 
Male  0.02 -0.14  0.21 -0.09 
 (0.29) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) 
Constant -1.83**  0.23 -1.45* -0.03 
 (0.62) (0.59) (0.56) (0.59) 
N   548  535  543  535 
 
Source: 2012 ANES Evaluations of Government Survey 







Curiously, the split-models also indicate that the effects of certain control variables 
contrast across those persons with left- and right-leaning identities. Respondents who 
belong to left-leaning groups with higher levels of political knowledge and education are 
17 and 28 percentage points more likely to value compromise, while evangelicals 
belonging to right-leaning groups are about 11 points more likely to prefer resolute and 
uncompromising elected officials. For those respondents that strongly link their moral 
values to issues of personal import, the likelihood of valuing an elected official who will 
compromise decreases modestly by about 5 percentage points.  
The evidence presented in these analyses indicates that identity sorting exerts a 
textured effect on individuals’ orientations toward compromise as a social good.94 
However, when it comes to the practical business of politics—that is, when individuals are 
actually required to acknowledge the extent to which they are willing to forego resources 
to achieve their preferred political goals—do we observe that the contours of this effect 
persist? In effect, no. 
Turning to the analyses presented in Table 6.2, I explore a unique question within 
the Pew PPT survey that asks individuals just how much they think different groups should 
compromise when bargaining. By transforming values on this item so that low values (0) 
reflect that neither side should receive a disproportionate amount of demands when 
working toward solutions to important policy issues and high values (50) a preference for 
one side to receive all of their demands, we are left with a variable that conveys the amount 
of group-bias in policymaking preferences. Beginning first with the full sample, we see 
that identity sorting is positively related to group biases. As individuals’ partisan and 
ideological identities converge, they are more likely to believe that their in-group should 





                                                          
94 In the Appendix, I provide a supplementary analysis of a sample collected from 
Amazon’s mTurk worker pool that controls for additional covariates like out-party fear, 
out-party affect, need for cognition, and personality traits associated with orientations 
toward compromise. The results are robust: even controlling for these additional 











sample  Left Right 
 Full 
sample 
Sorting    16.84**  23.42**  9.96**   
 
18.31**  
 (2.82) (3.72) (3.50)   (7.02)   
Values (quartiles)  0.50  0.04  0.28     0.63    
 (0.57) (0.84) (0.86)   (0.78)   
Sorting x values   -----   -----   ----- -0.53   
    (2.26)   
Political interest  3.24  4.98 -0.92    3.26    
 (2.02) (3.09) (3.30)   (2.01)   
Knowledge  1.86 -0.47  4.17     1.88    
 (2.25) (3.44) (3.59)   (2.25)   
Age -1.79  3.84 -11.96*  -1.82   
 (2.83) (3.91) (4.97)   (2.83)   
Education -1.10 -1.26 -1.18   -1.09   
 (2.39) (3.41) (3.90)   (2.39)   
Black  2.22  2.61 -9.24    2.17    
 (2.49) (2.86) (5.35)   (2.49)   
White -2.63 -1.83  0.05    -2.64   
 (1.76) (2.32) (2.83)   (1.76)   
Income -1.86 -0.06 -2.70   -1.89   
 (2.01) (2.82) (3.09)   (2.01)   
Male  0.58 -0.55  3.41*    0.57    
 (1.07) (1.60) (1.48)   (1.07)   
Constant  6.82**  4.82  10.75*    6.52*   
 (2.49) (3.46) (4.23)   (2.73)   
R2  0.09  0.12  0.08     0.09    
N  1,167  617  447     1,167   
 
 
Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey 







When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most 
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?  
 
 
Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey 
Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0, which conveys neutral responses or “a 
point of compromise,” to 50, which conveys that respondent believes that their 
side should “get everything they want.” (2) Estimates derived from interaction 
model available in Appendix. 
 
Figure 6.1. The effects of sorting on compromise by type of identity 
 
 However, while we might expect those persons with right-leaning identities to 
possess greater in-group biases than those with left-leaning identities, the data reveal 
precisely the opposite pattern. As the coefficients for the split-samples indicate, persons 
with left-leaning identities are more likely to believe that their group should get all of its 
demands relative those persons with right-leaning identities. Moreover, the difference is 
statistically significant, as Figure 6.1 indicates. Transitioning from unsorted to sorted 
identities, respondents’ with left-leaning identities levels of group-bias are more than 50 
percent larger than those persons with right-leaning ones.95 
                                                          
95 Since the split-sample presentation of these coefficients does not provide for a strict 





How do we square this evidence with the results that indicate that sorting among 
those belonging to the left has no effect on abstract commitments to compromise? In light 
of this evidence, does the finding presented in Figure 6.1 mean that citizens who belong to 
left-leaning groups are disingenuous about their “true” orientations regarding compromise? 
Could it be that in spite of a generalized commitment to compromise in principle these 
citizens are secretly harboring nefarious attitudes toward working with the other political 
team?  
Not necessarily. It could be the case that there are social desirability or self-
moderation pressures at play, where those with left-leaning identities are conforming to 
group-centric pressures of appearing like good, open-minded, and democratic citizens. 
Alternatively, perhaps people with left-leaning identities do truly value compromise in the 
abstract more than their peers with right-leaning identities, but, given party-based cues 
stemming from the refusal of Congressional Republicans to work with President Obama 
on various issues ranging from the federal budget to the Affordable Care Act, those among 
the left are simply less willing to engage in balanced policy arrangements that put them at 
a disadvantage (see: Grossman and Hopkins [2015] for an expanded discussion of this 
point).  
The differential nature of this effect aside, the ubiquitous tendency to see one’s 
group “win” helps explain the general shape of this effect. Given the pressures stemming 
from the perceived potential damages related to compromise—i.e. some type of loss 
function that operates using the logic “if you give someone an inch, then they’ll take it a 
mile”—a reluctance to remain even mildly deferential to one’s opponents is not irrational. 
In the end, although there is some evidence of a stronger commitment to compromise in 
principle by members of left-leaning groups, the convergence of political identities 
produces a general reluctance to act in ways that are ultimately contrary to the best material 
and psychological interests of one’s group.  
To test whether the relationship between sorting and compromise is further 
textured by the extent to which individuals profess coherent preferences, I interact sorting 
with the measure of values-consistency. This interaction effect is analyzed in the fourth 
column in Table 2. As the coefficient estimate for this interaction indicates, the effect of 
                                                          
are drawn from an interaction term between partisan identification and sorting, available 





sorting does not vary across different levels of value-consistency (b = -0.53, SE = 2.26). 
Figure 6.2 helps ease the interpretation of this effect, portraying minimum and maximum 
levels of sorting across quartiles of values consistency.96  
As the large confidence bands indicate, the point estimates overlap considerably 
and are indistinguishable from each other. In other words, individuals who have well-sorted 
identities and possess highly-consistent values orientations are no more or less likely to 
cede resources to their political opponents than those persons with overlapping political 
identities who possess a weak grasp of how political values cohere with those identities. 
Perhaps this is unremarkable given Converse’s (1964) finding that individuals utilize group 
cues to navigate the political landscape, but the fact that such “baseless” sorting exerts a a 
similar effect on compromise relative the highly sophisticated helps explain the general 
erosion in political debate. Simply put, even if citizens are unable to think about politics in 
a sophisticated manner (i.e. most of the mass public), sorting enhances the distinctions 
between in- and out-groups, which, by extension, significantly reduces the likelihood of 
intergroup cooperation (i.e. compromise).  
 
  
                                                          
96 Supplementary analysis indicates that this transforming values consistency from the 
original range of values to quartiles does little to change the substantive shape of this non-
significant effect. Simply put, as individuals transition from low to high values on sorting, 






When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most 
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?  
 
Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey 
Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0, which conveys neutral responses or “a 
point of compromise,” to 50, which conveys that respondent believes that their 
side should “get everything they want.” (2) Estimates derived from interaction 
model available in Appendix. 
 




6.6 Summary and conclusion 
Referring to his Republican counterparts, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) once argued that 
“…with a bully, you cannot let them slap you around. Because if they slap you around 
today, they slap you 5 or 6 times tomorrow.” This type of attitude premises that interparty 
policymaking requires a type of firm irresoluteness; that, in the face of undesirable or 
suboptimal outcomes, one ought to fight tooth and nail to prevent the passage of 
undesirable policy, embodying an unwillingness to pursue what Bismarck famously termed 
“the next best” solution. This strategy has been the defining feature of Congress over the 





2017, the status of interparty cooperation continues to look bleak. “The pessimistic 
scenario,” argued one panelist in a preelection forum, “is scorched earth from day one.”97 
 Elites’ tendencies to avoid compromise are not wholly divorced from the practical 
preferences of the American mass public—preferences which are exacerbated by the 
ongoing sorting of citizens’ political identities. For those among the right, such sorting 
drastically reduces commitments to compromise as a normative good.98 And, while 
Democrats fare slightly better in the positivity of their commitment to the ideal of 
compromise, in practice, the convergence between their partisan and ideological identities 
significantly reduces their willingness to cede resources to their political opponents. When 
push-comes-to-shove, group members with overlapping identities are all more likely to 
eschew even distributions of deference in the bargaining process.  
This disconnect between a commitment to compromise in principle and a general 
resistance to compromise in practice can be explained by some of the limitations to 
rationality that economists and psychologists observe. Beginning with the notion that the 
incentive, much less capacity, to obtain information is limited, people are generally poor 
at deciphering the implications or calculating the consequences of their choices. Combined 
with the finding that individuals do not neatly rank their goals (Winter and Mouritzen, 
2001) and tend toward ambivalence (e.g. Zaller, 1992), a person faced with making a 
generalized judgment about the value of compromise as a social good is likely to divorce 
the meaning of this abstract democratic value from the implications of what compromise 
means in practice.   
Perhaps most troubling, however, is that sorting exerts this effect on compromise 
independent of respondent sophistication—cross-pressures, or discordant values that ought 
                                                          
97 The remarks came from a panel hosted by the Institute of International Finance in 
Washington, D.C. (see: www.marketwatch.com/story/scorched-earth-might-be-all-thats-
left-in-washington-after-this-election-2016-10-08).  
98 In part, this finding can be explained by virtue of Republicans’ highly confrontational 
approach to governance that maximizes political conflict between Democrats and the 
GOP’s tendency to expunge moderates and party apostates. Yet there are also practical, 
philosophical reasons for why those among the “right” might be less likely to acquiesce to 
compromise than those on the “left.” If the underlying tension between these groups is 
related to the role of the state, then any individual compromise means inevitably 
contributing to the expansion of the state. In that case, it may be highly rational for those 





to destabilize goal-directed behaviors (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954), have 
virtually no effect on the relationship between identity convergence and orientations towar 
practical instances of compromise. This does not bode well for the future of inter-party 
exchange. Given the increase in sorting over time (Levendusky, 2009; Davis and Dunaway, 
2016), it is highly unlikely that Americans will come together to broker bipartisan solutions 
to the major issues of the day. Future research should continue to probe the nature of these 
attitudes and under what conditions even the highly-sorted are willing to pursue policy that 






Chapter 7: Sorting and Electoral Choice 
 
The notion that elections are decided by voters carefully weighing competing 
candidates’ stands on major issues reflects a strong faith in American political 
culture that citizens can control their government from the voting booth. We call 
it the “folk theory” of democracy…But that ideal makes sense, descriptively and 
normatively, only if citizens understand politics in terms of issues and ideologies 
and use their votes to convey clear policy signals that then determine the course 
of public policy. 
Achen and Bartels, The New York Times99 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Traditional models of elections presume that citizens’ preferences and candidates’ 
platforms can be arrayed in common ideological space (Downs, 1957). Bafumi and Herron 
(2010, p. 521), write “If we conceptualize legislators as having ideal points that drive their 
roll call voting choices, then we should think similarly about voters…[these] ideal points 
can be compared in a proximate sense.” As it relates to the vote choice, this logic demands 
that: 1) As candidates take liberal or conservative stances, voters presumably translate 
those messages into ideological space, which, 2) they navigate using some sort of utility 
maximization function whereby they select candidates according to the benefits they derive 
from their choice.  
Yet, the manner in which prospective voters conceptualize their preferences within 
ideological space, much less how they understand where candidates fit within this 
unidimensional portrayal of politics, is a matter of some debate (e.g. Lewis and King, 
1999).  At their core, these questions trouble the selection rules that voters allegedly use in 
translating their ideological preferences into vote choice, the subject of enduring debate 
between scholars advocating proximity (e.g. Downs, 1957; Grofman, 2004) and directional 
theories of voting (e.g. Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). While a growing body of 
research attempts to resolve these seemingly incompatible approaches to candidate 
selection (e.g. Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008; Claassen, 2009), these competing theories 
share an important theoretical and, by extension, empirical foundation in that this research 
uniformly relies on citizens’ evaluations of both their own and candidates’ policy 







preferences—thereby effectively divorcing the role of symbolic ideology from candidate 
selection.100 
 In this chapter, I revisit the spatial logic of vote choice to explore 1) how identity-
based sorting affects prospective voters’ impression of shared ideological proximity with 
political candidates, and 2) how this sorting, in turn, affects individuals’ electoral choices 
vis-à-vis issue-based proximity. I uncover little evidence that sorting biases how 
individuals think about candidate positioning within ideological space. However, I find 
that sorting exerts a curious effect on choice: while high levels of overlap between political 
identities increases the likelihood that individuals will choose the candidate that they 
perceive best resembles their ideological prototype, sorting actually decreases the 
likelihood that individuals will select the candidate whose objective ideological character 
is closest to their own policy preferences. In effect, then, identity sorting pushes voters to 
the ideological “extremes,” even when the distribution of their policy preferences reveals 
that they are better matched to more “moderate” candidates. 
Applying these insights to real instances of vote choice, I use the 2008 ANES 
Time-Series survey to test whether policy proximity with an in-party candidate or sorting 
are stronger predictors of casting an in-party vote for president. I show that, while policy 
proximity shapes partisan defection, even modest levels of identity-based sorting are 
sufficient to motivate group-conforming behavior. In other words, cross-pressures among 
one’s political identities generate greater instability in behavior than a poorly-matched 
system of attitudes.   
In part, these findings not only offer insight into why sorted voters are less likely 
to split their ballots between candidates of opposing parties (e.g. Davis and Mason, 2016), 
but help resolve some of the tension in the debate over whether voters utilize directional or 
proximity selection criteria. Simply put, identity sorting biases an individual’s 
understanding of ideological space in such a way that a more extreme candidate is favored 
                                                          
100 A recent working paper by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (n.d.) is emblematic of this 
point: the authors show that symbolic ideology more or less tracks with mean ideal points 
generated from policy positions. Yet, whether or not symbolic ideology functions in a 
predictive manner similar to policy-based ideology is something of an open question. 
Given the evidence presented in previous chapters that shows these constructs exert 






over other, more issue-proximate candidates, shifting citizens from proximity to directional 
voters—effectively decoupling policy considerations from the vote choice. In turn, sorted 
voters may contribute to polarized legislative politics: while the average citizen often 
possesses a mixture of countervailing views, identity sorting pushes potential voters to act 
in ways that run counter to the heterogeneity (and even moderation) that characterizes those 
persons’ attitudes. In this way, the vote choice of highly-sorted voters satisfies their strong 
emotional ties to their political groups by casting votes for consistent ideologues. 
 
 
7.2 Preferences and evaluations within spatial politics 
The spatial theory of elections begins with the premise that candidates’ policy positions 
and voters’ policy preferences can be ordered within a common, unidimensional left-right 
continuum (Downs, 1957). Consider, for the purpose of illustration, the matter of income 
taxes. When conceptualizing how individuals approach this issue, it is common to 
dichotomize the responses to tax policy into whether individuals believe that increasing 
taxes on certain categories of income is an appropriate method of raising government 
funds—what is traditionally considered a “liberal” approach—or whether increasing such 
taxes is an objectionable action—what is commonly termed a “conservative” approach. 
Thus, we can measure the degree to which an individual is “liberal” or “conservative” on 
this issue (and many others) by providing a survey item that juxtaposes these two 
approaches within a numbered, but bounded continuum.  
The prevailing logic that underscores most models of vote choice assumes that the 
mathematical computation of scores assigned to a given set of many policy positions can 
be arrayed within this liberal-conservative axis for both candidates and voters (e.g. 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Rogowski, 2014; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014). 
By summing and averaging an individual’s preferences together, the resulting value 
equates to their “ideal point”—or the placement within this dimensional space that reflects 
the distilled character of their indexed preferences.101 In turn, how individuals select a 
                                                          
101 There are at least two issues with this approach, one of which I will discuss at length 
below (whether or not individuals’ latent preferences are empirically “unidimensional”) 
and the other which I will discuss here. Problematically, as recent research shows, 
computational indexing of responses treats a person with strong countervailing preferences 





candidate is related to the ordering of candidates within this space in relation to the 
prospective voter’s own ideal point. Two explanations for the subsequent vote decision 
rely on different utility maximization functions that might be applied by voters: proximity 
and directional selection rules.102  
According to the proximity model of choice, prospective voters ought to prefer 
candidates that are nearest their own placement within this left-right policy space. As 
candidates deviate from the voter’s ideal point, the likelihood that that candidate will 
pursue policy that reflects an individual’s preferences decreases, thereby rendering that 
candidate less desirable. Thus, the candidate that is closest to an individual’s preferences 
ought to receive that person’s vote (Hinich and Enelow, 1984).   
 In contrast to this approach, the directional model of voting simplifies the logic of 
selection by discretizing the choices involved into “sides.” Instead of locational proximity 
governing choice, prospective voters prefer candidates that take strong positions in the 
general direction of their preferences because these candidates are both more reliable and 
committed to the voter’s political cause or side. Thus, ideological extremity in a candidate 
maximizes the prospective voter’s utility (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Accordingly, 
voters should shun more moderate candidates and prefer, instead, extreme ones who belong 
to the voter’s “team.” 
 The common thread linking both of these approaches is that prospective voters are 
not only required to possess principled attitudes that translate into valid self-placements, 
but that prospective voters understand and evaluate information about candidates in 
                                                          
technical understanding of moderate-as-neutral (Broockman, 2016). As such, the 
prevailing stylization of ideal points can throw off some of the predictions of models that 
assume this person derives more utility from a pure moderate than a candidate that supports 
the more important of the two extreme positions that the individual holds. In that case, the 
individual might derive more utility by prioritizing one extreme issue over the other and 
casting a vote for a candidate that will at least pursue that preference, as opposed to a 
moderate candidate that will support neither extreme opinion. As Ahler and Brookman 
(unpublished manuscript, pg. 4) note, citizens are not only “less likely to support moderate 
policies than politicians,” but “[c]itizens also do not reliably prefer politicians who support 
moderate policies.”  
102 A third notable selection criteria includes discounting, where “voters discount campaign 
pledges and judge each candidate based on the policies they expect the government to adopt 





uniform ways.103 While the first requirement is difficult but perhaps not unrealistic (e.g. 
Zaller and Feldman, 1992),104 the second one is perhaps more problematic in that 
perceptions of political actors are inevitably tinged with affect related to group 
memberships.105 These assumptions present the following problem: if survey respondents 
are not supplied with continua that prima facie place candidates within policy space—
informational conditions that exhibit a troubling lack of external validity—then how do 
individuals evaluate and, ultimately, select political candidates when they are provided the 
type of simple policy information that is often transmitted in political campaigns 
advertisements?106 Do their group memberships bias their concomitant candidate 
evaluations and, in turn, shape the proximity-based “fit” of their selections? 
 
7.3 How identity sorting shapes evaluations and choice 
A growing body of research indicates that individuals are not agnostic information 
processors. Recent work shows that group memberships bias information processing 
(Nyhan and Reifler, 2010), perceptions of social groups (Alher and Sood, 2016), copartisan 
extremity (Ahler, 2014), and party placements (Chapter 4). As such, if citizens do not 
accurately, or, for that matter, reliably perceive where candidates fit within ideological 
space, then these tendencies ought to have consequences for conclusions drawn about the 
selection rules that prospective voters use to choose candidates.  
This expectation dovetails with a more general disconnect within the spatial work 
on political choice insofar as—while scholars denote that there are sincere differences 
between policy- and identity-based ideology (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Ellis and Stimson, 
                                                          
103 A tertiary concern to which I will return to later involves the linkage between policy (or 
“operational,” in the parlance of Ellis and Stimson, [2012]) and symbolic space.  
104 However, it is worth noting that the requirement that these attitudes, in turn, can be 
transposed into one-dimensional policy space is a condition that is often unmet (Feldman 
and Johnston, 2014; Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015), 
105 Indeed Lewis and King (1999, pg. 22, emphasis mine) note that “the contributors to the 
literature on directional versus proximity voting are fighing over two central political 
science issues: our understanding of a basic feature of the political world—how voters 
make decisions—and a prominat aspect of our data collection strategies—how randomly 
chosen respondents answer imprescisely worded survey questions.” 
106 At its core, this question regards how individuals both understand the relationship 
between policy-based messaging and the liberal-conservative space and, in turn, how they 
weight or translate that information into actionable decisional criteria. Studies 1 and 2 





2012)—these differences have not been fully grappled with in the stylization of electoral 
choice. For instance, do perceptions regarding policy-based fit determine vote choice? Or 
is it something about liberal-conservative identity and, by extension, the extent to which 
that identity conforms to partisanship that pushes or drives how individuals resolve the 
tension of choosing between political candidates? Put another way, are individuals rational 
economizers of instrumental preferences or do they experience candidate choice as a social 
expression of their preferences?  
In a recent working paper, Ahler and Broockman (n.d.) find that the relationship 
between policy information and candidate preference is nuanced. If citizens are a mixed-
bag of countervailing preferences, they reason, then surely their candidate preferences 
ought to follow suit. In point of fact, the opposite seems to be true: while these prospective 
voters are computationally-moderate in the sense that the combination of their issue 
preferences offsets the directionality of their policy attitudes, these citizens actually prefer 
candidates that are, on balance, extreme. Why? Their answer to this disconnect seems to 
be related to how individuals connect individual policy preferences to candidates’ policy 
stances. According to their argument, these computationally-moderate voters may actually 
prefer candidates who match a subset of their policy preferences that are otherwise 
extreme. In that case, proximity-based logic mis-estimates how those voters approach their 
choices.107  
Consider, too, the research on “correct” voting (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). This 
research is a variation on proximity voting insofar as it computes a matrix of an individual’s 
preferences and beliefs to establish their ideal political profile and contrasts it with a 
number of candidates in a laboratory conceit. If an individual selects the candidate who 
best approximates their own preferences, then the voter is assumed to have selected 
correctly. 
Absent from much of this discussion, however, is an explicit role for identity, much 
less the convergence between political identities. I expect that accounting for the 
integration of symbolic identities ought to affect the calculus of electoral choice, and, in 
                                                          
107  There is also the dimension of issue “importance.” It may be the case, for example, 
that ideal points hold less relevance for the vote choice vis-à-vis the importance of 
particular issues. Consider the one-issue abortion voter who reliably casts a vote for a 





particular, explain why voters may eschew issue-proximate candidates in favor of more 
“extreme” ones. Given that sorting narrows in-group and expands out-group boundaries, 
individuals who are highly-sorted may engage in a biased sense of who “best” represents 
their interests. In a sense, the highly sorted voter may discount proximity-based policy 
considerations and instead vote in ways that correspond to the strength of their identities. 
As such, greater sorting ought not only bias “correct” voting, if we conceive that “best” 
equates to most issue-proximate, but may generate a preference for more ideologically-
extreme candidates—in effect, decoupling policy fit from representative preferences. 
Simply put, given recent findings that highlight the expressive nature of partisanship 
(Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015), I expect that sorting—independent policy-based 
proximity—should structure electoral choice.   
 
7.4 Study 1: Candidates, policy ideal points, and sorting  
To test explore the relationship among sorting, the fit between citizens’ and candidates’ 
policy preferences, and vote choice, I developed and implemented a survey-based 
instrument that captures how people connect explicit policy information to candidate 
choice. This pilot study was fielded at a large public university in the Southern United 
States during the spring of 2016. The survey sample consists of students who were awarded 
nominal extra credit for their participation, and is younger, whiter, more affluent, and more 
educated relative the general population (as is customary with such convenience samples). 
Representativeness notwithstanding, psychology research has traditionally utilized similar 
nonprobability samples to explore decision making. In particular, Krupnikov and Levine 
(2014) demonstrate that student samples generate similar estimates to representative adult 
samples gathered using probabilistic sampling methods. 
 
7.4.1 Survey design  
Individuals were first given a set of randomly-ordered policy questions on which they were 
asked to select their preferred solution to different social and economic problems. Next, 
they answered questions about their ideological and partisan affiliation. Subjects were then 
given four vignettes in random order describing fictitious candidates running in a local 
primary race. After reading about each candidate’s issue positions, individuals were asked 





or conservative. Finally, subjects were presented with all four candidates and their policy 
descriptions, the information displayed in Table 7.1, and asked to select the candidate for 
which they felt most inclined to vote.  
 
Table 7.1. Description of candidates 
 
Candidate A 
 Government should drastically cut spending and 
balance budget. 
 Same-sex marriage and civil unions are wrong. 
 We need to fight to overturn Roe v. Wade; 
abortion should never be legal. 
 The federal government has no place in creating 
jobs; if we remove restrictions on the private 
sector, then the economy will recover. 
Candidate B 
 The government can play a role in helping 
provide jobs for ordinary Americans. 
 Civil unions are appropriate, but same-sex 
marriage is wrong.  
 We should limit abortion to only those 
instances where the life of the mother is in 
danger or in rare circumstances such as rape or 
incest. 
 The present level of government spending is 
about where it should be. I would neither 
increase nor decrease federal spending. 
 
Candidate C 
 The government may help in job creation, but the 
private sector is more important in creating jobs.  
 Marriage is a right that all people should benefit 
from. 
 Abortion should be a woman’s choice, but not 
past the third trimester. 
 We should increase federal spending, but we 
need to make sure we don’t saddle future 
generations with too much debt 
 
Candidate D 
 We should continue to greatly increase federal 
spending. 
 Individuals should have the right to marry 
whomever they choose, regardless of gender.  
 A woman’s right to choose is important. 
Abortion shouldn’t be restricted. 
 The government should provide many 
opportunities to provide work for unemployed 
Americans. 
 
Notes: Treatment order is randomly assigned; after reading through each vignette, subjects were 
asked to assess how liberal or conservative the candidate sounded. 
 
 
Table 7.1 details information about the policy positions taken by each particular 
candidate. The same four issues were included in each vignette, including government 
spending, the permissibility of same-sex marriage, regulations governing abortion, and, 
finally, the government’s role in providing jobs for the public. The particular stances within 
each given policy domain match stereotypical positions taken by real officials, and the 
numerical value associated with that position’s “objective” placement in liberal-
conservative space is denoted by the value in parentheses (this numerical information was 





or “conservative,” high values).108 Averaging the values associated with the policy 
positions together, it is possible to place each respective candidate in liberal-conservative 
ideological space. These indexed ideal points, or the objective ideology of the various 
candidates, are represented by the light-grey dots in Figure 7.1. Candidates A and B are 
stereotypical ideologues insofar as their policy positions are uniformly extreme and 
correctly sorted. Candidates B and C are more moderate candidates who possess a mixture 




Notes: Objective placement derived from an average of the issue positions 
presented in Table 1. Perceived placement conveys the estimated liberal-
conservative placement made by respondent after reading vignette associated with 
respective candidate; solid lines represent 95 percent confidence interval bands. 
 
Figure 7.1. Objective candidate placements relative subjects’ placements 
 
7.4.2 Measures 
The solid point estimates depicted in Figure 7.1 represent perceived candidate ideology 
and convey the subjective assessments that respondents made after reading about each 
candidate’s policy positions. These estimates, bracketed by 95 percent confidence 
intervals, track reasonably well with the objective nature of the more “moderate” 
candidates. However, it is interesting to note that subjects under-estimated the extremity of 
the two more extreme candidates by modest margins, who were perceived to be both less 
liberal and conservative than their objective placements in ideological space.109 Curiously, 
                                                          
108 Admittedly, assigning numerical values is something of a subjective judgment; that said, 
respondent placements track well with this coding decision’s logic. 
109 In part this may be a function of respondents realizing that the issues presented to them 
are only a select few of many possible policies. Perhaps, then, respondents undersell their 





as Figure 7.2 illustrates, the well-sorted are not necessarily more adept or biased regarding 
these assessments. The well-sorted may be more slightly more “precise” in their estimation 
of the candidates’ ideological profiles, as indicated by the smaller confidence interval 
bands bracketing some of the estimates, but the differences between these assessments do 





Notes: Point estimates convey the liberal-conservative placement made by subject after reading 
vignette describing candidate’s issue positions. Values on y-axis range from 1 (extremely liberal) to 
7 (extremely conservative). Brackets around estimates convey 95 percent confidence interval bands. 
X-axis presents first (minimum) and fifth (maximum) quintile of sorting scores. Candidate A’s 
objective placement was at value 1; Candidate B’s objective placement in space was at value 3; 
Candidate C’s objective placement 4.25; Candidate D’s objective placement was at 7.  
 
Figure 7.2. Subjective candidate placements by subjects’ sorting 
 
Contrasting these subjective assessments with the objective ideal points of each 
respective candidate, I then created individual metrics of incorrectness of candidate 
placement. This variable conveys the absolute difference between an individual’s 





that candidate in ideological space. If individuals are systematically-biased in the manner 
in which they make these assessments, then the ability to make “more correct” assessments 
may decrease the likelihood that an individual will choose a non-proximate candidate.   
In addition to their assessments of candidate ideology, individuals were asked 
about four policy items at the outset of the questionnaire from which we can construct a 
respondent’s policy preferences. Using the traditional question format popularized by the 
American National Election Studies (and as described in Chapter 2), responses to these 
questions take the form of seven-category ordinal scales, where a liberal policy solution is 
juxtaposed with a conservative one. However, because the same-sex marriage and abortion 
items have discrete response categories (it does not necessarily make sense to juxtapose a 
pro-life and pro-choice response within this response set binary), values were assigned to 
the substantive response categories to maintain numerical parity with the seven-category 
items. The questions were as follows:  
1. Government spending. Some people think that the government should provide 
fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce 
spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale at point 1. Other people 
feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it 
means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 
7. Where would you place yourself? 
2. Government and welfare. Some people feel the government in Washington should 
see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other 
end, at point 7. Where would you place yourself? 
3. Same-sex marriage. Recently, the question of same-sex marriage has been an issue 
that has generated enormous public debate. Please select from among the following 
responses the position that best characterizes how you feel about same-sex 
marriage: Individuals should be free to marry whomever they choose (1); Civil 
unions are appropriate, but marriage benefits should not be extended to same-sex 
couples (4); Or, same-sex marriage is wrong and should be illegal (7).  
4. Abortion access. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent 
years. Please select the response that best characterizes your views on abortion: By 
law, a woman should always have access to an abortion (1); The law should permit 
abortion, but only prior to the third trimester (3); The law should permit abortion 
only in cases of rape, incest, or when a woman's life is in danger (5); Or, by law 






Next, I calculated latent ideological profiles for each subject by taking the average 
of the values associated with their responses. While the literature on mass ideology is not 
bullish on the notion that individuals possess unidimensional policy preferences (Feldman 
and Johnston, 2014; Kinder and Kalmoe, forthcoming), the literature on vote choice has 
traditionally utilized this parsimonious, one-dimensional treatment of policy preferences 
(e.g. Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; see Ahler and Broockman, n.d. for a recent 
review). To reduce concern about the tension regarding whether mass opinion is 
unidimensional, that is, whether it is empirically justifiable to arrange an individual’s 
preferences within liberal-conservative space, the four policy items used here were chosen 
for their saliency. Politicians frequently invoke these four issues during electoral 
campaigns, and it is not unreasonable to assume that individuals ought to connect these 
items to left-right space (indeed, they certainly do so for the candidate assessments). In this 
case, I find that a principal components factor analysis indicates that the four policy items 
load reasonably well onto a single factor, bolstering the justification for treating the 
combination of these preferences as a form of liberal-conservative ideology.110 
 With this information in hand, I then calculate the proximity of vote selection.  This 
variable reflects the distance between a respondent’s policy-based ideology and that of the 
candidate for which they voted. This item ranges from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate 
better or “closer” fit between candidate-respondent policy ideology. Table 7.2 reveals that 
more than half of the respondents selected the most optimal candidate—i.e. the candidate 
closest to the respondent’s own indexed ideological preferences. Roughly 30 percent of 
individuals selected the next closest candidate in space, while only about 15 percent of 
respondents selected a candidate that was third-furthest from the own policy ideal point.  
To test how ideology affects directional voting, two additional variables were 
created. First, extreme candidates are those candidates located at the two ideological poles. 
A vote for candidates A or D is coded 1, while a vote for one of the more moderate 
candidates B or C is coded 0. To test the comparative effect of policy- relative identity-
based ideology on this item, a variable capturing policy extremity is operationalized by 
                                                          
110 The four items produce an Eigenvalue of 1.87, with factor loadings of at least 0.66 for 
all items. For a small sample of undergraduate students (n = 260), this is impressive. 
However, it’s worth noting that most explorations of spatial voting take for granted the 
notion that mass policy-preferences can be categorized within liberal-conservative space 





folding the metric of policy ideology at its midpoint and taking the absolute value, where 
values of 0 (minimum) correspond to moderate attitudes and values of 4 (maximum) 
convey consistent, extreme attitudes. 
 





by policy proximity 
Percent of 
subjects 
Avg. distance between 
respondent and 
candidate ideology 
1st (best) 52.00% 0.35 
2nd 30.80% 1.31 
3rd 15.20% 2.22 
4th (worst) 2.00% 3.65 
 100.0%  
Notes: Candidate selection categories determined by taking the absolute value of 
the difference between candidate and subject policy ideology. Category best 
corresponds to scenario in which subject chose the candidate whose policy 
platform was objectively closest to the subject’s own policy preferences; 
similarly, category worst corresponds to selecting candidate whose policy 
platform is furthest from subject’s own preferences. Total subjects = 250.  
 
 
Finally, information regarding a number of control variables was collected. Male 
is coded 1 for persons identifying as a man and 0 otherwise. Respondents who identified 
as white were coded 1 and otherwise, 0. News consumption is an ordinal variable that 
ranges from 1 to 7 and conveys how many days a week a respondent watched, read, or 
listened to the news. Political knowledge is an index of correctly identifying which party 
controlled the House and Senate at the time of the survey, in addition to correctly 
identifying the political branch that appoints federal judges. The variable ranges from 0, 









Table 7.3. The effect of sorting on selecting the most objectively-proximate candidate  
 
 
Select most objectively- 
proximate candidate 
(low values = more 
proximate) 
Select candidate 
perceived to be closest 






Sorting   1.30** -1.05** 1.69* 
 (0.37) (0.33) (0.70) 
Policy strength / 
consistency -0.12 -0.07 0.34 
 (0.39) (0.33) (0.70) 
Sorting x policy strength ----- ------ -0.80 
   (1.07) 
Incorrectness of Cand A 
placement 0.09 0.22 0.09 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) 
Incorrectness of Cand B 
placement 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
Incorrectness of Cand C 
placement 0.05 0.15 0.06 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Incorrectness of Cand D 
placement 0.24 -0.01 0.23 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) 
Male 0.22 -0.73* 0.21 
 (0.38) (0.35) (0.37) 
White -0.29 0.19 -0.28 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) 
News consumption -0.13* 0.06 -0.13* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Political knowledge -0.30 -1.00* -0.32 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
1st cutpoint 0.19 -1.55** 0.37 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.60) 
2nd cutpoint 1.64** -0.23 1.83** 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.60) 
3rd cutpoint 3.24** 0.48 3.43** 
 (0.63) (0.53) (0.68) 
N 254 254 254 
 
Source: Sample of LSU undergrads, Spring 2016 






Beginning with the first column presented in Table 7.3, I model whether a respondent cast 
a vote for the most ideal or policy-proximate candidate. Recalling that the outcome variable 
ranges from 1, most issue-proximate, to 4, furthest candidate from the respondent’s ideal 
point, the estimates constitute log-odds ratios of the effect of a given covariate on the 
idealness of choice. The results indicate that any systematic bias in the way that individuals 
understand where candidates fit within policy space is unrelated to vote choice (the series 
of four items capturing the difference between perceived and objective candidate ideology, 
“incorrectness of candidate [a-d]”). Further, I find that consistent, strong policy 
preferences do not shape candidate selection. 
Moving to the coefficient for sorting, I find that the relationship between sorting 
and candidate selection is strong and positive. As individuals become better sorted, the 
likelihood of selecting the candidate closest to their policy preferences decreases. To 
illustrate the contours of the effect of sorting, Figure 7.3 plots point estimates for those 
persons with the weakest and strongest levels of sorting. Here, the y-axis conveys the 
probability of casting a particular vote; the optimality of that choice depicted along the x-
axis. Two observations are warranted. First, the likelihood of casting a vote for a candidate 
that is proximate to an individual’s bundle of policy preferences is modest for all 
respondents. However, those persons with weak, cross-cutting identities are more much 
likely to select candidates that are more proximate to their own policy preferences in three 
of four categories of candidate optimality.  
Interestingly, however, there is some evidence that, while policy-based fit 
decreases as sorting increases, individuals actually perceive that their candidate selections 
are the best fit to their overarching preferences. Consider Model 2 in Table 3, which models 
candidate selection based on perceived distance between a given candidate’s liberal-
conservative placement and the individual’s own ideological self-placement—in effect, the 
optimality of perceived ideological proximity. Here, the coefficient produced for the 
sorting term is actually negative and significant. As individuals become better sorted, the 
likelihood that they select a candidate that they think is closest to their own identity 
increases substantially. Thus, sorting increases the perceived liberal-conservative fit with 
a candidate even as it renders individuals less likely to select the candidate most proximate 







Notes: Y-axis conveys probability of candidate selection. X-axis values are 
candidates who, in descending order, represent best-to-worst fit between selected 
candidate’s policy profile vis-à-vis subject’s policy preferences. Vertical lines 
bracketing point estimates depict 95 percent confidence intervals. Point estimates 
for “min” and “max” are 1st and 5th quartiles of sorting, respectively. Solid red 
line is fitted marginal effect averaged across candidates.  
 
Figure 7.3. Marginal Effect of sorting on candidate selection optimality 
 
On the whole, these results indicate that higher levels of sorting predictably bias 
individuals toward “less-optimal” candidates—presumably turning the highly sorted into 
what are traditionally understood as “directional” voters.111 Further, Model 3 bears this 
conclusion out: the marginal effect of casting a vote for the candidate most proximate to 
                                                          
111 While it is tempting to ask whether this finding is normatively troubling, posing this 
question implicitly assumes that individuals ought to vote according to their aggregated 
instrumental policy preferences. If this result conveys anything, then it may be the 
realization that voters do not strictly reason using policy-based criteria to differentiate 
among candidates. Recent research, in fact, suggests that voting is a distinctly expressive 
act (e.g. Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). In that case, policy proximity is a probably a 
second-order concern. If true, then treating a voter with highly-sorted identities and mixed-





the individual’s policy-based preferences is not contingent on the interaction between 
strength / consistency of preferences and sorting. Even at minimal levels of policy-based 
consistency, identity-based sorting is sufficient to decrease the likelihood that an individual 
chooses a candidate who best-reflects their underlying policy preferences.  
 
 
7.5 Study 2: Policy proximity, sorting, and vote choice in the 2008 
presidential election 
 
Study 1 shows that, when given information regarding the policy platforms of multiple 
candidates, the highly-sorted, prospective voter tends to prefer more extreme candidates, 
even when their policy preferences convey they are matched to more moderate candidates. 
Having explored the relationship between sorting and choice in a multicandidate (primary) 
setting, I now turn to testing the insights derived from Study 1 in the context of a real-world 
election. While arranging candidates and voters in policy space and testing the comparative 
fit of vote choice is trickier in this application in that partisans reliably vote for their own 
candidate, the 2008 ANES Time-Series survey fields a number of questions suitable for 
comparing how perceived proximity to a presidential candidate and sorting affects the 
likelihood of casting an in-party vote. I expect that, while policy-based fit ought to predict 





The dependent variable in the following analyses is cast in-party vote. I take the vote choice 
variable provided by the ANES and transform it so that an individual who identifies as a 
Republican and voted for McCain is coded 1 and otherwise 0 (i.e. Obama or third-party 
vote). I then do the same for Democrats who voted for Obama, coded 1, and otherwise 0. 
Thus, any person who casts a vote for their party’s candidate, about 60 percent of all 
                                                          
112 Why in-party voting? This variable is ideal because sorting is not a “directional” 
variable; rather it is a measure of the strength / overlap between political identities. In 
effect, it is nonsensical to model choice between the two candidates as a simply a function 





respondents, is coded 1 and those persons who either voted for a third- or out-party 
candidate, coded 0. 
 To construct a measure of policy similarity with an in-party candidate, I first 
construct a measure of a respondent’s own policy ideology. To do so, I utilized responses 
to eight, seven-category policy placements. These include attitudes toward whether the 
government should financially assist minorities, provide health insurance and jobs, ought 
to prioritize environmental protections, women’s role in the home, abortion, defense 
spending, and general government spending. On each item, a liberal and conservative 
approach is juxtaposed at the values 1 and 7, respectively, with a midpoint that reflects 
some sort of moderate tradeoff between the two perspectives at the value 4. Individual 
responses are aggregated and averaged together to generate an “ideal” point in liberal-
conservative policy space.  
 Next, I construct a similar metric of policy-based ideology for the Republican 
(McCain) and Democratic (Obama) candidates. Individuals were asked where they would 
place both candidates on the same items as above. Using the condensed 3-category 
partisanship variable, I create a metric of in-party policy ideology by assigning Democratic 
identifiers the indexed Obama placements and those who identified as Republican the 
McCain placements. In-party policy similarity is generated by taking the absolute value of 
the respondent’s ideological ideal point from their ideal point of their party’s candidate. I 
then reverse-code and rescale that item so that higher values (1) convey perfect overlap 
and lower values no overlap between a respondent’s policy profile and their party’s 
perceived placement (0). Figure 7.4 illustrates the distribution of these values, and it is 
clear that most individuals perceive modest levels of policy-based similarity with their 
party’s candidate.  
  In addition to this distance-based measure of proximity, I also create a 
dichotomous variable that accounts for whether the out-party candidate’s ideological 
profile was actually closer to an individual’s policy-based ideology score. To generate this 
item, I assigned the value 1 to those partisans whose out-party candidate’s perceived 
ideology score was closer to their own score and otherwise 0. Interestingly, more than 15 
percent of respondents actually placed the out-party candidate nearer to their policy-based 








Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: X-axis conveys overlap between respondent policy-based ideology and 
perceived in-group candidate’s policy ideology, multiplied by the strength of 
both items. Value 1 conveys perfect overlap between respondent and in-party 
candidate. 
 
Figure 7.4. In-party policy similarity 
 
Political knowledge comprises correctly identifying political leaders and the party 
that controlled the House of Representatives. Respondents were asked whether they knew 
what office a stated individual held (e.g. John Roberts, in which case the correct response 
was “Chief Justice of Supreme Court”) and whether Democrats or Republicans were the 
majority party in the House. Responses are averaged into an index that ranges from 0, “no 
correct answers,” to 1, “all correct answers.”  
An individual’s level of formal education ranges from “some elementary” 
schooling, coded 1, to “advanced degree,” coded 7. News consumption is an ordinal 
variable that conveys how many days that an individual admits to watching some form of 
news on television. Respondent race is broken down into two dichotomous variables for 
white and black, where identification with a racial group is coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age 
is a continuous variable that ranges from a low of 17 years to 90 years. Finally, respondent 







Table 7.4. Effect of sorting and policy similarity on in-party vote choice 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Sorting  2.63**  0.47  2.90**   
 (0.47) (1.82) (0.55)   
In-party policy similarity  1.58**  0.87  1.56**   
 (0.53) (0.76) (0.52)   
Sorting × policy similarity -----  2.73 ----- 
  (2.30)           
Out-party candidate closest to R -1.15** -1.17** -0.87**  
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.33)   
Sorting × out-party candidate ----- ----- -1.35   
   (1.10)   
Knowledge -0.19 -0.19 -0.18   
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)   
Education  0.27**  0.27**  0.27**   
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)   
News consumption  0.10**  0.10**  0.10**   
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
White  0.21  0.19  0.18    
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)   
Black  0.77*  0.76*  0.76*   
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.31)   
Age  0.00  0.00  0.00    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Male -0.10 -0.10 -0.11   
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)   
Constant -2.51** -1.92* -2.53**  
 (0.71) (0.88) (0.71)   
N  1,172 1,172 1,172   
 
Source: 2008 American National Election Studies 
Notes: Dependent variable is whether or not respondent cast vote for in-party candidate (i.e. 







7.5.2 Results  
Table 7.4 depicts the results of three analyses, which model a preference for an in-party 
candidate as a function of sorting, in-party policy similarity, whether an out-party candidate 
was more issue-proximate to a respondent, and a series of controls. Beginning with Model 
1, the coefficient for the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote is positive and large 
in magnitude. As individuals’ partisan and ideological identities converge, the likelihood 
of casting a vote for an out-party candidate decreases, binding prospective voters to their 
group’s presidential candidate. Yet, while sorting removes the cross-pressures that 
destabilize goal-directed behaviors (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Davis 





Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Values on y-axis convey probability of casting vote for in-party candidate. Dotted lines 
represent 95 percent confidence interval bands. 
 
Figure 7.5. Effect of sorting on probability of selecting in-party candidate 
 
To demonstrate the contours of the effect of sorting on choice, Panel A in Figure 
7.5 illustrates the probability of casting an in-party vote at different level s of identity 
sorting. For those individuals who score near the minimum values on identity sorting (e.g. 
respondents who identify as a weak Democrat / weak conservative), the likelihood of 





particular candidate from the party with which they nominally associate are weak enough 
to allow for defection. Transitioning to modest levels of identity sorting at the value 0.5 
(e.g. respondents who identify as Republican / weak conservative), some of these cross-
pressures disappear. Here, the probability of casting an in-party vote increases 
tremendously to about 85 percent—a change in roughly 30 percentage points. Even a 
modest increase in sorting, then, is enough to bind these individuals to their groups’ 
candidate.  
Consider, however, the difference in predicted in-party voting between a 
Republican identifier with a weak conservative identity (moderate sorting) and a strong 
Republican who identifies as extremely conservative (maximum sorting). The predicted 
change in the likelihood of casting an in-party vote over this range of values is roughly 60 
percent less than the change in in-party voting between minimum and moderate levels of 
sorting. Two conclusions are warranted. First, low levels of identity convergence are 
related to behavioral instability. When individuals are modestly attached to one group, but 
are pulled in a competing direction by another, they are less likely to behave in ways that 
are consistent with either identity. However, these results indicate that it takes only the 
most minimal of changes in sorting to shift citizens toward engaging in goal-directed 
behaviors. Thus, moderate levels of overlap between consistent identities are sufficient to 
generate behavioral conformity with one’s group (e.g. in-party voting).  
 Moving next to the effect of in-party similarity on casting an in-party vote, the 
coefficient entry for this variable is positive and moderately strong. This coefficient 
indicates that when individuals perceive that their policy preferences are near to the in-
party candidate, the likelihood of casting an in-party vote increases. However, when we 
translate these estimates into predicted probabilities of casting an in-party vote, a caveat is 
warranted. Note that, in Panel B in Figure 7.5, the confidence interval bands for the effect 
of in-party policy similarity on vote choice are extremely wide. Recalling that this variable 
ranges from values 0 to 1, it is difficult to tell whether or not minimal levels of policy 
similarity (0.0) are distinguishable from modest ones (0.5). In fact, it seems that the effect 
of policy similarity on in-party vote choice is only appreciably distinct at the upper range 
of values (0.75 to 1.0).  
 The final covariate of interest in this first model is the item that captures whether 





This dichotomous variable takes the value 1 when an individual’s policy preferences are 
closer to the perceived policy placement of the out-party candidate. As expected, the 
coefficient associated with this variable is both negative and significant. Individuals who 
are closer in proximity to the out-party candidate are about 22 percentage points less likely 
to cast an in-party vote. While the magnitude of this effect is not as large as the coefficient 
for sorting, this finding indicates that attitudinal cross-pressures do nevertheless play a role 
in choice by reducing the propensity that a person who perceives that an alternative is closer 
to their own bundle of policy preferences.  
In light of the latter two findings, a natural extension of this modeling is to inquire 
into whether or not the effect of sorting on choice is conditional on these two variables. 
Specifically, do the effects of sorting on casting a vote for an in-party candidate vary as a 
function of the extent to which a person is proximate to their party’s candidate? Put another 
way, do attitudinal cross-pressures reduce the binding nature of identity sorting?  
 Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 analyze vote choice accounting for interaction terms 
that test for these relationships. Beginning with Model 2, the coefficient representing the 
interaction term between sorting and in-party policy similarity is large and robust, but 
indistinguishable from zero. In Figure 7.6, I illustrate this shape of this effect. Here, the 
point estimates convey the marginal effect of changing from minimum to maximum values 
on the policy-similarity item at varying levels of identity sorting. The grey shaded areas 
indicate the 95 percent confidence interval bands surrounding these estimates, which 
completely envelop the threshold of 0 (indicating the statistical insignificance of this effect. 
Simply, the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote does not vary as individuals become 








Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series 
Notes: Dotted line conveys difference between minimum and maximum levels 
of policy similarity on probability of casting vote for in-party candidate at 
varying levels of sorting. Shaded grey area conveys 95 percent confidence 
interval.  
Figure 7.6. The marignal effect of low- relative high-policy similarty 
with in-party candidate 
 
 
Similarly, in Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term between sorting and 
proximity to an out-party candidate also fails to reach conventional levels of significance. 
In this case, the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote does not vary among those 
persons who are closer or further from the out-party candidate. In practical terms, this 
implies that while an individual’s policy preferences might be closer to those of an out-
party candidate, the binding nature of sorting can overcome these attitudinal cross-
pressures. Provided that an individual’s identities are sufficiently strong and overlapping, 
the likelihood that they will cast a vote for their party’s candidate is still very high, even 
when they may be closer in ideological proximity to a different candidate.  
The prevailing logic of electoral choice stipulates that voters review candidates 
and evaluate their platforms (issues) and then select the candidate who best embodies their 
preferences. Looking at the 2008 Presidential election, I find modest evidence that 
perceived proximity to a candidate’s issue platform affects whether an individual will 





that individuals experience vote choice as a social expression of their preferences. At 
modest levels of overlap between political identities, there is a high likelihood that 
individuals will conform to the “correct” behavior of casting a vote for their in-party 
candidate. The literature on choice has traditionally assumed that issue-based cross 
pressures will perturb this goal-directed behavior. Yet I show that even when such tensions 
exist, the strength of political identities and, importantly, their interrelationship is sufficient 
to offset the negative effects of these issue-based concerns.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Much is frequently made of whether or not individuals “vote against their interests.” In a 
popular, though later criticized book What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Thomas Frank 
argues that the white working class in America, which, presumably, has a more leftward-
oriented “ideal point” than citizens of other groups, has been increasingly moved rightward 
by the Republican Party. As a result, these millions of voters are presumably voting against 
their economic interests by casting votes for Republican candidates who will undercut their 
economic wellbeing. Bartel’s (2006) pointed critique of this narrative aside, Frank’s 
argument fails to account for the power of social and political identities. Even if voters had 
policy ideal points that betrayed their material interests, they might nevertheless vote in 
line with their preferences insofar as electoral choice is a social or expressive behavior. 
When individuals sufficiently feel like a part of a political group—when their partisan and 
ideological identities converge—then they are acting in a rational manner by satisfying or 
conforming to these group goals. Indeed, this point is complimented by work on “correct 
voting” (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997), which explores whether or not individuals make 
decisions that best-reflect their “true” or latent preferences.  
This question has again sprung forth recently. In the latest iteration of this scenario, 
the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump to the United States Presidency was met with 
widespread confusion. If Donald Trump flouted the rule of law, undermined the desirability 
of a free press, attacked women and minorities, railed against a popular healthcare law, and 
promised to build a wall across the southern United States, then why would so many people 
who directly opposed those various platform planks ignore the implications of those polices 





The results of this chapter indicate that, while policy preferences are clearly related 
to choice, individuals do not necessarily approach elections as policy-maximizers. 
Identities don’t function as a running tally of positive and negative policy considerations. 
Instead, these group memberships compel individuals to act in ways that conform to the 
interests of their group, even when their own interests and preferences might otherwise 
push citizens to vote for candidates that more closely approximate their attitudes. At its 
core, this finding speaks to the tensions between the proximity and directional theories of 
voting. As sorting increases, it seems to be the case that individuals with strong and 
consistent identities will prefer politically extreme candidates, even when their own policy 
preferences are otherwise mixed. In effect, then, sorting appears to decouple policy-based 
proximity from the vote choice. 
On the one hand, this type of behavior is rational and expected. A rich literature in 
social psychology finds that individuals conform to group behaviors and interests even 
when their personal beliefs oppose those actions. On the other hand, the normative 
consequences of this behavior are probably a cause for concern. When individuals satisfice 
their political identities at the expense of cross-cutting issue preferences, then they may 
prefer candidates whose modus operandi is counter to many of their sincere beliefs. 
Consider the alarm conveyed by participants in a focus group of Trump voters polled by a 
well-known special interests group. “I guess I’ve been living in a bubble,” one respondent 
remarked. “If he does sign this into law [proposed healthcare restrictions], then it’s gonna 
cause more disruption in our society,” communicated another. Yet these concerns, which 
would have been raised in the pre-election period to astute observers, did not trouble these 
prospective voters.  
The power of sorted identities is significant. Even if individuals have not become 
appreciably more extreme in their attitudes over time, modest levels of sorting are 
sufficient to shift the criterion for choice from proximity to directional selection rules. As 
such, it is this linkage that may overwhelmingly responsible for pushing politics into 
uncivil and polarized territory. The politicians who are elected may not be the ones that 





Chapter 8: Conclusion: Sorted? Polarized? Who Cares, Anyways? 
 
Polarization is about more than just sorting, but sorting is polarization anyway 
Noel, Mischiefs of Faction113 
 
A core finding within social psychology research reveals that individuals struggle to 
maintain competing or disconfirming beliefs—that people often seek to reduce the mental 
stress or discomfort that possessing contradictory beliefs, ideas, and values generates. In 
other words, the average person does not deal well with cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957). Research in political science has been slower to account for this finding, but work 
shows that individuals update their evaluative preferences to conform to their political 
choices (Caplan, 2001; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009; McGregor, 2013) and resist 
information that disconfirms their prior beliefs (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). On the one hand, 
it is curious that ideologues often hold countervailing and contradictory views (Claussen, 
Tucker, and Smith, 2015; Ellis and Stimson, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, perhaps this 
inconsistency is unsurprising given the evidence that systematic constraint within citizens’ 
belief systems is low (Converse, 2000).  
 The concept of sorting, as presented in this dissertation, reflects an alternative 
approach to understanding the cohesion and consistency of individuals’ preferences and 
provides insight into two important debates within the broader study of political opinion, 
generally, and mass polarization, specifically. The first, to which I allude above, regards 
the coherency of mass opinion and turns on whether or not the relationship between an 
individuals’ beliefs and partisanship are systematically constrained. The second involves 
the extent to which Americans’ preferences have become more or less extreme over time—
whether sorting is a feature or derivative of what is colloquially called “polarization.”  
Beginning with the first sentiment, if partisanship functions as the fundamental 
lens through which individuals assess and navigate the political environment, then it 
provides a yardstick by which to gauge the consistency of public opinion without placing 
an undue informational burden on the average citizen, whose knowledge of current events 
and grasp on political minutia is poor. Low levels of political acumen notwithstanding, 






partisanship functions as a useful backdrop against which the coherency of social, 
economic, and political preferences can be judged.  
The findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 address the ongoing, and, frankly, oft-
misunderstood, debate regarding whether or not the mass public is “polarized.” If sorting 
is polarization, then this polarization is oversold in both its scope and practical effects. 
Compositionally, if we treated sorting only as a form of matching between ideology and 
partisanship, then the extent of that matching has more or less hit a ceiling—even as elite 
polarization continues to accelerate, matching among these preferences has not kept pace. 
Based on existing party sorting research, this finding is unexpected. Elite polarization may 
clarify where the parties stand, but, if individuals are unable or disinclined to understand 
what these divisions mean, then matching between partisanship and ideology predictably 
stagnates over the period of time between Levendusky’s work in The Partisan Sort and the 
2012 election.114  
The reality is that, while some amount of matching exists among issue preferences 
and sorting, the subsequent, substantive effect of that issue sorting on political behavior is 
relatively modest compared to that of identity sorting. Individuals who possess maximal 
levels of issue-based sorting are less likely to hold biased evaluations of political groups 
and engage in political participation compared to those persons with sorted identities. In 
this respect, the long-standing quest to understand the dimensionality of public opinion 
may miss the elephant in the room that such constraint is beside the point. Provided that 
individuals’ identities are sufficiently sorted, they satisfy a minimum condition of practical 
constraint: insofar as the convergence between political identities constitutes the removal 
of cross-pressures that generate instability in evaluative and behavioral outcomes.  
Second, the epigraph above is pithy, though a point of serious debate. Sorting—as 
it has been defined in the singular unifying text on the subject—is functionally treated as 
separate from polarization (Levendusky, 2009). Matching is separate from distribution. 
But sorting, as defined here, is part and parcel “polarization” in that it accounts for 
matching and extremity. If readers take one thing away from this work, then let it be this: 
matching is a minimalist treatment of the degree to which two quantities are related; a far 
more useful—theoretically, empirically, and analytically—approach is to allow sorting to 
                                                          






account for the full breadth of the underlying survey response. In that case, Noel is correct 
in his assessment that “sorting is polarization, anyway.” But be that as it may, based on the 
public opinion analyzed throughout Chapters 3 and 4, it would seem that the mass public 
is only modestly sorted, much less “polarized.” While the variance on individual survey 
items may have decreased over time, it is inaccurate to paint the mass public’s 
configuration of ideology vis-à-vis partisanship as extreme. 
Beyond exploring the compositional nature of partisan sorting, this dissertation 
also answered questions about the foundations and consequences of the identity sorting. In 
Chapter 4, I showed that the conventional wisdom regarding the foundations of sorting—
that the correlation between partisanship and ideology within the mass public is a direct 
response to elite polarization—is flawed in two important ways. First, the type of 
polarization to which individuals respond matters. Using an original experiment, I showed 
that exposure to policy-based polarization has a negligible effect on the extent to which 
individuals’ political identities converge; instead, symbolic elite cues are the primary 
antecedent of sorting. Second, because perceptions of elite cues are inherently shaped by 
group memberships, I showed that sorting is almost wholly a function of perceptions of 
out-group extremity and dissimilarity rather than perceived polarization.  
These findings support a social identity-informed theory of sorting. Although 
Greene’s (1999, 2000, 2002) pioneering work on partisanship persuasively argued that 
counting oneself a member of the Democratic or Republican Parties constitutes a form of 
social identity, this perspective has been slower to trickle into the larger behavioral milieu 
(most recently, Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe [2015]). Be that as it may, given that identity-
based sorting embodies the convergence between two social identities, these findings 
constitute much-needed evidence that ties the relationship between symbolic political 
identities to symbolic, group-based cues.   
In Chapter 5, I explore how the convergence between individuals’ partisan and 
ideological identities affects their propensity to value compromise. I find that citizens with 
sorted identities are less likely to voice normative support for compromise, with one 
important caveat: this effect is isolated among those with right- but not left-leaning 
identities. These differences disappear, however, when respondents are queried about the 
specific extent to which one’s “side” deserves greater deference in the policymaking 





resources to one’s out-group—even for those persons who lack a consistent framework of 
interconnected ideological values. In sum, this disconnect is emblematic of the tension 
between abstract principles and episodic behavior that scholars have observed regarding 
attitudes toward public goods. While individuals idealize compromise as a democratic 
value, sorting reduces one’s propensity to accommodate out-group demands.  
These findings are not particularly encouraging. A willingness to value and pursue 
compromise is necessary for the sustainability of democratic governance. The 
brinksmanship that characterizes elite communication and behavior in Congress now 
seems to characterize intergroup relations within the mass public. Sorting exacerbates 
intergroup exchange by binding individuals to their political teams. If citizens are to live 
peaceably, then sorting may undercut some of the normative barriers that prevent ill-
treatment and facilitate improving the status quo.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I show how sorting shapes vote choice. Traditional models 
of electoral choice are predicated upon parsimonious and optimistic, though perhaps 
unrealistic, assumptions regarding how citizens translate and understand complex policy 
information. While policy preferences are undoubtedly related to choice, individuals do 
not necessarily approach elections as policy-maximizers. Instead, these group 
memberships compel individuals to conceptualize choice as an expression of their 
symbolic identities. At its core, this finding speaks to the tensions between the proximity 
and directional theories of voting. As sorting increases, it seems to be the case that 
individuals with strong and consistent identities will prefer politically extreme candidates, 
even when their own policy preferences are otherwise mixed. In effect, then, sorting 
appears to decouple policy-based proximity from the vote choice.  
These findings have implications for prevailing explanations of elite polarization. 
This research presumes that, in order for the mass public to be responsible for elite 
polarization, the citizenry would need to exhibit extreme orientations that were temporally 
prior to legislative extremity. Given that the existence of mass polarization is mixed at best 
(Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006), the mass public is more or less let off the proverbial 
hook as it relates to responsibility for elite polarization (Barber and McCarty, 2013). 
However, the findings presented in Chapter 6 indicate that individuals who exhibit modest 
levels of identity sorting prefer, on balance, more extreme representatives. In other words, 





polarization by helping to elect more extreme officials, even when they possess a 
heterogeneous mix of policy preferences that are better matched to less well-sorted and 
extreme representatives.  
Moving forward, there remain questions unaddressed by this project for which 
future work might consider. First, the role that the media plays in shaping sorting within 
the campaign context is unclear. Campaign research indicates that these events boil down 
to effectively communicating information to (Drew and Weaver, 2006; Dimitrova et al., 
2014) and provoking emotional responses from prospective voters (Redlawsk, Civettini 
and Lau, 2007). While past research has shown that campaigns can have an exogenous 
effect on partisanship (Gerber, Huber, and Washington, 2010), whether or not campaigns 
trigger convergence between political identities remains an open question. If the 
informational prerequisites of identity sorting are relatively minor, however, then we ought 
to see greater convergence between political identities throughout the course of a 
campaign. 
So, too, is information-gathering behavior’s relationship to sorting unclear. 
Arceneaux and Johnson’s (2013) work demonstrates that a media-rich environment 
complicates how individuals access information germane to political evaluations and 
decision-making. While traditional (Sunstein, 2001) and social media (Conover et. al., 
2012) usage are related to increased polarization, past research on sorting has not 
developed a cohesive framework for understanding how iterative exposure to these news 
sources affect sorting. Davis and Dunaway (2016) find that the raw availability of media 
has only a minor effect on sorting in the aggregate, but future work would do well to 
examine the microfoundations of the usage of media vis-à-vis sorting.   
Third, the emotional (affective) and cognitive foundations of sorting have not been 
sufficiently examined. Consider the large literature that links emotions to information-
seeking behavior. Within the Affective Intelligence literature (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, and 
Mackuen, 2000), fear plays a special role in motivating an active search for information 
and, potentially, a reconsideration of one’s prior beliefs. In this vein, fearful citizens may, 
in turn, be more likely to match their ideological preferences to their partisan ones in 
response to such anxiety. If anxiety is resolved by assuaging one’s doubts—and, 
importantly, if individuals are fundamentally motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance 





likely to exhibit greater comity between their ideological and partisan preferences. Future 
research on sorting should account for the role of such emotions.  
 These extensions notwithstanding, this dissertation argues for greater theoretical 
and empirical precision in understanding the convergence between ideology and 
partisanship within the mass public. In particular, the relationship between liberal-
conservative and partisan identification is a dance that has significant consequences for the 
character of the larger party system. Given the negative repercussions that well-matched 
and strong political identities generate—and an incentive structure that trades on this 
symbolic, but simple information—campaigns and political leaders alike are faced with a 
perverse incentive to play upon these psychological group attachments. Ultimately, 
understanding the compositional structure of this facet of sorting provides insight into why 
American political discourse has become increasingly uncivil and intemperate despite 
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Appendix A – Chapter 4 
 
1 Description of controls  
The analyses in Chapter 3 employ a number of controls. White and Black respondents are 
coded 1 and otherwise 0. Male is coded 1 for a respondent who identifies as a man and 0 
for respondents who identify as a woman. Respondents residing in states that comprise the 
Old South, or those persons living in states that were a part of the original Confederacy, 
are coded 1 and otherwise 0. 
Education is coded differently for the CANES Time-Series than it is for the 
standalone 2012 ANES Time-Series survey. In the CANES, education is coded as a six-
part item that ranges from 0, “some elementary education” to 1 “graduate degree.” In the 
2012 iteration, education is measured using a finer-grade instrument that ranges from the 
grade that a respondent finished all the way through earning a doctorate degree. This 
generates sixteen separate categories, which are rescaled to range from 0 to 1.  
Political interest is measured as a three-category item in the CANES, where 
individuals are asked how much they are interested in elections. Respondents who reply 
“not much interested” are coded 0, while those who are “somewhat” and “very much 
interested” are coded 0.5 and 1.0, respectively. In the 2012 CANES Time-Series survey, 
individuals are asked how often they pay attention to politics and elections. Reponses take 
one of five categories that vary from “Never,” coded 0, to “Always,” coded 1.  
Finally, political knowledge is operationalized in the CANES as whether a 
respondent correctly identifies the majority party in the House of Representatives, coded 
1, and otherwise, coded 0. In the 2012 ANES Time-Series survey, knowledge is 
operationalized as an index of whether a respondent correctly identifies the majority party 
in the House, the Vice President, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Respondents 
who offer no correct answers are coded 0, while correctly identifying all three items yields 
a score of 1.115  
  
                                                          
115 The reason for different political knowledge items is related to the absence of common 





Appendix B – Chapter 5 
1 Study 1 measurement details 
 










      
Conditions      
Symbolic – avg polarization 194 ----- ----- 0 1 
Policy – avg polarization 182 ----- ----- 0 1 
Symbolic – distribution 
polarization 178 ----- ----- 0 1 
Policy – distribution polarization 202 ----- ----- 0 1 
Symbolic – text polar (no graphic) 190 ----- ----- 0 1 
Control condition 156 ----- ----- 0 1 
 
Controls      
White 1102 0.784029 0.411681 0 1 
Black  1102 0.048094 0.214063 0 1 
Age 1099 36.71156 12.83805 18 100 
Education 1100 3.549091 0.875482 1 5 
Male 1078 0.512987 0.500063 0 1 
Income      
Internet  1100 5.607273 3.040572 1 12 
Knowledge  1102 0.647913 0.477838 0 1 
News consumption (frequency)  1102 0.533424 0.235632 0 1 
      













Notes: Higher rates of sorting are observed in the mTurk sample relative 
what we would expect in a more demographically-representative sample 
(the sample here is disproportionately young, educated, and politically 
knowledgeable, all of which are related to increased propensities of 
sorting). Still, this does not present a problem for the task at hand, per se, 
because we are only interested in relative sorting rates across conditions 
and whether exposure to elite cues affects sorting. That we actually 
observe more sorting, in general, makes observing treatment effects 
slightly more difficult given the higher baseline rate of sorting.  



























Table B2. Partisan-ideological sorting as a function of elite cues (Study 1) 
Conditions b s.e. 
Symbolic – avg polarization 0.064 0.038 
Policy – avg polarization -0.010 0.040 
Symbolic – distribution polarization 0.013 0.040 
Policy – distribution polarization -0.002 0.039 
Symbolic – text polar (no graphic) 0.061 0.039 
Controls   
White 0.065 0.029 
Black  0.095 0.061 
Age -0.001 0.001 
Education 0.018 0.013 
Male 0.086 0.022 
Income  0.001 0.004 
Internet  -0.038 0.024 
Knowledge  0.072 0.040 
News consumption (frequency) 0.013 0.005 
Constant 0.223 0.072 
Notes: Analyses use robust standard errors; italicized coefficients / standard errors 
















Notes: Marginal effect estimates correspond to Table A2.  































2 Study 2 measurement details 
 










      
Dependent variable      
Partisan-ideological sorting 28892 0.248506 0.230018 0 1 
      
Symbolic placements      
Perceived party differences 29621 0.660152 0.207602 0 1 
In-party ideological extremity 27127 0.632396 0.233434 0 1 
Out-party ideological extremity 26758 0.698697 0.253707 0 1 
In-party ideological similarity 23382 0.811806 0.172437 0 1 
Out-party ideological 
dissimilarity 23123 0.435124 0.254177 0 1 
      
Policy-based placements      
Perceived policy differences 31627 0.563603 0.139762 0 1 
In-party policy extremity 28643 0.54956 0.181085 0 1 
Out-party policy extremity 11922 0.583276 0.19185 0 1 
In-party policy similarities 28544 0.812512 0.166 0 1 
Out-party policy dissimilarities  14369 0.292866 0.220631 0 1 
      
Controls      
White ID 55674 0.818157 0.385719 0 1 
Black ID 55674 0.112198 0.315612 0 1 
Hh Income 50338 0.472474 0.286912 0 1 
Male 55674 0.448051 0.497299 0 1 
Age  53455 45.40993 17.25246 17 99 
Old South 55674 0.276162 0.447102 0 1 
Political interest 50815 0.503093 0.377545 0 1 
Knowledge of House majority 55674 0.424292 0.494239 0 1 
Protestant ID 55674 0.60989 0.487779 0 1 
Year counter 55674 1982.409 18.07997 1948 2012 
 
Source: CANES Time-Series 







Coding information and Distribution of sorting scores 
Identity-based sorting comprises the overlap between partisan and ideological self-
placements, in addition to the strength of those identities. Specifically, we might pursue 
the following operationalization: 
 
Generate “Overlap of IDs” = | PID – IDEO| + 1     [1] 
Reverse code “Overlap” so that high values convey more overlap  [2] 
Fold PID and IDEO to create measures of “strength”    [3] 
Multiply three items together: Overlap × PID strength × IDEO strength  [4] 





Source: CANES Time-Series, 1972-2012 
Notes: Data weighted by sample weights provided by ANES 
 



































































Table B4. Sorting and group assessments (Table 2 in manuscript) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Symbolic assessments    
Perceived ideological 
differences 0.33** ----- ----- 
 (0.02)   
In-party ideological 
extremity ----- 0.17** ----- 
  (0.02)  
Out-party ideological 
extremity ----- 0.22** ----- 
  (0.04)  
In-party ideological 
similarity ----- ----- 0.17** 
   (0.03) 
Out-party ideological 
dissimilarity ----- ----- 0.65** 
   (0.03) 
Policy-based 
assessments    
Perceived policy 
differences 0.12* ----- ----- 
 (0.04)   
In-party policy extremity ----- 0.05* ----- 
  (0.02)  
Out-party policy 
extremity ----- 0.07* ----- 
  (0.03)  
In-party policy similarity ----- ----- -0.04 
   (0.02) 
Out-party policy 
dissimilarity ----- ----- 0.02 
   (0.02) 
Controls    
White 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black 0.02* -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hh income 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 





Table B4 continued… 
 (1) (4) (7) 
Age 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South -0.01** -0.00 -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Political interest 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Know House majority 0.04** 0.03** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Protestant 0.02** 0.05** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Year counter 0.00* 0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.44* -4.11** 0.62 
 (1.01) (1.23) (1.29) 
R2 0.13 0.14 0.50 
N 20,458 8,393 8,330 
 
Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series 







A closer examination of the differences of group assessments across forms of sorting 
 
The associated manuscript argues that group cues are not evenly related to identity-based sorting. 
One potential objective to the validity of the conclusions drawn from these analyses is that I have 
“moved the goal posts” by exchanging the omnibus measure of sorting employed in The Partisan 
Sort with an identity-based one. Table A5-1 replicates Levendusky’s (2009) original analyses by 
regressing his measure of “awareness of elite differences,” which aggregates policy and identity-
based cues together, on his measure of sorting. This dependent variable is a form of sorting that 1) 
aggregates policy preferences and symbolic identities together, and 2) only captures “matching” 
between and not the strength of the constituent ideology / partisanship parts. I juxtapose this 
analysis by breaking down this omnibus measure of sorting into policy- and identity-based 
components. As I would expect, the awareness of group differences is not evenly related to these 
constituent components. 
 Transitioning to the next set of analyses in Table B3, I break down these cues into their 
respective group “types” to examine how these various assessments differentially affect symbolic 
and policy sorting (the analyses in the main body of the associated manuscript do not include this 
comparative analysis). Two conclusions are immediate. First, symbolic assessments exert an 
extremely strong effect on partisan-ideological (identity) sorting, while policy-based assessments 
exert a severely muted effect. Conversely, symbolic assessments contribute little to policy-based 
sorting, while policy-based assessments are strong correlates of policy-based sorting. Combining 
these items together in an omnibus metric “group assessments,” however, totally obscures these 
differences. Clearly, the relationship of group assessments vis-à-vis sorting is predicated upon these 








Table B5. Comparing the effects of elite cues on different forms of sorting 
 Levendusky Issue sorting Identity sorting 
Awareness of elite 
differences (policy & 
symbolic cues) 0.33** 0.15** 0.26** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
White 0.01 -0.01* 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.06** 0.07** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hh income 0.05** -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South -0.02** -0.01 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interest 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Know House majority 0.05** 0.01** 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Protestant 0.03* 0.01 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 0.00* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -3.76* 0.29 -2.78* 
 (1.50) (0.73) (1.30) 
R2 0.12 0.08 0.12 
N 23,140 23,140 20,458 





Table B6. Disaggregating the effects of group assessments on various forms of sorting 
 Levendusky sorting Issue sorting Identity sorting 
Symbolic assessments (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Perceived polarization 0.17** ------ 0.06** ------ 0.17** ------ 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
In-party similarity ------ 0.21** ------ 0.10** ------ 0.17** 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Out-party dissimilarity ------ 0.36** ------ 0.14** ------ 0.65** 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Policy assessments       
Perceived policy differences  0.16* ------ 0.11** ------ 0.06* ------ 
 (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.02)  
In-party similarity ------ -0.10 ------ -0.21** ------ -0.04 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Out-party dissimilarity ------ 0.48** ------ 0.39** ------ 0.02 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Controls       
White 0.01 0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.02** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Black  0.06** -0.05** 0.06** -0.03* 0.02* 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Income  0.05** 0.07** -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  0.00 0.03** -0.01** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age  -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interest  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Knows House majority 0.05** 0.02** 0.01** -0.00 0.04** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Protestant  0.03* 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Year  0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -3.70* -3.68** 0.03 -1.25* -2.21* 0.62 
 (1.33) (0.73) (0.64) (0.43) (1.02) (1.29) 
R2 0.12 0.45 0.08 0.41 0.13 0.50 
N 23,140 8,330 23,140 8,330 20,458 8,330 





Table B7. Modelling for Figure 5 
 1972 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
In-party similarity  0.03  0.07*  0.06*  0.07  0.07  0.13**  0.07*  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.05  0.15** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Out-party differences  0.52**  0.56**  0.55**  0.49**  0.59**  0.49**  0.53**  0.56**  0.58**  0.56**  0.66**  0.61** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
White -0.00  0.02 -0.04 -0.01  0.03  0.01 -0.00  0.04*  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black  0.06  0.06 -0.05  0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Income  0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.02 -0.02  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male  0.01 -0.00  0.02  0.03* -0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.00 -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00** -0.00  0.00 -0.00* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old South -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02*  0.00  0.00 -0.00  0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Interest  0.03**  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.06**  0.05**  0.03*  0.05*  0.03*  0.04**  0.07**  0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Know House majority  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.04**  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.04**  0.00 -0.00  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Protestant  0.01  0.01  0.02*  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02* -0.00  0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.02 -0.10** -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08* -0.03 -0.10** -0.00 -0.09** -0.06 -0.16** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
R2  0.44  0.44  0.41  0.38  0.43  0.39  0.40  0.42  0.45  0.43  0.53  0.51 





Table B. Modelling for Figure 5 continued…. 
 
 
1998 2000 2004 2008 2012 
In-party 
similarity 
  0.10* -0.02  0.12*    0.12**  0.21**   
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.02)   
Out-party 
differences 
  0.58**  0.55**  0.63**    0.67**  0.67**   
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.02)   
White  -0.03  0.00 -0.00   -0.02 -0.02   
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.01)   
Black  -0.05 -0.07 -0.09**  -0.06* -0.05**  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.02)   
Income   0.03 -0.08*  0.06**    0.09** -0.04**  
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.01)   
Male  -0.02 -0.01 -0.00   -0.03* -0.01   
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.01)   
Age  -0.00  0.00  0.00     0.00 -0.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)   
Old South  -0.01 -0.02  0.01    -0.00 -0.01   
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.01)   
Interest   0.04* 0.09** -0.03    0.09** -0.06**  
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.01)   
Know House 
majority 
  0.02  0.01  0.03    -0.02 -0.01   
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.01)   
Protestant  -0.00  0.03  0.04**    0.06**  0.01    
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.01)   
Constant  -0.03  0.06 -0.17**  -0.24** -0.13**  
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.03)   
R2   0.42  0.38  0.50     0.54  0.51    








Appendix C – Chapter 6 
 
Figure C1. Probability of selecting elected official who will compromise among persons 
with right-leaning identities.  
A. Representative    B. President 
 
Source: ANES Evaluations of Government Survey 












Notes: Figure depicts the significance test between low- and high-value consistency across 
gradations of sorting. Clearly, given the large overlap in the shaded area (95 percent confidence 
intervals) with the value 0, the difference between estimates at varying levels of values consistency 
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